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THE FEDERAL CRIMINAL "CODE" IS A
DISGRACE: OBSTRUCTION STATUTES AS
CASE STUDY
JULIE R. O'SULLIVAN*
Any discussion of federal penal law must begin with an important
caveat: There actually is no federal criminal "code" worthy of the name. A
criminal code is defined as "'a systematic collection, compendium, or
revision' of laws."' What the federal government has is a haphazard grab-
bag of statutes accumulated over 200 years, rather than a comprehensive,
thoughtful, and internally consistent system of criminal law. In fact, the
federal government has never had a true criminal code. The closest
Congress has come to enacting a code was its creation of Title 18 of the
United States Code in 1948.2 That "exercise, however, accomplished little
more than sweeping a host of internally-disorganized statutes containing
fragmentary coverage into a series of chapters laid out in ... alphabetical
order.",3 Readers should be cautioned, then, that my use of the term "federal
criminal code" within this Article is simply a shorthand for an
"incomprehensible, 'A random and incoherent, 5 "duplicative, ambiguous,
incomplete, and organizationally nonsensical' 6 mass of federal legislation
that carries criminal penalties.
Once this caveat is understood, I can state my (by now obvious) thesis:
The so-called federal penal "code" is a national disgrace. Let us first
understand why the public should care. Professor Herbert Wechsler, the
* Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center.
Robert H. Joost, Federal Criminal Code Reform: Is It Possible?, 1 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV.
195, 210 (1997) (quoting BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 256 (6th ed. 1990)).
2 See, e.g., id. at 202.
3 Ronald L. Gainer, Federal Criminal Code Reform: Past and Future, 2 BUFF. CRIM. L.
REv. 45, 93 (1998) [hereinafter Gainer, Federal Criminal Code Reform].
4 Ronald L. Gainer, Report to the Attorney General on Federal Criminal Code Reform, 1
CRIM. L.F. 99, 100 (1989) [hereinafter Gainer, Report to the Attorney General].
5 Gerard E. Lynch, Towards a Model Penal Code, Second (Federal?): The Challenge of
the Special Part, 2 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 297, 315 (1998).
6 Joost, supra note 1, at 195.
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prime mover behind the Model Penal Code, articulated the stakes best in a
passage worth reprinting in its entirety:
Whatever view one holds about the penal law, no one will question its importance in
society. This is the law on which men place their ultimate reliance for protection
against all the deepest injuries that human conduct can inflict on individuals and
institutions. By the same token, penal law governs the strongest force that we permit
official agencies to bring to bear on individuals. Its promise as an instrument of safety
is matched only by its power to destroy. If penal law is weak or ineffective, basic
human interests are in jeopardy. If it is harsh or arbitrary in its impact, it works a
gross injustice on those caught within its toils. The law that carries such
responsibilities should surely be as rational and just as law can be. Nowhere in the
entire legal field is more at stake for the community or for the individual.
7
In such circumstances, our failure to have in place even a modestly
coherent code makes a mockery of the United States' much-vaunted
commitments to justice, the rule of law, and human rights. And this is not
news.8 Distinguished academics, codifiers, judges, former prosecutors,
7 Herbert Wechsler, The Challenge of a Model Penal Code, 65 HARV. L. REV. 1097,
1098 (1952) [hereinafter Wechsler, The Challenge of a Model Penal Code].
8 See, e.g., Gainer, Federal Criminal Code Reform, supra note 3, passim; Joost, supra
note 1, at 196-97 ("Current title 18 contains sections that are largely duplicative, statutory
gaps that must be filled by case decisions, illogical barriers to federal prosecutions,
mandatory penalties, ambiguities, irrelevancies, and a great deal of hard-to-understand
statutory language."); Lynch, supra note 5, at 299, 315 (arguing that Congress is "the proud
possessor of the most important unreconstructed penal law in the United States," with a code
that is "incoher[ent] and random[]").
Federal criminal law unfortunately is a prime example of the accumulation approach to offenses.
It has simply accumulated new offenses for two hundred years or so, with little examination or
reformulation of existing offenses. The result is serious overlaps in coverage and irrationalities
among offense penalties, which create new possibilities for disparity in treatment and for double-
punishment for the same harm or evil.
Paul H. Robinson, Reforming the Federal Criminal Code: A Top Ten List, 1 BUFF. CRIM. L.
REV. 225, 233 (1997); Gainer, Report to the Attorney General, supra note 4, at 99 ("[The
federal penal laws are] an odd collection of two hundred years of ad hoc statutes, rather than
a unified, interrelated, comprehensive criminal code.").
"All agree that the United States ... has never before had a comprehensive, logically
organized and internally consistent penal code. . . . [T]he present Title 18 of the United
States Code [is) . . . merely an assembly of ancient and new provisions arranged
alphabetically with little regard to the content of successive chapters." Louis B. Schwartz,
Reform of the Federal Criminal Laws: Issues, Tactics, and Prospects, 41 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 1, 15 (1977).
As our statutes stand at present, they are disorganized and often accidental in their coverage, a
medley of enactment and of common law, far more important in their gloss than in their text
even in cases where the text is fairly full, a combination of the old and of the new that only
history explains.... The consequence, it seems to me, gives proper cause for deep concern.
Herbert Wechsler, A Thoughtful Code of Substantive Law, 45 J. CRiM. L. CRIMrNOLOGY &
POLICE Sci. 524, 526 (1955) [hereinafter Wechsler, A Thoughtful Code].
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defense lawyers, politicians (including a number of Presidents and
Attorneys General), 9 and others have been expressing outrage over the state
of federal criminal law for many decades. To illustrate that reality, I have
consciously chosen to exaggerate the usual law review fashion of
footnoting and quoting with abandon. By so doing, I hope to underscore
that our society's apparent disinterest in remedying this universally-
acknowledged default is doubly disgraceful.
To begin with the optimal, an effective and just system of penal laws
should be: drafted by elected representatives to be as clear and explicit as
possible so that citizens have fair notice of that which will subject them to
criminal sanction; public; accessible; comprehensive; internally consistent;
reasonably stable; rationally organized to avoid redundancy and ensure
appropriate grading of offense seriousness; prospective only in application;
and capable of uniform, nonarbitrary, and nondiscriminatory enforcement.10
No code drafted by human beings and produced by political institutions can
meet all of these criteria. What is shameful about the state of federal penal
law, however, is that none of these characteristics can be claimed by our
"code" and our elected officials have made no serious effort to correct that
glaring fact for decades. I will attempt to substantiate this proposition
generally in Part I and particularly in Part II's examination of certain federal
obstruction of justice statutes.
Although previous code reform efforts in the 1960's through the
1980's failed, they did yield something that made the deficiencies of the
substantive code more tolerable: the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines. As will
be explained at greater length in Part III, in pre-Guidelines practice, judges
had vast discretion in sentencing criminal offenders; their choice of
9 See, e.g., Gainer, Federal Criminal Code Reform, supra note 3, at 107-08 (quoting
President Nixon); id. at 110-11 (quoting Attorney General Richard Kleindienst); id. at 118-
19 (quoting Attorney General Griffin Bell); id. at 120 (discussing personal support of
President Carter and Attorney General Bell for code reform); id. at 122 (quoting President
Reagan).
10 See, e.g., LON FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW 38-39 (1964) (stating that attempts to
create and maintain a legal order may miscarry in numerous ways, including: the failure to
achieve rules at all, so that every issue must be decided on an ad hoc basis, the failure to
publicize, the abuse of retroactive legislation, a failure to make rules understandable, the
enactment of contrary rules or rules that require conduct beyond the powers of the affected
party, introducing too frequent changes in the rules, and a failure of congruence between the
rules as announced and their actual administration); Gainer, Federal Criminal Code Reform,
supra note 3, at 56 (stating that to achieve its aims, criminal laws must be adequate in their
coverage, reasonably accessible to lawyers and ordinary citizens, and understandable);
Robinson, supra note 8, at 225 ("[T]he characteristics of an effective criminal code [are]
meaningful organization, internal consistency, rationality in formulation, and
comprehensiveness in coverage .... ).
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sentence was constrained only by the statutory maximum Congress set for
the offense of conviction (e.g., 0-10 years). 1 Because prosecutors often
could choose among a variety of overlapping charges, many of which
carried different statutory maximums, prosecutors' discretionary charging
choices greatly affected the defendant's sentencing exposure. So, for
example, a prosecutor could choose a five-year count (e.g., obstruction of
justice under 18 U.S.C. § 1505) rather than a twenty-year count (e.g.,
obstruction of justice under 18 U.S.C. § 1512(c)).
In the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, Congress delegated to the U.S.
Sentencing Commission the task of making more uniform, proportional,
and rational federal sentencing through promulgation of mandatory
guidelines that directly constrained the sentencing discretion of judges.' 2
The mandatory Sentencing Guidelines provided sentencing formulas to be
applied to the facts of offenders' cases and required judges to sentence
offenders within the narrow sentencing range (e.g., 15-21 months) dictated
by those formulas absent extraordinary circumstances. The statutory
maximums still operated to cap defendants' sentencing exposure, but in
most cases the maximums were sufficiently generous that they did not
impose a significant limitation on Guidelines sentencing ranges. 13
The Sentencing Commission recognized the many deficiencies of the
code-including the power that its redundancy and irrational grading gave
prosecutors to manipulate sentencing results and thus create sentencing
disparities. The Commission attempted to address these concerns and
others by adopting a modified "real offense" sentencing system-that is, a
system where the sentence an offender received was based on the "real"
circumstances of his case, often regardless of what charge(s) the prosecutor
chose to pursue. One aspect of this "real" system was the Sentencing
Commission's decision to create its own classification system based on the
type of harm or threat posed by the offense committed by the defendant, not
on the chaotic array of statutes available or irrational statutory maximums
set by Congress. For example, the same sentencing calculus would apply to
arrive at a given sentencing range for defendants charged with either § 1505
or § 1512(c). Prosecutors' ability to choose between overlapping and
randomly graded offenses, then, often had no impact on the final sentence
the judge was required to impose. 14
Some have gone so far as to suggest that prosecutors' vast discretion in
selecting among elastic and redundant code provisions, combined with the
See, e.g., JULIE R. O'SULLIVAN, FEDERAL WHITE COLLAR CRIME 123-24 (2d ed. 2003).
12 See id. at 122-23.
13 See id. at 124.
14 See, e.g., id. at 130, 134-36.
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mandatory Sentencing Guidelines, rendered the substantive code largely
irrelevant. 15 Certainly the Guidelines shifted the critical focus and energies
of commentators and public officials from substantive law to sentencing for
decades. In 2005, however, the Supreme Court held the mandatory
Sentencing Guidelines unconstitutional in Booker v. United States.16 It
reasoned that augmentation of a defendant's sentence by mandatory judicial
determination of the "real" facts of the case at sentencing violated
defendants' jury trial rights.' 7 The Court ruled, however, that augmentation
of sentences based on judicial findings in a discretionary system did not
offend the Sixth Amendment.' 8 Accordingly, the Court decreed that,
henceforth, the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines should be considered in
formulating criminal sentences but they would be advisory only. 19
This means that, once again, judges have enormous sentencing power
because their discretion, though informed by the Guidelines, is limited only
by the applicable statutory maximum(s). Prosecutors, too, will have great
power to influence sentencing results through their choice of charge, which
sets the statutory maximum(s) and thus the effective sentencing range.
More than anything else, however, Booker means that statutory maximums
will once more be the critical limiting factor in sentencing; the code's
redundancies, internal inconsistencies, and irrational grading will once more
be highly visible and undoubtedly much criticized. The Booker Court, then,
could be said to have restored the substantive code-with all its problems-to
its former prominence. To the extent that a galvanizing event was
necessary to refocus reform efforts, Booker was it.
The first step in creating a code reform movement must be to publicize
the problem, promoting a "widespread understanding, not merely on the
part of academics carping from the sidelines, but also on the part of
practicing lawyers, judges and even political figures, that the criminal law"
of the United States is in shameful condition.20 As detailed throughout this
part of the Article, others have published extensively in service of this
mission. This Article is an attempt to illustrate the problem, both generally
(Part I) and through use of the federal statutes criminalizing non-coercive
15 See Jeffrey Standen, An Economic Perspective on Federal Criminal Law Reform, 2
BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 249, 252 (1998).
16 543 U.S. 220 (2005).
1 Id. at 245.
is Id. at 233.
'9 Id. at 245-46.
20 Gerard Lynch, Revising the Model Penal Code: Keeping It Real, I OHIO ST. J. CRIM.
L. 219, 225 (2003) [hereinafter Lynch, Revising the Model Penal Code].
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obstruction of justice (Part II). Finally, I will address at greater length the
important effect that Booker should have on reform efforts (Part II).
I. INDICTMENT OF THE FEDERAL CRIMINAL "CODE"
A. THE "CODE" IS A CHAOTIC MASS OF LAWS SO VAST AND
SPRAWLING THAT REPEATED EFFORTS TO COMPILE A COMPLETE
LISTING OF FEDERAL CRIMES HAVE COME TO NAUGHT
At the most basic level, the above-described attributes of an effective
and fair code presuppose that we should be able to identify the penal laws of
the United States. It is a shocking fact, however, that the federal "code"
contains a profusion of laws so complex and sprawling that the laws
susceptible to criminal sanction cannot even be counted.21 While a count of
3,000 federal crimes was made in about 1989,22 an ABA Task Force on the
Federalization of Criminal Law chaired by former Attorney General Edwin
Meese found this number outmoded by 1998.23 The Task Force tried to
come up with a systematic count and finally was forced to give up the
effort, concluding instead that "[s]o large is the present body of federal
criminal law that there is no conveniently accessible, complete list of
federal crimes.",24 This conclusion was endorsed in 2002 by the Heritage
Foundation and, reportedly, the Congressional Research Service (a research
arm of Congress).25 A Federalist Society study estimated in 2003 that there
21 Arriving at an accurate count of the number of federal crimes is difficult for two
reasons. First, the statutes are numerous and scattered throughout the 50 Titles of the United
States Code, federal regulations, and even rules of court. Second, compilers must determine
what counts as a crime and differentiate, where different acts are criminalized within a single
statutory section, whether that section ought to be counted as one crime or many. See, e.g.,
JOHN S. BAKER, JR., THE FEDERALIST SOC'Y FOR LAW & PUB. POLICY STUDIES, MEASURING
THE EXPLOSIVE GROWTH OF FEDERAL CRIME LEGISLATION 4-10 (2004), available at
http://www.fed-soc.org/Publications/practicegroupnewsletters/criminallaw/
crimereportfinal.pdf [hereinafter FEDERALIST SOCIETY REPORT].
22 Gainer, Report to the Attorney General, supra note 4, at 110.
23 TASK FORCE ON FEDERALIZATION OF CRIMINAL LAW, CRIMINAL JUSTICE SECTION, AM.
BAR ASS'N, THE FEDERALIZATION OF CRIMINAL LAW 9 n. 11, app. C (1998) [hereinafter ABA
TASK FORCE REPORT].
24 Id. at 9.
25 Id.; see also Union Reporting and Disclosure: Legislative Reform Proposals-
Consideration of H.R. 4054 and H.R. 4055: Hearing Before the Subcomm. On Employer-
Employee Relations of the House Comm. on Educ. And the Workplace, 107th Cong. (2002)
(testimony of Paul Rosenzweig, Senior Legal Research Fellow, Center for Legal and Judicial
Studies, the Heritage Foundation) (reporting conversations with CRS and congressional
staff, and stating that it is not possible to count all criminally-enforceable federal statutes and
regulations because of the diversity of criminal statutes and regulations and their haphazard
placement throughout the United States Code).
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26
are more than 4,000 federal crimes, some 1,200 of which are jumbled
together in Title 18, with the remainder scattered throughout the remaining
49 titles of the United States Code.27 This number, however, excludes
federal regulations that may be criminally enforced. The ABA Task Force
projected that, as of 1998, if regulations were included, the number of
criminal offense would top 10,000. 21 Other sources, however, estimated in
the mid-1990's that there were 300,000 such regulations on the books.29
As may be obvious from the above, the code is disorganized and
incoherent. And it is not a compulsion for tidiness that underlies the
screaming need for organization of federal penal statutes. Rather, as
Roscoe Pound said, "a satisfactory administration of criminal justice must
rest ultimately on a satisfactory criminal law."30  Without a system of
offenses, it is impossible to make a collection of random laws work
together 31 to serve the purposes of punishment identified by Congress: just
deserts, crime control, and (where incarceration is not an option)
rehabilitation.32 One cannot weed out the archaic sections or winnow the
code to that which truly deserves incarceration. Thus, criminal prohibitions
on knowing transportation of water hyacinths or use of aircraft to hunt wild
burros remain cheek by jowl with federal laws punishing arson and
assault.33  One cannot identify internal inconsistencies, gaps, or
redundancies in coverage-and we shall see just how important that can be
in examining the obstruction statutes, infra. For present purposes it may be
sufficient to note that so chaotic was the code that no one noticed that the
assassination of a President was not a federal offense until President
Kennedy was killed.34 Perhaps more shocking, Congress neglected to
specify the purposes of criminal punishment now reflected in 18 U.S.C. §
3553 until 1984.
Absent effective organization, one also cannot assure that offenses are
graded in terms of their relative seriousness, as reflected, among other
things, in sentencing consequences. Thus, for example, the statutory
26 FEDERALIST SOCIETY REPORT, supra note 21, at 3.
27 Gainer, Federal Criminal Code Reform, supra note 3, at 53.
28 ABA TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 23, at 10.
29 Richard J. Lazarus, Meeting the Demands of Integration in the Evolution of
Environmental Law: Reforming Environmental Criminal Law, 83 GEO. L.J. 2407, 2441-42
(1995); see also John C. Coffee, Jr., Does "Unlawful" Mean "Criminal"?: Reflections on
the Disappearing Tort/Crime Distinction in American Law, 71 B.U. L. REV. 193, 216 (1991).
30 Wechsler, A Thoughtful Code, supra note 8, at 524 (emphasis added).
31 See, e.g., Robinson, supra note 8, at 233.
32 See 18 U.S.C. § 3553 (2000); 28 U.S.C. § 994(k) (2000).
33 See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. §§ 46, 47, 81, 111.
34 See Gainer, Federal Criminal Code Reform, supra note 3, at 58.
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maximum for fleeing enforcement agents at an INS checkpoint in excess of
the speed limit,35 and possession of a depiction of animal cruelty with the
intent to mail that depiction for commercial gain36 -- five years-is the same
as the penalty prescribed for female genital mutilation of girls under
eighteen. 37  "Discriminations that distinguish minor crime from major
criminality, or otherwise have large significance for the offender's
treatment and his status in society, reflect a multitude of fine distinctions
often turning upon factors that have no discernable relation to the ends the
law should serve.
3 8
This lack of any system to the code's organization is not only rife with
the possibility of injustice but is also inarguably ineffective in combating
crime. As Ronald Gainer, a veteran of earlier code reform wars, asserts:
"the existing morass of statutory provisions and judicial decisions is so
complex, and so confusing to law enforcement officers as well as to the
public, that it could scarcely have been designed to be less efficient., 39 As
will be demonstrated in our examination of the obstruction sections,
prosecutors and judges have to fight their way through a maze of legislation
to identify the applicable code section(s) and the elements of the offense(s),
and often get it wrong. That time would be better spent pursuing and
adjudicating more cases. For example, Ronald Gainer has estimated that if
investigators, prosecutors, defense counsel, and judges could reduce by
10% the amount of time they spend wrestling with, and litigating about,
confusions in the federal code, that 10% of added time would mean that
roughly 4,000 more offenders could be prosecuted each year.40 Finally, "[a]
more efficient criminal justice system would soon be perceived by the
public to be more effective. This would promote a greater degree of
deterrence of criminal conduct, which in turn could somewhat lessen the
future caseload, and thereby hold promise of still greater efficiency and still
more deterrence."
4 1
" 18 U.S.C. § 758.
36 Id. § 48.
7 Id. § 116.
38 Wechsler, A Thoughtful Code, supra note 8, at 526.
39 Gainer, Report to the Attorney General, supra note 4, at 107; see also Joost, supra
note 1, at 197 (quoting former Attorney General William French Smith as testifying in 1981
that "[w]e have been laboring for decades under a complex and inefficient criminal justice
system-a system that has been very wasteful of existing resources") (citation omitted).
40 Gainer, Federal Criminal Code Reform, supra note 3, at 84-85; see also Joost, supra
note 1, at 215-16.
41 Gainer, Report to the Attorney General, supra note 4, at 101.
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B. THE "FEDERALIZATION" AND "OVERCRIMINALIZATION"
PHENOMENA TRANSLATE INTO FEDERAL OVERREACHING IN
AREAS OF TRADITIONAL STATE COMPETENCE AND THE
TRIVIALIZATION OF THE CRIMINAL SANCTION
The unfairness and inefficiency flowing from the code's lack of
organization is exacerbated by the overly ambitious scope of federal
legislation. First-year law students know that the Constitution contemplates
a limited role for federal criminal law, but federal officials appear to have
only a limited awareness of this constitutional fact. No doubt the breadth of
federal penal law would astound the framers. The "federalization" of
criminal law-that is, Congress' increasing penchant for making federal
crimes of offenses that traditionally were matters left to the states-has
been well documented and much lamented. The ABA Task Force on
Federalization of Criminal Law issued a report in 1998 that focused on, and
criticized, Congress' role in "federalizing" crime.42  It noted that the
impetus for the increased federal presence in law enforcement did not
appear to be one grounded on considerations of respective federal and state
competence:
New crimes are often enacted in patchwork response to newsworthy events, rather
than as part of a cohesive code developed in response to an identifiable federal need.
Observers have recognized that a crime being considered for federalization is often
"regarded as appropriately federal because it is serious and not because of any
structural incapacity to deal with the problem on the part of state and local
government." There is widespread recognition that a major reason for the
federalization trend-even when federal prosecution of these crimes may not be
necessary or effective-is that federal crime legislation is politically popular .... 43
The ABA Report focused on persuading Congress to consider more
carefully its apparent proclivity to respond to important criminal issues
through knee-jerk (or politically expedient) federalization.44  Many
observers believe, however, that this battle has been lost, and that the real
war lies elsewhere. Professor John Jeffries and Judge John Gleeson have
42 ABA TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 23.
43 Id. at 14-15 (quoting Franklin E. Zimring & Gordon Hawkins, Toward a Principled
Basis for Federal Criminal Legislation, 543 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 15, 20-21
(1996)); see also FEDERALIST SOCIETY REPORT, supra note 21, at 5 ("Congress passed many
more completely new criminal sections in all the three election years ('98, '00, and '02) than
it did in any of the nonelection years."); Paul Rosenzweig, Epilogue: Overcriminalization:
An Agenda for Change, 54 AM. U. L. REV. 809, 810 (2005).
44 One group, concerned about overcriminalization in Texas, has gone as so far as to
formulate a series of questions entitled "Analyze Before You Criminalize: A Checklist for
Legislators," to guard against further overcriminalization. See MARC LEVIN, TEX. PUB.
POLICY FOUND., NOT JUST FOR CRIMINALS: OVERCRIMINALIZATION IN THE LONE STAR STATE
6 (2005), available at http://www.texaspolicy.com/pdf/2005-04-pp-overcrim.pdf.
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argued that-like it or not-federalization of the substantive criminal law is
"largely an accomplished feat." 45  What this means is that, "[w]ith
legislation covering virtually any crime they might plausibly wish to
prosecute, federal prosecutors pick their targets and marshal their resources,
not in response to the limitations of the substantive law but according to
their own priorities and agendas." 46
Like "federalization," the federal "overcriminalization" phenomenon
has also been widely discussed.47 As Professor Erik Luna has pointed out,
this one phenomenon actually comprises a number of problems: "(1)
untenable offenses; (2) superfluous statues; (3) doctrines that overextend
culpability; (4) crimes without jurisdictional authority; (5) grossly
disproportionate punishments; and (6) excessive or pretextual enforcement
of petty violations. '48  It is almost too easy to find statutory examples:
federal criminal statutes sanction using the insignia of the "Swiss
Confederation" as a commercial label; knowingly using the character of
"Woodsy Owl" without authorization and for profit49; transporting alligator
grass across a state line; unauthorized use of the slogan "Give a hoot, don't
pollute"; wearing a postal worker's uniform in a theatrical production that
tends to discredit the postal service50 ; pretending to be a 4-H club member
with intent to defraud; and including a member of the armed forces in a
voter preference poll.5' The same sad political considerations that gave us
the federalization fashion are also are responsible for this phenomenon:
"[a]s a rule, lawmakers have a strong incentive to add new offenses and
enhanced penalties, which offer ready-made publicity stunts, but face no
countervailing political pressure to scale back the criminal justice
system. 52
"Overcriminalization" of "essentially innocuous conduct has
contributed materially to the trivialization of the concept of criminality...
-a trivialization that erodes the respect for, and hence the deterrent impact
of, the criminal law generally." 53 On a more concrete level, the effect of
45 John C. Jeffries, Jr. & Hon. John Gleeson, The Federalization of Organized Crime:
Advantages of Federal Prosecution, 46 HASTINGS L.J. 1095, 1125 (1995).
46 Id.
47 See, e.g., Ellen S. Podger, Overcriminalization: The Politics of Crime, 54 AM. U. L.
REV. 541 (2005).
48 Erik Luna, The Overcriminalization Phenomenon, 54 AM. U. L. REV. 703, 716 (2005).
49 See Joost, supra note 1, at 200 (citing 18 U.S.C. §§ 708, 71 la (1994)).
50 See id. at 206 (citing 18 U.S.C. §§ 46, 71 la, 1730).
51 See Gainer, Federal Criminal Code Reform, supra note 3, at 66 (citing 18 U.S.C. §§
916, 596).
52 Luna, supra note 48, at 718.
53 Gainer, Federal Criminal Code Reform, supra note 3, at 78.
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"overcriminalization" is primarily to empower law enforcement officials:
"[T]he more crimes on the books, the more behavior that is restricted (and
restricted in more ways), and the more punishment for a particular offense,
the more clout police and prosecutors can exercise in the criminal justice
system.
54
The "federalization" and "overcriminalization" trends show no sign of
abating. "Whatever the exact number of crimes that comprise today's
'federal criminal law,' it is clear that the amount of individual citizen
behavior now potentially subject to federal criminal control has increased in
astonishing proportions in the last few decades., 55 The ABA Task Force's
research revealed that "[m]ore than 40% of the federal criminal provisions
enacted since the Civil War have been enacted since 1970. " 56 The
Federalist Society, in its Report, noted that this "explosive" growth has
"continued unabated"; indeed, it concluded that the number of statutory
provisions susceptible to criminal enforcement had increased by one-third
since 1980.
57
C. THE "CODE" IS REDUNDANTLY REPETITIVE, THEREBY
INCREASING THE POWER OF PROSECUTORS IN CHARGING, PLEA-
BARGAINING, AND DETERMINING THE ACTUAL SCOPE OF
FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAW
One aspect of the "overcriminalization" phenomenon deserves
particular emphasis. Congress is able to legislate in such numbers and at
such a pace over what would seem to be a limited criminal subject-matter
because it repeats itself-and often. As Attorney General Griffin Bell
testified in 1977, the federal criminal law "now, in many ways, can be
described as a nonsystem or nonset of laws because there is so much
overlap." 58 To give this "overlap" meaning, numbers may help. Professor
Joost notes that "in the mid-1970s there were approximately 159 sections in
the United States Code pertaining to offenses involving false statements to
government officials, 134 pertaining to theft and fraud, 89 pertaining to
forgery and counterfeiting, and 84 pertaining to arson and property
54 Luna, supra note 48, at 722; see also William Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of
CriminalLaw, 100 MICH. L. REV. 505, 519-20, 531 (2001).
55 ABA TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 23, at 10.
56 Id. at 7 (emphasis omitted).
57 FEDERALIST SOCIETY REPORT, supra note 21, at 8.
58 Reform of the Federal Criminal Laws, Part XIII: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
Criminal Laws and Procedures of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 95th Cong. 8597 (1977)
(statement of Attorney General Griffin Bell).
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destruction. 5 9 In sum, the federal "code" had 466 sections to cover these
four crime categories. But Congress was not finished: By Ronald Gainer's
count in 1998, the "code" had grown to include 642 sections covering these
categories: 232 statutes pertaining to theft and fraud, 99 pertaining to
forgery and counterfeiting, 215 pertaining to false statements, and 96
pertaining to property destruction.60 To give a sense of how unnecessary
this is, one earlier, doomed effort at code reform consolidated these 642
sections into 19 sections, which amply covered the four crime categories at
issue.6'
The reason for the redundancies again can be traced largely to the
political desire to react to a given scandal-for example, the destruction of
Enron audit records by persons within Arthur Andersen LLP
("Andersen")-by enacting a "new" section that simply repeats existing
prohibitions (and by jacking up statutory maximum penalties to underscore
congressional resolve). Sometimes Congress creates new offenses that are
simply more specialized models of old statutes-for example, by passing
specific prohibitions on bank, health care, and securities fraud that augment
the existing general prohibitions on fraud.62 Sometimes Congress adds new
prohibitions within existing sections that are not specific to the subject-
matter of the scandal but can be claimed to be responsive to it. As we shall
see in examining certain of the obstruction statutes, these random additions
can make the rag-tag offenses on the books even more incoherent.
The redundancy of the Code, to the extent it helps anyone, helps
prosecutors. They have the ability to pick and choose among a smorgasbord
of statutes that might apply to given criminal conduct. Some of the statutes
will offer prosecutors important advantages over others-in terms of such
matters as venue, proof, evidentiary admissibility, or sentencing impact.
Often a prosecutor may choose a general statute over a statute that is more
specifically tailored to a particular context-by choosing mail fraud or the
general conspiracy statute, for example, rather than another statute that has
more complicated proof requirements. The effect of these choices is to give
prosecutors substantially greater bargaining power vis-a-vis the defense.
The code's redundancy also empower prosecutors vis-a-vis Congress.
The breadth of the penal laws subject to federal sanction all but ensures that
federal enforcement officials, despite substantial increases in funding in the
last few decades, will be unable to enforce them all. Prosecutorial choices
59 Joost, supra note 1, at 197-98.
60 Gainer, Federal Criminal Code Reform, supra note 3, at 62.
61 Id. at 103-04.
62 Compare, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1344 (2000) (bank fraud), id. § 1347 (health care fraud),
and id. § 1348 (securities fraud), with id. §§ 1341, 1343.
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regarding enforcement priorities will mean that some sections of the code
may be significantly underenforced, while a very select few sections receive
a great deal of attention. For example, according to the U.S. Sentencing
Commission, in fiscal year 2003, 37.4% of federal criminal offenders were
convicted of a small selection of drug offenses (i.e., trafficking (35.7%), use
of a communication facility (.6%), and simple possession (1.8%)).63
Immigration offenses accounted for another 21.9% of offenders and fraud
for 10.8%.64 Thus, these three fairly narrow crime categories accounted for
just over 70% of all cases pursued. Effectively, then, prosecutors could be
said to be creating their own code within a code-emphasizing drug,
immigration, and fraud cases-and nullifying congressional penal choices
in thousands of other available statutes through non-enforcement. Although
such choices arguably undermine the legislative role in crime definition,
courts cannot second-guess such choices unless (as is virtually impossible
to prove) they arise out of unconstitutional motives. 65
D. MUCH OF THE "CODE" CONSISTS OF VAGUE, OVERBROAD, OR
INTERNALLY INCONSISTENT LAWS
Congress' penchant for speaking only in very broad and vague terms
in criminal legislation may raise more far-reaching and profound issues
than does its habit-reflected in the federalization and overcriminalization
debates-of speaking often, repetitively, and over a wide range of subject-
matters. Drafting criminal statutes concededly is difficult because of an
inherent tension between, on the one hand, creating statutes sufficiently
open-ended to address new ways of committing the offense and prevent
defendants from evading liability by relying on technical "loopholes" in
very specific prohibitions, and, on the other, making criminal prohibitions
sufficiently specific to provide citizens fair notice of that which is outlawed,
avoid delegation of law-making power to judges, and constrain the charging
discretion of prosecutors. While accommodating this tension can be
challenging, it is not a challenge that federal draftsmen even appear to
recognize: Federal statutes consistently and seriously err on the side of
over-inclusiveness. In addition to being overbroad, many statutes lack
definition-that is, they are vague. In recognition of the grievous lack of
specificity in many statutes subject to criminal sanction, courts regularly
63 See, e.g., U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, 2003 SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL SENTENCING
STATISTICS fig.A, tbl.3 (2003), available at http://www.ussc.gov/ANNRPT/2003/
SBTOC03.htm.
64 Id. at fig.A.
65 See, e.g., United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456 (1996).
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add definitions, or even elements, to existing offenses to "cure" any due
process difficulties.
1. Mens Rea
One of the areas in which congressional drafting has been most
deficient is in specifying the mental element, or mens rea, necessary to
support a criminal conviction. Criminal liability is normally founded on the
concurrence of two factors, "an evil-meaning mind [and] an evil-doing
hand., 66 This is often expressed as a requirement that some degree of mens
rea (guilty mind) must attend the actus reus (guilty act or non-action where
there is a duty to act) to warrant the imposition of a criminal stigma.
Unfortunately, as Professor George Fletcher observed, "[t]here is no term
fraught with greater ambiguity than that venerable Latin phrase that haunts
Anglo-American criminal law: mens rea.
67
Part of the ambiguity is founded upon the fact that a seemingly endless
variety of terms have been used to describe the guilty mind necessary to
prove federal offenses. Federal statutes, for example, provide for more than
100 types of mens rea.68 Even those terms most frequently used in federal
legislation-"knowing" and "willful"-have, according to judges, different
meanings in different contexts; judges adjust the definitions according to
what they believe is the correct level of mens rea given the conduct at issue
and are able to do so because of congressional inaction.69 Another layer of
difficulty is attributable to the fact that Congress may impose one mens rea
requirement upon certain elements of the offense and a different level of
mens rea, or no mens rea at all, with respect to other elements. Often, the
law at issue does not specify a mens rea requirement or, far too frequently,
is ambiguous as to which elements an express intent requirement modifies.
The lack of statutory specificity regarding the applicable level of the
mens rea, and the definition of any potentially applicable mens rea, is most
troubling where Congress enacts a statute that prospectively "criminalizes"
regulations Congress has asked a federal agency to produce. This appears
to be done almost as a matter of course these days.70 In pondering the
66 Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 251 (1952).
67 GEORGE P. FLETCHER, RETHINKING CRIMINAL LAW 398 (1978).
68 William S. Laufer, Culpability and Sentencing of Corporations, 71 NEB. L. REV. 1049,
1065 (1994).
69 See, e.g., Ratzlaf v. United States, 510 U.S. 135, 141 (1994) ("'Willful,' this Court has
recognized, is a 'word of many meanings,' and 'its construction [is] often... influenced by
its context."' (quoting Spies v. United States, 317 U.S. 492, 497 (1943))).
70 See, e.g., Gainer, Federal Criminal Code Reform, supra note 3, at 72 ("Today, when a
congressional committee adopts new requirements concerning... virtually any.., regulated
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significance of this drafting default, recall that no one has yet come up with
an accurate count of the number of regulations so "criminalized," but
estimates range up to 300,000.7 1 Some of these "regulatory" crimes are
properly regarded as malum in se-wrong in and of themselves independent
of law. More often, however, the subject-matters of these regulations
concern conduct designed to achieve a regulatory end and are not
something that most of the public would know-by reference to societal
moral norms-are criminal. Most of these crimes, then, are more properly
characterized as malum prohibitum-wrong because prohibited. For
example, it unlikely that most people would know that criminal sanctions
may attach to such activities as walking a dog in a government building,
mixing two kinds of turpentine, or violating an instruction in the twenty-
two pages of OHSA regulations pertaining to construction of ladders and
scaffolding. 72
Why is this default troubling? I will once again turn to Professor
Wechsler to explain:
Criminal liability imports a condemnation, the gravest we permit ourselves to make.
To condemn when fault is absent is barbaric. It is the badge of tyranny, the plainest
illustration of injustice. Correct me if I overstate this but I do not think I do. Indeed,
we are reluctant-very properly-to condemn action as criminal merely because the
actor should have known of its offensive quality. We seek so far as possible to insist
that he really must have known. When he knew and acted nonetheless, we feel real73
confidence that we have our man.
Nonetheless, the federal courts regularly permit felony criminal
convictions, in malum prohibitum cases, to rely on a species of strict
liability. In these so-called "public welfare" cases, Congress passed statutes
that state that a "knowing violation" of the regulations can be criminally
prosecuted. The plain language might indicate that the defendant must
know that he is violating the regulation at issue. Federal courts, however,
have consistently read this language to mean, in cases where "deleterious
devices or products or obnoxious waste materials" and thus the "public
welfare" are at issue, people dealing in such materials should be on notice
that their activity is subject to regulation. Accordingly, courts have often
decided that persons are criminally culpable if they knew the nature of the
material with which they were dealing, even if they were not aware of the
activity, it routinely incorporates ...a statement that any deviation constitutes a federal
crime.").
71 See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
72 Id. at 74 (citing 29 C.F.R. §§ 1926.450-52 (1997); 41 C.F.R. §§ 101-20.311-15 (1997);
7 C.F.R. § 160.85 (1997)).
73 Wechsler, The Challenge of a Model Penal Code, supra note 7, at 528.
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regulations at issue and, if they were aware, did not know they were
violating them.74
That is, of course, unless the courts decide that this shockingly (in a
felony case) low level of mens rea would "criminalize a broad range of
otherwise innocent conduct," in which case courts pump up the mens rea
required. 75 The judgment of what constitutes "innocent" behavior is made
by judges. So, for example, the Ninth Circuit held in United States v.
Weitzenhoff that persons working in wastewater treatment plants may be
held criminally liable for discharging pollutants in excess of the permitted
amount as long as they knew (as they had to, given the nature of the
business in which they were engaged) that they were discharging pollutants
(even if that activity itself--discharging pollutants-was lawful within
permitted amounts).76 The rationale in such cases is that these individuals
know that they are dealing with a substance dangerous to human health and
thus are responsible for ensuring that their conduct conforms to legal
requirements. The Weitzenhoff court held that the defendants did not need
to be aware that they are discharging in excess of permitted amounts-that
is, they need have no knowledge regarding the actus reus of the crime and
no culpable state of mind with respect to the alleged wrongdoing. This
decision essentially made "designated felons" of anyone working in the
wastewater industry, leaving it to prosecutorial discretion to decide who in
a given plant will go to jail when unintended discharges in excess of
permitted amounts occur.
By contrast, the Supreme Court held in Staples v. United States that
semiautomatic weapons are not sufficiently dangerous to put their owners
on notice of the regulated nature of such gun ownership.77 Thus, the Court
said, for purposes of prosecuting someone for unlicensed possession of a
fully-automatic weapon, it is not sufficient that the government prove that
the defendant knew of the dangerous character of the gun he had; rather, to
avoid entrapping "innocent" owners of machineguns, the government had
to prove that the defendant knew that his semiautomatic weapon had been
converted to fully-automatic firing.78 As Staples may indicate, it is difficult
to sort out just what criteria the courts are using (aside from their own
74 See, e.g., United States v. Int'l Minerals & Chem. Corp., 402 U.S. 558 (1971); United
States v. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277 (1943); United States v. Weitzenhoff, 35 F.3d 1275 (9th
Cir. 1993) (en banc).
75 Staples v. United States, 511 U.S. 600, 610 (1994) (quoting Liparota v. United States,
471 U.S. 419, 426 (1985)).
76 35 F.3d at 1284.
17 511 U.S. at 611-12.
78 Id. at 619-20.
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personal experience and morality) in determining what they consider
"innocent" behavior worthy of an elevated mens rea.
Should courts be able to subject persons violating malum prohibitum
provisions to felony criminal sanction with only the most negligible
showing of mens rea (e.g., they knew that they were dealing with a
dangerous or deleterious device)? Professor Green identifies arguments
many of us would agree with, when he writes that "applying criminal
sanctions to morally neutral conduct is both unjust and counterproductive.
It unfairly brands defendants as criminals, weakens the moral authority of
the sanction, and ultimately renders the penalty ineffective. It also
squanders scarce enforcement resources and invites selective, and
potentially discriminatory, prosecution., 79 Whatever one might believe is
the correct answer as a matter of criminal law policy, this is a sufficiently
troubling basis for liability that courts have no business making it. The
failure of the criminal code to be specific and clear about the critical mens
rea element in these regulatory cases is, in short, simply appalling.
Judges' willingness to tinker with the mens rea applicable to criminal
offenses in the "public welfare" line of cases is anything but aberrational.
Judges often undertake to supply missing mens rea elements, fill in gaps, or
correct ambiguities through "interpretation" (some would say common
lawmaking). Sometimes they get it right, and sometimes (as I will argue
below in the obstruction context) they most assuredly don't. I do not
question their good faith in doing so, but I do question the wisdom of such
lawmaking. In any case, even were judges able effectively to patch up
specific statutory provisions, they cannot do that which is necessary: create
a small number of defined and consistent mens rea terms to be used with
care throughout the United States Code.
79 Stuart P. Green, Why It's a Crime To Tear the Tag off a Mattress: Overcriminalization
and the Moral Content of Regulatory Offenses, 46 EMORY L. 1533, 1536 (1997). Consider,
too, the following thought from Henry M. Hart, The Aims of the Criminal Law, 23 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 401, 431 n.70 (1958):
In relation to offenses of a traditional type, [the Supreme Court seems to say], we must be much
slower to dispense with a basis for genuine blameworthiness in criminal intent than in relation to
modem regulatory offenses. But it is precisely in the area of traditional crimes that the nature of
the act itself commonly gives some warning that there may be a problem about its propriety and
so affords, without more, at least some slight basis of condemnation for doing it.... In the area
of regulatory crimes, on the other hand, the moral quality of the act is often neutral; and on
occasion, the offense may consist not of any act at all, but simply of an intrinsically innocent
omission, so there is no basis for moral condemnation whatever.
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2. Offense Definition: "Honest Services" Fraud
The over breadth and lack of specificity in the criminal code is not
restricted to its mens rea provisions and to malum prohibitum offenses.
Even with respect to malum in se offenses, these same characteristics
threaten many persons who may deserve some kind of employment,
professional, or civil penalty but do not warrant incarceration. Brief
reference to any federal criminal law textbook will reveal a wealth of
excellent examples.
80
In Part II of this Article, I will try to illustrate the nature of these
problems by examining a number of statutes outlawing non-coercive
obstruction of justice. For purposes of this section, however, I would like
to focus on an example that is my personal favorite: the oft-used "honest
services" theory of mail and wire fraud. I find this particular illustration
helpful because it demonstrates the importance of specificity in statutory
definitions and of fair notice in a way that should resonate even with those
who believe that such things are unnecessary because "ordinary morality"
should suffice to keep "good" people safe from criminal prosecution. 81
"Fair notice" ceases to be a merely "academic" concern once one
recognizes that anyone could be subjected to indictment and the humiliation
and stresses of a public trial, and begin serving jail time upon conviction,
only to have some court of appeals decide that what s/he did was not, in
law, a crime. Also, these cases demonstrate the terrifying power that
overbroad or vague statutes give prosecutors. Where federal prosecutors
can make an "honest services" case against anyone under existing
"standards," no matter how generally "good" their character, a vast
potential for arbitrary, discriminatory, and unfair prosecutorial choices
inevitably follows.
Some background is necessary for the uninitiated. Two of the most
popular offenses in the criminal code are mail and wire fraud (18 U.S.C. §§
1341, 1343). These crimes are among federal prosecutors' favorites
because of their seemingly limitless malleability and their simplicity in
terms of proof. Technically, the elements of these crimes are: (1) a scheme
or artifice to defraud; and (2) a mailing or interstate wiring in furtherance of
the scheme.8 2 As the Supreme Court has pointed out, under traditional
principles, a "scheme or artifice to defraud" commonly referred to
"wronging one in his property rights by dishonest methods or schemes"-
80 In an act of shameless self-promotion, I refer readers to O'SULLIVAN, supra note 11,
passim.
81 See, e.g., Dan M. Kahan, Is Chevron Relevant to Federal Criminal Law?, 110 HARV.
L. REV. 469, 481-89 (1996) [hereinafter Kahan, Is Chevron Relevant?].
82 See, e.g., Pereira v. United States, 347 U.S. 1, 7 (1954).
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that is, to schemes in which the defendant misled another in order to secure
money or property to which he was not entitled.83
Prosecutors sought to push beyond this traditional understanding of
fraud because there was (and is) no generally-applicable federal statute
available to prosecute state and local political corruption. Accordingly,
federal prosecutors pursued state and local politicians under a creative
theory of "honest services" fraud. And courts bought it, not just when
politicians were inarguably corrupt, but also when their activities were-
though disturbing to federal prosecutors-not illegal under state or local
law. Thus, for decades prior to 1987, federal courts of appeals were
unanimous in holding that criminal "schemes or artifices to defraud" within
the meaning of the mail and wire fraud statues encompassed situations in
which public officials, or politically-active persons who had no formal
government position, deprived the citizenry of its rights to their "honest
services." But where is the "fraud" (that is, the lies, deceit, etc.) in public
corruption? The gravamen of an honest services case was not the
corruption; it was the "fraud" of failing to tell the citizenry about the
corruption or allegedly improper conduct.84  (If the public official did
disclose his alleged wrongdoing, there was no case.) The government did
not have to prove that the governmental entity or citizenry "victimized" by
this concealment lost money or property-it was sufficient that the
defendant deprived his victims of their "right to his honest services"
through his concealment of breaches of his duty.
Having met with success in pushing this theory in the public
corruption area, prosecutors and courts then expanded the scope of the
"honest services" fraud theory to employees of private companies who,
prosecutors charged and courts agreed, assumed a duty to advise their
employers of material breaches of their terms of employment and who were
criminally responsible if they failed to make appropriate disclosures. Thus,
prosecutors have "brought to justice," among others, a coach who
improperly helped players with their course work to ensure their eligibility
to play,85 a professor who helped his students plagiarize work to secure
degrees to which they might not otherwise be entitled,8 6 a lawyer who
operated under an undisclosed conflict of interest,87 and a city contractor
who did not fulfill his contractual obligation to pay his workers on a city
83 McNally v. United States, 483 U.S. 350, 358 (1987) (emphasis added) (quoting
Hammerschmidt v. United States, 265 U.S. 182, 188 (1924)).
84 United States v. Margiotta, 688 F.2d 108 (2d Cir. 1982).
85 United States v. Gray, 96 F.3d 769, 772 (5th Cir. 1996).
86 United States v. Frost, 125 F.3d 346, 353 (6th Cir. 1997) (affirming conviction).
87 United States v. Bronston, 658 F.2d 920, 922 (2d Cir. 1981) (affirming conviction).
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project at a certain pay scale.88 All of these persons were acting improperly
or unethically-and should at least be fired or pursued civilly-but are
these criminal cases? If so, anything is. It is only a slight exaggeration to
say that any public official or private employee who has an undisclosed
conflict of interest or who otherwise breached their duties to their
employers (as defined by those employers) in the vicinity of a mailbox or
interstate wire could be charged with a federal felony.
Forty-odd years after individuals started going to prison under this
theory of liability, the Supreme Court decided in McNally v. United States
that a "scheme to defraud" encompassed only efforts to deprive another of
intangible or tangible property rights.8 9 All those individuals who had been
adjudged criminals, and who had served jail time, for depriving others of an
intangible, non-property right to "honest services," were, in fact, not guilty
of any crime under the mail and wire fraud statutes. The essence of the
Supreme Court's objection to these cases was that they permitted federal
prosecutors to pursue state and local public officials for, among other
things, political patronage schemes that prosecutors may have found
offensive but that were not improper under state law. The Court concluded
that
[r]ather than construe the statute in a manner that leaves its outer boundaries
ambiguous and involves the Federal Government in setting standards of disclosure
and good government for local and state officials, we read § 1341 as limited in scope
to the protection of property rights. If Congress desires to go further, it must speak
more clearly than it has.
9°
Congress' reaction was swift and thoughtless. Rather than speaking
"more clearly" regarding what types of state and local political activity
ought to be prosecuted on the federal level, Congress created 18 U.S.C. §
1346, which states simply that, for purposes of the fraud statutes, the term
"'scheme or artifice to defraud' includes a scheme or artifice to deprive
another of the intangible right of honest services." 9' Ignoring the Supreme
Court's request for further definition of "honest services," a term never
before seen in the United States Code, Congress essentially re-delegated to
prosecutors and the judiciary responsibility for determining the contours of
88 United States v. Handakas, 286 F.3d 92, 96 (2d Cir. 2002) (overturning "honest
services" fraud conviction on vagueness grounds).
89 McNally v. United States, 483 U.S. 350, 360 (1987) ("[W]e read § 1341 as limited in
scope to property rights."); see also Carpenter v. United States, 484 U.S. 19, 25 (1987)
("McNally did not limit the scope of § 1341 to tangible as distinguished from intangible
property rights.").
90 McNally, 483 U.S. at 360.
9' 18 U.S.C. § 1346 (2000).
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the honest services prohibition.92 The legislative history indicates that
Congress gave critical definitional questions (what are honest services?) no
thought at all. Section 1346 was inserted into an otherwise unrelated
omnibus drug bill for the first time on the day that the omnibus bill was
passed, was never examined in committee, and had no contemporaneous
legislative history.
The post hoc legislative history indicates that in this section Congress
intended to overturn the Supreme Court's decision in McNally.93 What
Congress failed to consider, however, was that there was no extant, unified
concept of "honest services": The circuits were split on the meaning of
various aspects of that theory's application. What, then, were the courts to
do? As the Second Circuit explained,
[s]ome circuits have implemented § 1346 by resurrecting pre-McNally law. Thus, the
Sixth Circuit has held that "§ 1346 has restored the mail fraud statute to its pre-
McNally scope." And the Fifth Circuit, after noting that "Congress could not have
intended to bless each and every pre-McNally lower court 'honest services' opinion,"
observed that "Congress . . . has set us back on a course of defining 'honest
services'; and that Court has "turn[ed] to that task." However, one of these
approaches simply reinstates the entire, dissonant body of prior circuit precedent,
while the other invites the creation out of whole cloth of new judicial interpretations
of "honest services"--interpretations that will undoubtedly vary from circuit to
circuit. The result is "a truly extraordinary statute, in which the substantive force of
the statute varie[s] in each judicial circuit."
"Extraordinary," indeed.
Federal courts are now split every which way from Sunday on
construction of this statute.95 Why? Because read literally, this section
would make a crime of the nondisclosure of virtually every breach of any
public or private employment relationship-turning § 1346 into a "draconian
personnel regulation" that transforms private and governmental "workplace
violations into felonies. '96 As the Second Circuit has noted,
a customer who importunes an employee to allow her to use the company's telephone
access code to make an important long-distance telephone call, in the face of a written
92 See, e.g., United States v. Brumley, 116 F.3d 728, 742 (5th Cir. 1997) (en banc) (Jolly,
J., dissenting).
9' See id. at 742-45 (Jolly, J., dissenting) (discussing legislative record).
94 United States v. Handakas, 286 F.3d 92, 103 (2d Cir. 2002) (citations omitted)
(alterations in original).
95 See, e.g., O'SULLIVAN, supra note 11, at 543-83; see also United States v. Rybicki,
354 F.3d 124, 162-65 (2d Cir. 2003) [hereinafter Rybicki En Banc] (en banc) (Jacobs, J.,
dissenting).
96 United States v. Czubinski, 106 F.3d 1069, 1077 (Ist Cir. 1997); see also United
States v. Frost, 125 F.3d 346, 368 (6th Cir. 1997) ("[Section 1346's] literal terms suggest
that dishonesty by an employee, standing alone, is a crime.").
2006]
JULIE R. 0 'SULLIVAN
company policy expressly prohibiting non-employees from using the access code,
could conceivably fall within the scope of the statute if read literally. So too could an
employee's use of his company's letterhead to lend authority to a letter of complaint
mailed to the employee's landlord in disregard of the company's code of conduct
prohibiting the use of the company's letterhead for non-company business.
97
To take a more current example, all those people who use their work
email or internet connection for personal matters (assuming the connection
runs in any respect interstate) are potentially subject to up to twenty years'
imprisonment under § 1346. And in two circuits (Fourth and Seventh) but
not in another (Second), the fact that the purported employer-"victim" does
not feel victimized by this deviation from the employee manual and is
satisfied with its employee's performance would not excuse the employee
from criminal liability at the behest of a federal prosecutor eager to make a
case. As the Fourth Circuit has stated, "[s]uch issues are not decided by the
whim of the perceived victim. The perception of the victim or target of the
scheme is ultimately irrelevant"
98
Likewise, most government officials could be prosecuted under this
section for failing to disclose something that their constituents might like to
know. For example, many constituents would deem "material" government
officials' true reasons for supporting certain legislation (e.g., horse-trading,
promoting their chances for reelection, etc.) or, in the case of the executive,
for myriad decisions including everything from budget allocations to going
to war.
99
Federal courts have thus struggled to give this penal provision a
limiting construction, grafting onto the statute elements not apparent on its
face rather than throwing the vague statute back in Congress' lap, as would
be appropriate. Unfortunately, the courts disagree on the best means to
contain the reach of the statute1OO If judges cannot make sense of the
statute, neither can laymen. As Judge Jacobs, dissenting in an en banc
decision upholding § 1346 against a vagueness challenge, noted after
surveying the ever-shifting contours of the "honest services" decisions in
97 United States v. Rybicki, 287 F.3d 257, 264 (2d Cir. 2002) [hereinafter Rybicki Panel],
affd, 354 F.3d 124.
98 United States v. Bereano, Nos. 95-5312, 95-5395, 1998 LEXIS 21131, *12 (4th Cir.
Aug. 28, 1998) (unpublished opinion); see also United States v. Bryza, 522 F.2d 414, 422
(7th Cir. 1975) (holding that employee may be convicted of defrauding employer of "honest
and faithful services" even if victim took no retributive action and was satisfied with
defendant's performance). The court further stated that "the defendant's intent must be
judged by his actions, not the reaction of the mail fraud victims." Id. But see United States
v. D'Amato, 39 F.3d 1249, 1257 (2d Cir. 1994).
99 See, e.g., United States v. Margiotta, 688 F.2d 108, 139-43 (2d Cir. 1982) (Winter, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
100 See, e.g., Rybicki En Banc, 354 F.3d at 145-47.
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the Second Circuit: "How can the public be expected to know what the
statute means when the judges and prosecutors themselves do not know, or
must make it up as they go along?"'0 1
E. THE PENAL LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES MAY BE NOMINALLY
PUBLIC, BUT THEY ARE NOT "ACCESSIBLE," DO NOT PROVIDE
"FAIR NOTICE," AND INVITE ARBITRARY OR DISCRIMINATORY
ENFORCEMENT
This lack of clarity has a number of consequences. First and most
obviously, we have both a "fair notice" and an "accessibility" problem. For
example, the words of § 1346 say very little, and the prosecutorial theories
expanding the reach of the statute are certainly not clear on the statute's
face. Thus, to secure anything close to "fair notice," citizens would have to
wade through a confusing welter of courts of appeals decisions. Section
1346 is perhaps the most obvious example of this phenomenon, but it is
assuredly not alone among commonly-used federal criminal statutes.
Without reference to the-often conflicting-federal case law and,
sometimes, volumes of federal regulations, one cannot know the law.
Problems of practical accessibility are compounded by the sheer bulk
of federal criminal statutes and the random way in which they are
organized, all of which "make[s] it difficult to ferret out the applicable law
even in the age of electronic databases. It is particularly hard to find
important offenses because they are often surrounded by trivial ones."'
10 2
Once one (or more likely, several) potentially applicable code sections are
identified, it is not infrequently the case that the statutory language is
difficult to parse. While many statutes are well-drafted, many others are
very "plainly deficient either in their conception or in their amenability to
application.' 0 3 Consider, for example, that "[m]any of the sentences in
current title 18 run over 200 words," and one statute, 18 U.S.C. § 793,
contains a lead sentence that is approximately 700 words long.10 4 Further,
given that different draftsmen over 200 years were responsible for the
present code, it is not surprising that there is a great deal of inconsistency in
language and structure among statutes pertaining to the same subject-
matter. These overlaps in coverage among different sections, then, mean
that the code is not only redundant but also internally inconsistent. In short,
these statutes may be "public" in the sense of being available in print or on-
line, but the "code" is not by any stretch "accessible" to the average citizen.
1o1 Id. at 160 (Jacobs, J., dissenting).
102 Joost, supra note 1, at 214.
103 Gainer, Federal Criminal Code Reform, supra note 3, at 58.
104 Joost, supra note 1, at 198.
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A lack of precision in statutory drafting fails due process vagueness
standards not only when the statutory provision at issue cannot be said to
provide "fair notice." An even more important consideration is whether
"the legislature [has] establish[ed] minimal guidelines to govern law
enforcement."'10 5 The test is whether the statute "permit[s] 'a standardless
sweep [that] allows policemen, prosecutors, and juries to pursue their
personal predilections.' 10 6 I believe that if investigators dig deep enough,
anyone can be convicted under § 1346. The Supreme Court has cautioned
that "[i]t would certainly be dangerous if the legislature could set a net large
enough to catch all possible offenders, and leave it to the courts to step
inside and say who could be rightfully detained, and who should bet set at
large." 10 7 Yet that is precisely what § 1346 and many other code sections
do. I join Judge Jacobs in his confidence that "prosecutors . . . and the
Attorney General under whom they serve can be trusted to avoid any
systematic abuse of such a statute; but we should construe [§ 1346] so that
it serves to bind those who nevertheless may need constraint."'10 8 The
potential for arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement is simply too great
under many of the statutes in the federal "code" to do anything else.
F. THE ABOVE CHARACTERISTICS HAVE FUNDAMENTALLY
CHANGED THE TRADITIONAL UNDERSTANDING OF THE
APPROPRIATE ROLES OF JUDGES AND PROSECUTORS
The above discussion has highlighted the fact that Congress' default
has empowered judges and prosecutors to an extraordinary degree. By
leaving to prosecutors and judges the determination of the contours of these
vague and overbroad statutes, Congress has effectively delegated its
responsibility to determine the content of substantive federal criminal law.
Let us turn, then, to the institutional consequences of this delegation.
1. Judges
The Supreme Court has decreed that federal crimes "are solely
creatures of statute."' 0 9  Arguably a central myth of federal criminal
jurisprudence is that there are no "federal common law crimes."''10 To be
sure, in a technical sense, federal judges are not creating a federal common
105 Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 358 (1983) (quoting Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S.
566, 574 (1974)).
106 Id. (quoting Smith, 415 U.S. at 575).
107 Id. at 358 n.7.
108 Rybicki En Banc, 354 F.3d at 162 (Jacobs, J., dissenting).
109 Liparota v. United States, 471 U.S. 419, 424 (1985).
"1o See United States v. Hudson & Goodwin, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 32, 34 (1812).
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law of crime because they always ultimately found their decisions regarding
the content of a criminal rule on a statute or regulation. 1 ' As Professor
Jeffries has noted, "[t]oday, no court would invoke the unadorned rubrics of
the common law, and the exigencies of law enforcement do not require
resort to such authority. Penal legislation exists in such abundance that
wholesale judicial creativity is simply unnecessary. ' 12 And it is worth
recalling that "[e]very code will inevitably contain ambiguous language that
will be interpreted by judges. A legislature's obligation is to reserve that
delegation of judicial authority to the instances in which it is not reasonably
avoided."' 1 3  The fact that federal courts clearly engage in interstitial
"lawmaking" in the course of interpreting positive law does not raise
serious constitutional concerns. Even those most committed to traditional
constitutional separation of powers principles acknowledge that "no statute
can be entirely precise, and that some judgments, even some judgments
involving policy considerations, must be left to the officers executing the
law and to the judges applying it.' 1'4
However, the line between common lawmaking and statutory
interpretation is one of degree. Given the complete lack of definition in
some important federal statutes, courts are in fact engaging in lawmaking in
determining that such statutes in fact apply to varied fact situations when
the statutes themselves do not in any intelligible terms speak to those
situations. Section 1346 is one example of this phenomenon. Another
excellent example are the rules that govern organizational criminal liability.
There is no generally applicable statute in the federal criminal code that
defines when corporations can be held liable for crimes. Courts have
created the black-letter law of organizational liability: a corporation is liable
for the criminal misdeeds of its agents acting within the actual or apparent
scope of their employment or authority if the agents intend, at least in part,
to benefit the corporation." 5 In 1909, the Supreme Court rejected a due
111 See Bradford R. Clark, Federal Common Law: A Structural Reinterpretation, 144 U.
PA. L. REv. 1246, 1247 (1996).
Federal common law is generally used to refer to "federal judge-made law"-that is, rules of
decision adopted and applied by federal courts that have the force and effect of positive federal
law but "whose content cannot be traced by traditional methods of interpretation to federal
statutory or constitutional command."
Id. (citations omitted).
112 See, e.g., John Calvin Jeffries, Jr., Legality, Vagueness, and the Construction of Penal
Statutes, 71 VA. L. REV. 189, 202 (1985) (criticizing rule of strict construction because it
does not serve stated goals).
113 Robinson, supra note 8, at 231; see also id. at 252.
114 Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 415 (1989) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
115 See O'SULLIVAN, supra note 11, at 202.
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process challenge to application of this respondeat superior formula when
it was included in a criminal statute," 6 but courts since that time have
simply assumed that this standard applies regardless of whether the criminal
statute involved explicitly provides for such liability. Courts have also
embroidered on the basic standard, for example, by rejecting a corporate
"due diligence" defense-which would relieve organizations of criminal
liability where their agents' actions were contrary to organizational policy
or express organizational orders-based on what they infer would be
congressional intent were Congress to speak." 17  Courts have in fact
massaged the corporate liability standard to allow for corporate criminal
liability where, under traditional respondeat superior liability principles, it
would not be appropriate."i8 Indeed, given the way that courts have applied
these principles, it is difficult to find a case in which a corporation cannot
be tagged for the activities of its agents119- an d all on the say-so of judges,
rather than Congress.
These examples are not outliers: Once again, this phenomenon is one
that is well-recognized among those who study and practice federal criminal
law. For example, Professor Daniel Richman, who was a federal prosecutor
for many years, knowledgeably asserts that
anyone with more than a passing familiarity with federal criminal law is struck by the
extraordinary extent to which Congress has eschewed legislative specificity in this
highly sensitive area. The result, intended or otherwise, has been to transfer a
considerable degree of lawmaking authority to the other branches of government.120
Even Professor Dan Kahan, who is less troubled by Congress' default
in this area than I, has acknowledged that "[t]he proposition that federal
crimes are 'solely creatures of statute' is a truth so partial that it is nearly a
116 N.Y. Cent. & Hudson River R.R. Co. v. United States, 212 U.S. 481 (1909).
117 See United States v. Hilton Hotels Corp., 467 F.2d 1000 (9th Cir. 1972).
118 Under traditional respondeat superior principles, if there is no identifiable individual
whose conduct and state of mind can be attributed to the corporation, the corporation would
not be liable. This conceptual difficulty has been obviated by courts in a number of ways.
See O'SULLIVAN, supra note 11, at 221-22. One significant departure was created by the
First Circuit and adopted by most other circuits. Thus, in United States v. Bank of New
England, N.A., 821 F.2d 844, 856-57 (1st Cir. 1987), the First Circuit held that a corporation
could be found liable either under traditional respondeat superior rules or under a theory of
liability that allowed the jury to (1) "collect" the diffuse knowledge of a number of agents
and attribute it to the corporation; and (2) find that a corporation acted "willfully" where the
government proved "flagrant organizational indifference."
119 See, e.g., United States v. Sun-Diamond Growers of Cal., 138 F.3d 961 (D.C. Cir.
1998), aft'don other grounds, 526 U.S. 398 (1999).
120 Daniel C. Richman, Federal Criminal Law, Congressional Delegation, and
Enforcement Discretion, 46 UCLA L. REv. 757, 761 (1999).
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lie. To be sure, Congress must speak before a person can be convicted of a
federal crime, but it needn't say much of anything when it does."'
' 21
The bar on judicial making in the criminal realm is not a theoretical
nicety. It is founded in a number of very basic principles-separation of
powers being one. "Enlightenment theoreticians decreed that liberty is most
secure when power is fractured and separated., 122 It would be a dangerous
concentration of power for life tenured judges to both propound the law and
to preside over its interpretation and administration. More fundamentally,
"[a]s the branch most directly accountable to the people, only the legislature
could validate the surrender of individual freedom necessary to formulation
of the social contract."'
123
The bar on judicial crime-creation is also founded on "the first
principle" 124 of criminal law-the principle of legality-which outlaws the
retroactive definition of criminal offenses.
It is condemned because it is retroactive and also because it is judicial-that is,
accomplished by an institution not recognized as politically competent to define
crime. Thus, a fuller statement of the legality ideal would be that it stands for the
desirability in principle of advance legislative specification of criminal misconduct.
1 2 5
The legality principle has been identified as the most basic of human
rights in a myriad of international treaties and declarations.
1 26
121 Kahan, Is Chevron Relevant?, supra note 81, at 471 (footnote omitted); see also Dan
M. Kahan, Three Conceptions of Federal Criminal-Lawmaking, 1 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 5
(1997).
122 Jeffries, supra note 112, at 202 (criticizing rule of strict construction because it does
not serve stated goals); see also Dan M. Kahan, Lenity and Federal Law Crimes, 1994 Sup.
CT. REV. 345. But see Lawrence M. Solan, Law, Language, and Lenity, 40 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 57 (1998).
123 Jeffries, supra note 112, at 202; see also Whalen v. United States, 445 U.S. 684, 689
(1980) (affirming that "within our federal constitutional framework.., the power to define
criminal offenses[,] and to prescribe the punishments to be imposed upon those found guilty
of them, resides wholly with the Congress").
124 HERBERT PACKER, THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL SANCTION 79-80 (1968).
125 Jeffries, supra note 112, at 190.
126 In particular, most major human rights treaties contain explicit protection against
being held guilty of a penal offence "on account of any act or omission which did not
constitute a penal offence at the time when it was committed" or being punished more
severely than is proscribed by law at the time of the offense. Universal Declaration of
Human Rights, U.N. G.A. Res. 217A, art. 11(2); see also International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights, 999 U.N.T.S. 171, art. 15(1) (Dec. 16, 1966); American Declaration of
the Rights and Duties of Man, O.A.S. Res. XXX, arts. XXV, XXVI (1948); American
Convention on Human Rights, O.A.S. Treaty Ser. No. 36, art. 9 (1969); African [Banjul]
Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights, O.A.U. Doc. CAB/LEG/67/3 Rev. 5, art. 7(2)
(1981); European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms, 213 U.N.T.S. 221, art. 7(1) (1950). The same right is guaranteed to defendants
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This requisite is, in part, operationalized in U.S. law in the due process
vagueness doctrine, 127 which "requires that a penal statute define the
criminal offense with sufficient definiteness that ordinary people can
understand what conduct is prohibited and in a manner that does not
encourage arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement."' 128 "[A] statute which
either forbids or requires the doing of an act in terms so vague that men of
common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to
its application, violates the first essential of due process of law." 129 The
vagueness doctrine's "connection to legality is obvious: a law whose
meaning can only be guessed at remits the actual task of defining criminal
misconduct to retroactive judicial decisionmaking.' 30
As the above discussion demonstrates, however, judges have (in this
author's view), all too infrequently attended to the allocation of lawmaking
responsibility demanded by our democratic system, by separation of
powers, by the principle of legality, and by human rights and due process
guarantees. Again, it is important to emphasize that I am not questioning
their good faith. Many judges may decide that, to do justice in individual
cases, they have no choice but to do something to clarify the law at issue,
given elected officials' demonstrated unwillingness to attend properly to the
dismal state of the federal criminal code generally. My view, however, is
that by attempting to carry Congress' water through piecemeal fixes, they
have in fact made a morass out of a mess. Moreover, if judges were to
more consistent in requiring Congress to fix what ails many statutes,
perhaps Congress would be more willing to address the morass through
comprehensive code reform.
2. Prosecutors
The same principles that demand that Congress take the laboring oar in
identifying the conduct that will be subject to penal sanction-beforehand
and with reasonable specificity and clarity-also, of course, bars
prosecutorial law-making. And, as noted above, Congress' penchant for
federalization, overcriminalization, and speaking in overbroad and vague
terms has had the direct effect of empowering prosecutors with vast
discretion. Federal prosecutors exercise a very broad-and for the most
brought to answer for international crimes before international criminal tribunals. See Rome
Statute of the International Criminal Court, arts. 22 (Nullem crimen sine lege), 23 (Nulla
poena sine lege), 24 (Non-retroactivity ratione personae).
127 Jeffries, supra note 112, at 196.
128 Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357 (1983).
129 Connally v. Gen. Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926).
130 Jeffries, supra note 112, at 196.
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part unreviewable--discretion in selecting cases and charges. They can
also fundamentally change the content of a vaguely worded criminal statute
by pursuing novel theories of prosecution-for example, by creating the
"honest services" theory to address public corruption. Prosecutors "make
law," then, by exercising their discretion to make enforcement decisions
that functionally determine the real shape of the federal code and to
formulate theories of prosecution that expand the accepted understandings
of the reach of certain criminal statutes. In these respects, prosecutors are
allied with judges in determining the true content of federal penal laws.
Some prosecutorial discretion is inevitable, and it can be a positive.
131
Most codes will provide prosecutors with some flexibility in enforcement;
as noted above, statutes that are too specific may irrationally foreclose the
prosecution of persons who knowingly imposed criminal harm on others.
And most common law justice systems include some provision for
selectivity in prosecution. Otherwise, the social and economic costs of full
enforcement of the code would be oppressive. Finally, as Judge Gerard
Lynch put it,
[s]o long as our criminal codes contain too many prohibitions, the contents of which
are left to be defined by their implementation, or which cover conduct that is clearly
not intended to be punished in every instance, or which provide for the punishment of
those who act without wrongful intent, prosecutors must exercise judgment about
which of the many cases that are technically covered by the criminal laws are really
worthy of criminal punishment. 
132
Again, I believe that most prosecutors act in the good faith belief that
they are "doing justice." And I also believe that they sometimes do "do
justice" by stretching the code. For example, there most certainly are cases
that were prosecuted under an "honest services" theory in which the
defendants deserved criminal sanction, although one would wish it were
dispensed under a statute that actually addressed their particular crime.
The problem is that there is too much discretion available to
prosecutors. Prosecutorial discretion flows from a number of circumstances
in addition to those noted above.13 3 First and foremost is the fact that the
131 See, e.g., Gerard E. Lynch, Our Administrative System of Criminal Justice, 66
FORDHAM L. REv. 2117, 2138-2142 (1998).
132 Id. at 2136-37.
133 It is notoriously difficult to do empirical work relating to declination statistics because
the data is not kept in a detailed, organized way and is generally not revealed to persons
outside of the Department of Justice. An unusual empirical study of the exercise of
prosecutorial discretion by federal prosecutors in the Northern District of Illinois, however,
revealed that formal charges were filed in less than one-fifth of the matters received by the
U.S. Attorney in that district. Richard S. Frase, The Decision to File Federal Criminal
Charges: A Quantitative Study of Prosecutorial Discretion, 47 U. CHI. L. REv. 246, 257, 278
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number of crimes worthy of investigation outstrips the resources available
to pursue them. Prosecutors' flexibility in responding to these constraints is
augmented by the availability of alternative civil and regulatory sanctions;
thus prosecutors can decline a case with some confidence that the
misconduct involved will be addressed through alternative civil and
regulatory sanctions. Much of what is subject to federal prosecution is also
subject to prosecution under state law. 134 Accordingly, prosecutors can use
their judgment regarding what does and does not deserve federal criminal
action.
I view this as the "natural" discretion imbedded in the job given the
overabundance of crime and the availability of alternative remedies. That
"natural" discretion, however, is exaggerated in a potentially dangerous
way by the state of the code. The "code" allows prosecutors to bring cases
that would not be warranted under a clean and rational system, and it
permits them choices that simply leverage their bargaining power vis-a-vis
the defense but (as we shall see below) serve no legitimate penal purpose. I
have no problem with plea bargaining-it often serves the interests of the
government and the defense. If, however, prosecutors are given undue
power to pressure defendants into pleading because of code irrationalities,
the result may be disparate treatment of similarly situated defendants based
on the idiosyncratic choices of prosecutors.
(1980). When the question whether there was perceived to be a sufficient basis to obtain a
conviction was factored into the equation, the ratio increased only to slightly higher than one
of four. Id. at 278-79. Forty-five percent of the declinations were based to some degree on
evidentiary or legal barriers to prosecution. Id. at 264, 278. "About two-thirds of the
remaining declinations involved the use of an alternative to federal prosecution (most often
state or local prosecution), and the rest-18% of all declinations-were based entirely on
policy considerations, especially the perceived triviality of the offense." Id. at 278; see also
John Kaplan, The Prosecutorial Discretion-A Comment, 60 Nw. U. L.J. 174 (1966)
(describing considerations in exercise of prosecutorial discretion).
134 Some argue that this overlap creates its own equitable problems.
Although the substance of federal criminal law has come to duplicate much of state criminal law,
the procedures that apply and the sentences that convicted defendants receive and serve in the
federal criminal justice system are often far different than those encountered in state courts.
Notwithstanding some significant exceptions, defendants typically fare considerably worse when
prosecuted in federal court.
Steven D. Clymer, Unequal Justice: The Federalization of Criminal Law, 70 S. CAL. L. REv.
643, 668 (1997); see also ABA TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 23, at 27-35. Thus, even in
situations where the defendant's conduct is "wrong" in a moral sense, substantial equitable
concerns are raised when a defendant had no way of knowing until the appeal of his
conviction was decided whether his conduct violated federal laws that exponentially
increased his sentencing exposure when compared to his confederates prosecuted in state
courts. See Sara Sun Beale, The Many Faces of Overcriminalization: From Morals and
Mattress Tags to Overfederalization, 54 AM. U. L. REv. 747 (2005).
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A more fundamental concern is that prosecutors, in plea bargaining,
can offer defendants such a stark choice between a lenient plea offer (say a
five-year count) and a threat of harsh charges if the plea is rejected (the
potential for a twenty-year sentence after trial) that risk-averse but innocent
defendants will be coerced into a guilty plea. In some white-collar cases,
where the issue is less about what happened or who "did it" (the drug deal,
assault, etc.) and more about what the defendant's state of mind was at the
time or whether the conduct at issue should be sanctioned under an
expansive theory of the law, the issue is more subtle. Where a defendant's
culpability-even on the facts-is arguable, prosecutors can avoid the
adjudication of novel theories or of difficult questions of intent by
pressuring a plea. The cases may not involve a complete "innocent," but
they may be ones where formal adjudication would reveal that what the
defendant did (or what he thought while doing it) should not be criminally
sanctioned or should be sanctioned much less stringently than charged.
In sum, the overbreadth, vagueness, and redundancy of the code give
prosecutors power that they are not supposed to have in a decently-
functioning system of justice. While it would be impossible-and
counterproductive-to attempt to stamp out all prosecutorial discretion,
there is clearly a point beyond which the code's empowerment of
prosecutors is harmful, whether measured in the language of "efficiency" or
of "justice." And the overwhelming majority of those familiar with the
federal code-including many former prosecutors like me-believe that we
have passed that tipping point by a substantial margin.
The fact that prosecutors have such (in my view, outsized) discretion
has in part contributed to a reality of prosecutorial functioning that is
fundamentally at odds with the traditional conception of prosecutors as
advocates in a system of justice where convictions are obtained through
adversarial testing. 35 It is more accurate to characterize prosecutors as
"administrators" or "quasi-judicial" actors than as advocates. This re-
conceptualization of the prosecutorial role is warranted because of the
simple truth that the outcome in most cases is determined not by a court or a
jury but by the prosecutor. Prosecutors have broad power to pick and
choose among cases and, because of the state of the code, to secure
indictments and force dispositions; the fact that somewhere around 95% of
all federal criminal cases are resolved by guilty plea'36 demonstrates that
135 See, e.g., id. passim.
136 See, e.g., U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, 2003 DATAFILE, USSCFY03 fig.C (2003)




criminal law is increasingly an administrative system in which the
prosecutor reigns supreme (with occasional "appeals" to the jury).
The costs of undue prosecutorial power are many. I have discussed
above the concerns that undue prosecutorial discretion may well result in
arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement decisions. In addition, as a matter
of separation of powers, prosecutors' broad discretion allows them to usurp
Congress's role in determining what should and should not be sanctioned
criminally. One may further assert that prosecutors, using their discretion
to act as administrative adjudicators in declining some cases and plea
bargaining away others, are usurping the role of courts and juries. Some
contend that prosecutors are not competent-given their adversarial
orientation, selection, and training-to dispense the type of neutral justice
contemplated by such a role, and that politics and other improper
considerations may well taint their exercises of discretion. Certainly,
because prosecutorial discretion is largely exercised outside the public eye,
it is difficult to document, let alone to regulate or check. The existence of
this broad power also "relieve[s] pressure on the public and the legislature
to make important and painful decisions." 137 Instead of requiring that hard
policy and political choices regarding the allocation of scarce criminal
justice resources be debated openly and made publicly, this discretionary
power allows prosecutors to make hidden resource decisions.
Most fundamentally, the quantity of unreviewed or unreviewable
discretion vested in federal prosecutors obviously raises fundamental
questions regarding fair process and equal treatment. As Professor James
Vorenberg argued,
prosecutors are not held to anything remotely like what due process would require if
they were engaged in an acknowledged rather than a hidden system of adjudication.
No uniform, pre-announced rules inform the defendant and control the decisionmaker;
a single official can invoke society's harshest sanctions on the basis of ad hoc
personal judgments. Prosecutors can and do accord different treatment-prison for
some and probation or diversion to others--on grounds that are not written down
anywhere and may not have been either rational, consistent, or discoverable in
advance.'
3 8
The risk of unequal treatment created by standardless discretion is troubling
not only as a threat to due process but in its own right as well. Giving prosecutors
the power to invoke or deny punishment at their discretion raises the prospect that
society's most fundamental sanctions will be imposed arbitrarily and capriciously
137 James Vorenberg, Decent Restraints in Prosecutorial Power, 94 HARV. L. REv. 1521,
1559 (1981).
138 Id. at 1554.
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and that the least favored members of the community-racial and ethnic
minorities, social outcasts, the poor-will be treated most harshly.
139
In short, although it is probably beneficial and certainly inevitable that
federal prosecutors exercise some discretion in deciding when and how to
bring cases, there are substantial costs to investing prosecutors with too
much discretion. Among the suggestions made for restraining prosecutorial
discretion or making prosecutors more accountable for its exercise are:
instituting formal guidelines to control prosecutors' choices; legislative
oversight; increased judicial activism in reviewing prosecutorial decisions;
increasing the public visibility of prosecutorial choices; making governing
ethical standards more stringent and specific; and educating prosecutors on
their duties and the ramifications of their choices. 140  All of these
suggestions have merit. All except perhaps the last, however, are in my
view unlikely to come to fruition. In sources too numerous to recount,
commentators have documented the ever-increasing discretion vested in
federal prosecutors and almost universally bemoaned this increase in
prosecutorial power as a pernicious development-but none of these
reforms has been seriously considered. The final suggested "fix" is code
reform. Although it may, if properly done, be the most effective in
appropriately cabining prosecutorial discretion, it is, in the view of many,
also the least likely to happen. As is discussed further in Part III, infra, my
view is that the potential for code reform is higher than it has been for
decades as a result of the Supreme Court's Booker decision.
G. THE FINAL COST OF CODE IRRATIONALITY IS LOSS OF PUBLIC
RESPECT FOR, AND VOLUNTARY COMPLIANCE WITH, CRIMINAL
NORMS
I have traced in the above discussion some of the costs of code
irrationality: inefficiency and ineffectiveness in enforcement of the criminal
law, "fair notice" and accessibility issues, the potential for arbitrary and
discriminatory enforcement, the undue delegation of law-making authority
to judges and prosecutors, and the consequences that delegation has for the
code and for the traditional roles of judges and prosecutors in the
139 Id. at 1554-55; see also generally KENNETH CULP DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE: A
PRELIMINARY INQUIRY (1969).
140 See, e.g., Robert L. Misner, Recasting Prosecutorial Discretion, 86 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 717, 763-777 (1996); Ellen S. Podgor, The Ethics and Professionalism of
Prosecutors in Discretionary Decisions, 68 FORDHAM L. REv. 1511, 1530-35 (2000);
Vorenberg, supra note 137, at 1562-73; see also Kathleen F. Brickey, Federal Criminal
Code Reform: Hidden Costs, Illusory Benefits, 2 BUFF. CRIM. L. REv. 161 (1998); Stuntz,
supra note 54, at 505.
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administration of criminal law. All of these are fairly specific, and even
potentially measurable. A perhaps greater but harder to quantify cost is the
affect that a chaotic code has on societal confidence in the criminal justice
system.
A traditional criminal code has a dual audience. First, it speaks to
lawyers, judges, jurors and other participants in the criminal system in
defining the rules they must employ to decide whether a defendant should
be criminally liable, and for what. 141 As noted above, the inefficiency of
the code obviously means that those involved in criminal cases-judges,
prosecutors, defense lawyers, defendants, and others-will needlessly
expend time and energy to deal with poorly drafted, organized, or
conceptualized criminal provisions. But the inefficient and ineffective
enforcement of criminal law has reverberations far beyond opportunity
costs expressed in terms of resources. A code's second audience is the
general public, and its purpose in this regard is to "announce[] the law's
commands to those whose conduct it seeks to influence."'
' 42
Obviously, if the law is in a real sense inaccessible, people cannot
make the rational calculation necessary for effective deterrence. A code
correctly perceived to be irrational, moreover, will undermine faith in the
criminal justice system as a whole, thus encouraging the view that "beating
the system" is neither immoral nor antisocial. The most unique feature of
the penal law is its ability to impose upon wrongdoers the moral stigma of a
criminal conviction. Criminal law is critical in assisting in the "building,
shaping, and maintaining of [moral] norms and moral principles."' 143 If
criminal law
earns a reputation as a reliable statement of what the community, given sufficient
information and time to reflect, perceives as condemnable, people are more likely to
defer to its commands as morally authoritative and as appropriate to follow in those
borderline cases where the propriety of certain conduct is unsettled or ambiguous in
the mind of the actor. 144
This expressive function is particularly important in a complex, multi-
cultural and multi-ethnic society such as ours. Obviously, law's expressive
function, and criminal law's moral stigma, are only effective where the
public is in fact persuaded of the moral culpability of offenders. "In this
respect, the criminal law exhibits unavoidable circularity: criminality turns
on morality, yet morality may itself turn on criminality. Hence, one of the
features that makes criminal law unique-the moral stigma associated with
141 See, e.g., Robinson, supra note 8, at 268.
142 Id.
141 Id. at 264.
144 id.
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a criminal conviction-is not self-executing. It can be lost over time with
overreaching.,
145
"[T]he main goal of penal reform is to promote respect for the law by
making law respectable. 146  Public compliance with the law-whether
through fear (deterrence) or example (reinforcement of moral norms)-is
critical because resource constraints mean that enforcement efforts cannot
alone reduce crime rates. To induce the necessary public voluntary
compliance with the law's requirements,
the criminal laws and the criminal process must be, and must be publicly perceived to
be, sensible, certain, impartial, and efficient. A nation can achieve neither the reality
nor the perception of these qualities if the laws themselves are confusing and
complex, if important legal consequences turn on accidents in legislative drafting, and
if just disposition of offenders often rests as much on chance as on design.
14 7
II. APPLICATION TO OBSTRUCTION
I was inspired to attempt to use some of the non-coercive obstruction
of justice offenses found in the United States Code to illustrate many of the
problems identified above by two circumstances. First, I can, without
burdening readers with too broad a statutory survey, demonstrate some of
the greatest problems with the "code" generally. Second, it appears to me
that white-collar prosecutors are increasingly electing to rely on obstruction
charges in high-profile cases such as the criminal prosecutions of Frank
Quattrone (former star banker for Credit Suisse First Boston), Andrew
Fastow (former CFO of Enron), Martha Stewart, Sam Waksal (founder of
ImClone Systems), Arthur Andersen LLP, and "Scooter" Libby (the former
Chief of Staff for Vice President Cheney). Perhaps the increased visibility
of these offenses will translate into an increased interest in the deficiencies
of this portion of the "code." In the best case, then, my attempt to make
clear those deficiencies may serve my larger purpose in promoting
comprehensive code reform.
There is one point that should be underscored at the inception of this
analysis. I believe obstruction of justice is a serious crime and should be
treated as such, independent of the merits of the matter under investigation.
For example, Martha Stewart was charged with conspiracy, false
statements, obstruction of justice under 18 U.S.C. § 1505, and securities
fraud in connection with her sale of shares of ImClone Systems Inc. stock,
allegedly after a "tip" from ImClone's founder. Although convicted for
145 Lazarus, supra note 29, at 2443.
146 Schwartz, supra note 8, at 4.
147 Gainer, Federal Criminal Code Reform, supra note 3, at 55-56.
2006]
JULIE R. O'SULLIVAN
obstruction, lying to federal investigators, and conspiracy in connection
with the false explanations she had offered for her stock sale, she was never
indicted for the alleged insider trading that spawned the investigation.
Some criticize the prosecutors' decision to bring the case, arguing that "it is
far from clear whether Stewart's trades were unlawful, let alone illegal, and
it is hard to identify any harm her acts directly caused anyone."'
148
These arguments fundamentally misconceive the harm in obstruction,
which is not dependant on the merits of the matter "obstructed."
Considering especially the size of modem government, the prominent role it plays,
and its far-reaching effects, it is vital to impose criminal sanctions to safeguard the
integrity of government operations so as to assure the effective transaction of the
public's business and ultimately to maintain the highest degree of public confidence in
government."
149
Where the effective conduct of the criminal justice system is at issue,
obstruction is particularly pernicious. Not only may it impair investigators'
ability to discern whether the underlying activity is a crime and (if it is) to
successfully prosecute it, but also, if unaddressed, criminally obstructive
activity will encourage a public belief that the system is gamed on a regular
basis with no consequences. It is difficult to promote respect for law, and
law administration, when attempts to impede the effective administration of
justice are essentially permitted if they are successful in preventing
prosecutions. I bring this up to underscore my belief that so potentially
serious is the harm presented by obstruction of justice, the "code's" defaults
in this area are particularly acute.
The obstruction provisions I will be talking about demonstrate quite
graphically how incompletely defined, redundant, and internally
inconsistent the obstruction portion of the "code" is. They provide clear
examples of the irrationalities in organization and grading that plague the
code as a whole. Examining the post-2002 state of the criminal code should
also illustrate Congress' penchant for reactive, and not terribly thoughtful,
criminal legislation. This is an area where statutes have recently been
enacted in response to specific events-such as, most recently, the
destruction of Enron audit records by Andersen personnel and the resultant
prosecution and conviction of Andersen. As a result, the non-coercive
obstruction provisions are fairly incoherent, often overlapping, and
148 Jeanne L. Schroeder, Envy and Outsider Trading: The Case of Martha Stewart, 26
CARDOZO L. REv. 2023, 2023 (2004); see also Michael L. Seigel & Christopher Slobogin,
Prosecuting Martha: Federal Prosecutorial Power and the Need for a Law of Counts, 109
DICK. L. REv. 1107 (2005).
149 S. REP. No. 97-307, at 289 (1981) (as reported by S. Comm. on the Judiciary
accompanying S. 1630, the Criminal Code Reform Act of 1981).
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overbroad-leaving much to the discretion of prosecutors. Judges' good
faith attempts to "rationalize" the law of obstruction through judicial "fixes"
have resulted in yet more confusion.
To the extent that I find a recent obstruction prosecution helpful in
illustrating the code's deficiencies, it is Andersen, rather than Martha
Stewart. The Andersen case demonstrates that non-coercive obstruction
offenses are so broadly defined that they can encompass almost anything-
even entirely legal acts-that prosecutors or juries might find troubling.
Andersen, an accounting and consulting company that served as the auditor
for Enron Corp., was charged with obstruction of justice under § 1512(b)
based on its wholesale destruction of Enron-related workpapers just prior to
the inception of an SEC investigation into Enron's finances. The jury,
however, apparently did not convict Andersen based on the conduct
charged in the indictment. Rather, it named an in-house legal counsel,
Nancy Temple, as the person who rendered Andersen liable by virtue of
legal advice she communicated in one email suggesting revisions to a draft
memo for the Andersen files. 150 The Andersen partner who was drafting the
memo accepted her suggested changes, and the jury concluded that Temple
had "corruptly persuaded"15' the partner to "alter" the draft so as to render
it unavailable for use in subsequent legal proceedings. In short, the jury
was able to read the language of § 1512(b) to criminally sanction what
noted legal ethics expert Professor Stephen Gillers characterized as
precisely "the kind of advice lawyers give clients all the time." '152
A. THE OBSTRUCTION STATUTES ARE SPREAD THROUGHOUT THE
"CODE" AND WHAT PROVISIONS HAVE FOUND THEIR WAY INTO
CHAPTER 73 ARE UNORGANIZED AND CONCEPTUALLY
INCOHERENT
Chapter 73 of Title 18 is supposed to contain the criminal code
provisions related to "Obstruction of Justice." As is typical, however,
obstruction prohibitions can be found scattered throughout Title 18113 and
beyond. For example, bribing a juror can be prosecuted under § 201, which
resides in the Bribery, Graft, and Conflicts of Interests Chapter of Title 18,
150 See O'SULLIVAN, supra note 11, at 449-67.
151 See Sterling P. A. Darling, Jr., Mitigating the Impressionability of the Incorporeal
Mind: Reassessing Unanimity Following the Obstruction of Justice Case of United States v.
Arthur Andersen, LLP, 40 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 1625, 1630-31 (2003).
152 Stephen Gillers, The Flaw in the Andersen Verdict, N.Y. TIMES, June 18, 2002, at
A25.
' See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 551 (2000); id. § 665(c); id § 1033(d) (crimes by or affecting
persons engaged in the business of insurance whose activities affect interstate commerce).
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or it can be pursued as obstruction of justice under § 1503, which is found
within the Obstruction of Justice Chapter of the same title, or both. Many
statutes which deal with obstructive activity in specific contexts, such as
corrupt endeavors to obstruct the due administration of the IRS laws, can be
found scattered through the remaining forty-nine Titles of the United States
Code.' 54 The potential activities covered by these (and other) sections of
the Code are wide-ranging but, given the lack of systematic organization,
they can be difficult to locate. Once they are located, however, prosecutors
faced with obstructive activity in specific contexts can choose the particular
provision or a more general one, or (assuming no double jeopardy
problems) both, depending upon which provision is easier to prove or
carries sentencing advantages.
Much of the legwork necessary to rationalize the obstruction offenses
has already been done. For example, in the proposed but never enacted
Criminal Code Reform Act of 1981, S. 1630, members of Congress
conceptualized the different ways that obstruction can occur, and identified
those offenses within each category that warranted federal attention.
155
Congress proposed creating an overall Chapter entitled "Offenses Involving
Government Processes" and splitting obstruction offenses into three
subchapters:
"General Obstruction of Government Functions" (which included obstructing a
government function by fraud; obstructing a government function by physical
interference; and impersonating an official);
"Obstructions of Law Enforcement" (including hindering law enforcement; bail
jumping; escape; providing or possessing contraband in a prison; and flight to avoid
prosecution or appearance as a witness); and
"Obstruction of Justice" (which included witness bribery; corrupting a witness or an
informant; tampering with a witness, victim, or an informant; retaliating against a
witness or an informant; tampering with physical evidence; improperly influencing a
juror; monitoring jury deliberations; and demonstrating to influence a judicial
proceeding). 156
Within the Obstruction Chapter were additional subchapters containing
related categories of offenses: "Contempt Offenses" (including criminal
contempt; failing to appear as a witness; refusing to testify or to produce
information; obstructing a proceeding by disorderly conduct; and
114 See 26 U.S.C. § 7206(5) (2000); 28 U.S.C. § 7212(a) (2000); see also, e.g., 45 U.S.C.
§ 60 (2000); 49 U.S.C. § 1472(g) (2000).
"' S. REP. No. 97-307, at 289 (1981) (as reported by the Sen. Comm. on the Judiciary
accompanying S. 1630, the Criminal Code Reform Act of 1981).
156 See id. at 289-367.
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disobeying a judicial order)'5 7; "Perjury False Statements, and Related
Offenses" (including perjury; false swearing; making a false statement;
tampering with a government record; and failing to keep a government
record)5 8; and "Official Corruption and Intimidation.''
159
This work is nowhere reflected in the current United States Code. As
noted, obstruction provisions remain scattered through the Code, with
eighteen substantive criminal prohibition jumbled together in Chapter 73 of
Title 18 (along with two provisions relating to civil actions and one
definitional section). The offenses in Chapter 73 relate to all three of the
"obstruction" subcategories noted above but they are not grouped according
to kind-that is, the kind of obstruction with which they conceptually
belong. Nor does each section target a specific type of obstructive activity
(e.g., tampering with physical evidence as opposed to tampering with
witnesses). To give a sense of just what an organizational and conceptual
mess this "code" is, one section, 18 U.S.C. § 1503, has been applied to
conduct that falls in at leastfive of the discrete subchapters identified in S.
1630: general obstruction of a governmental function by fraud (e.g.,
lawyers' efforts to obtain monies from criminal defendants by false
promises to "fix" the proceedings or pay off criminal justice officials);
obstruction of justice (e.g., knowing concealment, falsification, or
destruction of evidence to be submitted to a grand jury or court and efforts
to alter the testimony of witnesses for corrupt purposes); contempt (e.g.,
refusing to testify before a grand jury after immunity has been conferred);
false statements and perjury (e.g., false statements made to federal agents
and false testimony before a grand jury or trial court); and public corruption
(e.g., bribing a juror).
Consistent with this lack of discipline, the sections in Chapter 73 are
subject to serious overlaps in coverage, as we shall see in our specific
discussion of the statutes. This means that the irrationality of the grading of
current offenses-reflected in the statutory maximums attached to different
provisions-can give prosecutors substantial power as they pick and choose
among potentially applicable code provisions. Finally, it is somewhat
difficult to know whether the coverage of obstruction offenses now in the
United States Code is as comprehensive as S. 1630 because the existing
offenses are vague and elastic, as well as scattered and disorganized. While
it is not clear whether the existing code is underinclusive, we do know that
it is overinclusive. For example, Chapter 73 contains: discrete provisions
not thought necessary by congressional code reformers in the 1980's (e.g.,
117 Id. at 367-89.
' Id. at 389-420.
159 Id. at 420-63.
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assault on a process server (§ 1501) and resistance to an extradition agent (§
1502)); at least one prohibition that probably unnecessarily invades state
prerogatives (e.g., obstruction of state or local law enforcement (§ 1511));
and a number of specific provisions that could probably be either folded
into more general prohibitions or deleted entirely (e.g., obstruction of
federal audit (§ 1516); obstructing examination of financial institution (§
1517); obstruction of criminal investigations of health care offenses (§
1518); destruction of corporate audit records (§ 1520)). Thus, one could
argue that seven out of the eighteen substantive criminal statutes in Chapter
73 should not be in there.
I will not try to make my way through all the offenses in Chapter 73.
My analysis focuses on the two provisions traditionally used in white-collar
cases: the "omnibus" clause of § 1503 and the more recently enacted non-
coercive witness tampering prohibitions in § 1512(b). Brief coverage is
given to a less frequently invoked statute, § 1505, which has been used
where obstructive activity takes place in the context of federal agency and
congressional investigations and proceedings. Finally, Congress's additions
to the code in the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002,160 18 U.S.C. §§ 1512(c),
1519, and 1520, are discussed and compared with the protections already
embodied in sections 1503, 1505, and 1512(b).
"[T]he purpose of § 1503 is to protect not only the procedures of the
criminal system but also the very goal of that system-to achieve
justice. '  This statute "was drafted with an eye to 'the variety of corrupt
methods by which the proper administration of justice may be impeded or
thwarted, a variety limited only by the imagination of the criminally
inclined.', 162 The main body of § 1503163 specifically targets conduct that
160 Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (2002).
161 United States v. Griffin, 589 F.2d 200, 204 (5th Cir. 1979).
162 Id. at 206-07 (quoting Anderson v. United States, 215 F.2d 84, 88 (6th Cir. 1954)).
"3 18 U.S.C. § 1503 (2000). Influencing or injuring officer or juror generally
(a) Whoever corruptly, or by threats or force, or by any threatening letter or communication,
endeavors to influence, intimidate, or impede any grand or petit juror, or officer in or of any
court of the United States, or officer who may be serving at any examination or other proceeding
before any United States magistrate judge or other committing magistrate, in the discharge of his
duty, or injures any such grand or petit juror in his person or property on account of any verdict
or indictment assented to by him, or on account of his being or having been such juror, or injures
any such officer, magistrate judge, or other committing magistrate in his person or property on
account of the performance of his official duties, or corruptly or by threats or force, or by any
threatening letter or communication, influences, obstructs, or impedes, or endeavors to influence,
obstruct, or impede, the due administration of justice, shall be punished as provided in subsection
(b). If the offense under this section occurs in connection with a trial of a criminal case, and the
act in violation of this section involves the threat of physical force or physical force, the
maximum term of imprisonment which may be imposed for the offense shall be the higher of
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interferes with the duties of a juror or court officer. The "omnibus" clause
is the portion of the statute with which we are principally concerned and it
states that "[w]hoever . . . corruptly or by threats or force, or by any
threatening letter or communication, influences, obstructs, or impedes, or
endeavors to influence, obstruct, or impede, the due administration of
justice, shall be punished. ' 164 The omnibus clause "is essentially a catch-all
provision which generally prohibits conduct that interferes with the due
administration of justice."1 65
Section 1505 is very similar to § 1503 in structure and (at least
currently) effect. 166 While § 1503 deals with obstruction in the context of
judicial proceedings, § 1505 applies to corrupt endeavors to obstruct or
impede investigations conducted by Congress or administrative agencies.
Congress has tinkered with Chapter 73 increasingly over time, but its
most significant amendments to the obstruction provisions occurred in 1982
and 2002. In 1982, Congress removed the express references to
intimidating or influencing witnesses in § 1503 and § 1505, and created a
new, consolidated prohibition on witness tampering: 18 U.S.C. § 1512.167
that otherwise provided by law or the maximum term that could have been imposed for any
offense charged in such case.
(b) The punishment for an offense under this section is-
(1) in the case of a killing, the punishment provided in sections 111 and 1112;
(2) in the case of an attempted killing, or a case in which the offense was committed against a
petit juror and in which a class A or B felony was charged, imprisonment for not more than
20 years, a fine under this title, or both; and
(3) in any other case, imprisonment for not more than 10 years, a fine under this title, or both.
164 id.
165 United States v. Thomas, 916 F.2d 647, 650 n.3 (I 1th Cir. 1990).
166 Section 1505 reads, in relevant part:
Whoever corruptly, or by threats or force, or by threatening letter or communication influences,
obstructs, or impedes or endeavors to influence, obstruct, or impede the due and proper
administration of the law under which any pending proceeding is being had before any
department or agency of the United States, or the due and proper exercise of the power of inquiry
under which any inquiry or investigation is being had by either House, or any committee of
either House or any joint committee of Congress-Shall be fined under this title, imprisoned not
more than five years or, if the offense involves international or domestic terrorism (as defined in
section 233 1), imprisoned not more than 8 years, or both.
18 U.S.C. § 1505.
167 Consistent with the focus of this article, the following are excerpted portions of §
1512 (Tampering with a witness, victim, or an informant) which deal with non-coercive
witness tampering:
(b) Whoever knowingly uses intimidation, threatens, or corruptly persuades another person, or
attempts to do so, or engages in misleading conduct toward another person, with intent to-
(1) influence, delay, or prevent the testimony of any person in an official proceeding;
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Until Congress amended § 1512 in 2002 (more about that below), § 1512
was specifically concerned with protecting witnesses and the integrity of
physical evidence.
When first enacted, § 1512 contained provisions prohibiting tampering
with witnesses by intimidation, physical force, threats, misleading conduct,
(2) cause or induce any person to-
(A) withhold testimony, or withhold a record, document, or other object, from an official
proceeding;
(B) alter, destroy, mutilate, or conceal an object with intent to impair the object's
integrity or availability for use in an official proceeding;
(C) evade legal process summoning that person to appear as a witness, or to produce a
record, document, or other object, in an official proceeding; or
(D) be absent from an official proceeding to which such person has been summoned by
legal process; or
(3) hinder, delay, or prevent the communication to a law enforcement officer or judge of the
United States of information relating to the commission or possible commission of a Federal
offense or a violation of conditions of probation, supervised release, parole, or release
pending judicial proceedings;
shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than ten years, or both.
(c) Whoever corruptly-
(I) alters, destroys, mutilates, or conceals a record, document, or other object, or attempts to
do so, with the intent to impair the object's integrity or availability for use in an official
proceeding; or
(2) otherwise obstructs, influences, or impedes any official proceeding, or attempts to do so,
shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than 20 years, or both.
(e) In a prosecution for an offense under this section, it is an affirmative defense, as to which the
defendant has the burden of proof by a preponderance of the evidence, that the conduct consisted
solely of lawful conduct and that the defendant's sole intention was to encourage, induce, or
cause the other person to testify truthfully.
(f) For the purposes of this section-
(1) an official proceeding need not be pending or about to be instituted at the time of the
offense; and
(2) the testimony, or the record, document, or other object need not be admissible in evidence
or free of a claim of privilege.
(g) In a prosecution for an offense under this section, no state of mind need be proved with
respect to the circumstance-
(1) that the official proceeding before a judge, court, magistrate judge, grand jury, or
government agency is before a judge or court of the United States, a United States magistrate
judge, a bankruptcy judge, a Federal grand jury, or a Federal Government agency; or
(2) that the judge is a judge of the United States or that the law enforcement officer is an
officer or employee of the Federal Government or a person authorized to act for or on behalf
of the Federal Government or serving the Federal Government as an adviser or consultant...
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or harassment. 168  With the exception of misleading conduct, all the
activities proscribed by the 1982 incarnation of § 1512 involved some
element of coercion. This provision, then, did not cover all the non-
coercive types of witness tampering that courts had, prior to 1982,
recognized as falling with the "omnibus" obstruction prohibition in § 1503.
Accordingly, even after passage of § 1512, prosecutors successfully
continued to invoke § 1503 to address non-coercive witness tampering such
as "efforts to urge a witness to give false testimony or withhold or destroy
evidence."1 69  In 1988, Congress responded to this perceived gap by
amending § 1512 to include the "corruptly persuades" language.170
Sections 1503 and 1505 are different from § 1512 in structure as well
as intended affect. Sections 1503 and 1505 are focused on "corrupt
endeavors" to interfere with pending judicial, congressional or agency
proceedings. Under § 1512, only one of the proscribed activities-
persuasion-requires proof of a "corrupt" motive. Instead of § 1503's
broad prohibition on any type of "corrupt" activity that obstructs the "due
administration of justice," then, § 1512 focuses more narrowly on specific
types of conduct through which physical evidence can be compromised or
witnesses tampered with. In short, § 1512 was said to change the focus
from corrupt motives to presumptively corrupt methods. The problem is, as
the Supreme Court emphasized in Arthur Andersen, LLP v. United States
171
(Andersen), not all of the methods outlawed are inherently corrupt.
In the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Congress again made substantial
changes to the obstruction of justice chapter in reaction to the scandal
surrounding Andersen's destruction of Enron-related audit records. 172 It
added a new omnibus provision, § 1512(c)(2), which mimics in major part
§ 1503's omnibus clause but is applicable in contexts outside of the judicial
proceedings that § 1503 protects, such as in proceedings before federal
agencies and in congressional inquiries. Violations of § 1512(c)(2) carry a
maximum sentence of double that usually available under § 1503. In the
same Act, Congress also tacked two additional provisions, 18 U.S.C. §§
1519 and 1520 onto the end of Chapter 73.
168 See Victim and Witness Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 97-291, 96 Stat. 1248 (1982).
169 See, e.g., United States v. Ladum, 141 F.3d 1328, 1338 (9th Cir.1998); United States
v. Lester, 749 F.2d 1288, 1294 (9th Cir. 1984).
170 See United States v. Farrell, 126 F.3d 484, 488 (3d Cir. 1997).
171 125 S. Ct. 2129 (2005).
172 18 U.S.C. §§ 1519-20.
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B. FEDERAL NON-COERCIVE OBSTRUCTION OFFENSES LACK
APPROPRIATE DEFINITION AND ARE OFTEN OVERBROAD, THUS
ENCOURAGING JUDICIAL LAW-MAKING
Two of the problems identified above were the code's vagueness and
over breadth. I will illustrate these qualities by reference to two commonly-
used provisions. First, § 1503's omnibus provision has been on the books
in substantially the same form for over a hundred years, yet the elements of
the crime are still emerging. As will be demonstrated in the following
materials, in response to the statute's lack of definition, courts have nearly
doubled the elements of the crime visible on the face of the statute.
Unfortunately, federal courts still do not agree on the content or appropriate
application of these elements. This lack of definition in statutory terms not
only invites further judicial law-making, but also permits convictions for
actions that should not constitute crimes, and further empowers prosecutors.
The second section examined within, § 1512(b), also demonstrates the
over breadth of the statutory terms. As noted above, the Andersen jury
apparently convicted the company because it thought that a lawyer's
provision of comments on a draft memorandum destined for Andersen's
own files, in response to a legitimate request for legal advice, constituted
corrupt witness tampering. Perhaps more shocking than the possibility that
criminal convictions may rest on such grounds is the fact that the
government defended this theory of conviction against post-conviction
attacks.
1. Section 1503 's Omnibus Provision
Let us begin with the question of elements-that is, the basic building
blocks of any criminal case, each of which constitutionally must be proved
beyond a reasonable doubt to a jury.'7 3 Section 1503's "omnibus" clause is
most often invoked in white-collar obstruction cases that do not involve the
type of witness tampering usually pursued under 18 U.S.C. § 1512.114
Where no killing or other special circumstances exist, the statutory
maximum punishment is ten years' imprisonment.1 75 On its face, the statute
would seem to be satisfied by proof that a defendant (1) "corruptly"; (2)
"endeavored"; (3) to influence, obstruct or impede; (4) the due
administration of justice. 176 Not so.
173 See, e.g., United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005); United States v. Gaudin, 515
U.S. 506 (1995).
174 For the full text, see supra note 163 and accompanying text.
175 18 U.S.C. § 1503(b) (2000).
176 See United States v. Cueto, 151 F.3d 620, 633 (7th Cir. 1998); United States v.
Brenson, 104 F.3d 1267, 1275 (1 lth Cir. 1997).
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In 1893, the Supreme Court, in Pettibone v. United States, added two
more elements: (5) the defendant must know that a judicial proceeding is
pending; and (6) must specifically intend to obstruct justice. 177 Although
the Supreme Court, in United States v. Aguilar,178 seemed to confirm these
two additional requirements,179 some lower courts have questioned whether
the pending proceeding requirement is consistent with the statute's text.
80
Potentially more important is the status of the "specific intent to
obstruct" element. The "specific intent" terminology was applied by the
Supreme Court to this statute in 1893. Since that time, this term has
become outmoded: It (and its cognate, "general intent") do not appear in the
code and have been rejected by the Supreme Court as outdated and
confusing.' 8' Yet, because of the Pettibone case, courts of appeals are still
trying to apply this element in § 1503 cases, with (in my view) decidedly
mixed results. To understand what was originally meant by "specific
intent," one must understand that the term "mens rea" has two general uses.
First, mens rea is used to describe a general wicked state of mind or
intention, suggesting that the defendant committed a particular action with a
morally blameworthy state of mind. This has been described as the
"culpability" meaning of mens rea.'82 Second, mens rea means the
particular mental state required to be proved by the statutory offense. This
177 148 U.S. 197, 204-07 (1893) (reasoning that "a person is not sufficiently charged with
obstructing or impeding the due administration of justice in a court unless it appears that he
knew or had notice that justice was being administered in such court"); see also United
States v. Aguilar, 515 U.S. 593, 599 (1995) (stating that the Pettibone Court "reasoned that a
person lacking knowledge of a pending proceeding necessarily lacked the evil intent to
obstruct").
178 515 U.S. 593, 599 (1995).
179 Most courts believe that "Aguilar reaffirmed the proposition that a defendant may be
convicted under section 1503 only when he knew or had notice of a pending proceeding."
United States v. Frankhauser, 80 F.3d 641, 650 (1st Cir. 1996).
is0 See, e.g., United States v. Novak, 217 F.3d 566 (8th Cir. 2000) (questioning existence
of the "pending proceeding" element, which is not reflected in plain language of statute, but
assuming its existence for purposes of the case).
181 See Liparota v. United States, 471 U.S. 419, 433 n.16 (1985) (stating that jury
instructions concerning specific intent have "been criticized as too general and potentially
misleading" and courts should "eschew use of difficult legal concepts like 'specific intent');
United States v. Bailey, 444 U.S. 394, 403-06 (1980) (distinguishing between specific and
general intent "has been the source of a good deal of confusion"). "Each of the jury
instruction committees of the circuit courts of appeals have followed suit and discouraged
the use of jury instructions on specific intent." KEVIN F. O'MALLEY, ET AL., FEDERAL JURY
PRACTICE AND INSTRUCTIONS § 17.03 (5th ed. 2000).




has been labeled the "elemental" meaning of mens rea183 and is the use of
the term that has been explored in these materials.
Today's statutes generally include some type of express mens rea
element, but this is a modem development. The historical meaning of
"specific" versus "general" intent reflects the fact that statutes formerly did
not specify the mental state necessary to be proved. Thus, "general intent"
meant that the crime required a mens rea in the culpability sense of a
blameworthy state of mind. "Specific intent" was a designation reserved
for those offenses that required proof of a particular, additional state of
mind.
Because modem statutes, or courts interpreting them, at least attempt
to specify a particular level of "elemental" mens rea, the continuing
meaning of the distinction between "general" and "specific" intent is
questionable; indeed, there appears to be no commonly accepted definition
of these terms.
Generally speaking, however, a "specific intent" offense is one in which the definition
of the crime: (1) includes an intent to do some future act, or achieve some further
consequence (i.e., a special motive for the conduct), beyond the conduct or result that
constitutes the actus reus of the offense; or (2) provides that the actor must be aware
of a statutory attendant circumstance. An offense that does not contain either of these
features is termed "general intent."
184
In this context, then, it would appear that a specific intent to obstruct
would mean that government must prove that the defendant's purpose was
to obstruct justice-that was his special motive for acting. An apparent
majority of federal courts hold, however, that a defendant can be said to
have acted with a specific intent to obstruct when he specifically intended to
engage in the conduct alleged to be obstructive and he should have
reasonably foreseen that the natural and probable consequences of his
actions would be the obstruction of justice.185 This means that most federal
183 Id. at 103.
184 Id. at 119.
185 Although many courts acknowledge that obstruction is a specific intent crime, they
are confused about just what the defendant must specifically intend. See United States v.
LaRouche Campaign, 695 F. Supp. 1265, 1270-74 (D. Mass. 1988). That is, courts disagree
about whether the Government must prove that the defendant did the obstructive act with a
specific intent to obstruct justice or only that the defendant specifically intended to engage in
the conduct alleged to be obstructive and should have reasonably foreseen that the natural
and probable consequences of his actions would be the obstruction of justice. Although
there is support in the case law for both propositions, the latter seems to be in ascendancy.
See United States v. Cueto, 151 F.3d 620, 630-31 (7th Cir. 1998) (stating that to prove that
the defendant acted corruptly, that is, "with the purpose of obstructing justice," the
government "only has to establish that the defendant should have reasonably seen that the
natural and probable consequences of his acts was the obstruction of justice"); United States
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courts read the "specific intent to obstruct" element to be satisfied by proof
that the defendant acted intentionally in, for example, destroying documents
but negligently with respect to the possibility that the destruction of those
documents would obstruct justice.
Substituting a negligence ("reasonably foreseeable") standard for a
specific intent to obstruct requirement does not make sense. Considered
together with the fact that criminal liability founded on negligence is
generally only reserved for the most severe harms (such as negligent
manslaughter),18 6 and that traditional notions of "specific intent" reflect the
highest, not the lowest, form of culpable mental states, the majority rule
seems particularly misguided. And this is not a quibble. Such a reading
permits the criminal sanction to be applied to all kinds of nonculpable
conduct: "It is easy to imagine conduct which could foreseeably result in
obstruction of justice but which lacks any sort of criminal culpability. For
example, employees often ignore office memoranda; people carelessly-
sometimes even recklessly-fail to preserve evidence. Section 1503 was
not meant to criminalize such conduct."' 87  Judges, in relying on a
misconstruction of the meaning of "specific intent," have significantly
increased the power of prosecutors to pick and choose among potential
defendants--only some of whom could be deemed to have been truly
culpable. Why would courts wish to water down the intent to obstruct
requirement, and empower prosecutors, in this way?
As it turns out, this instruction is useful to the government where the
government chooses to pursue wrongful conduct as obstruction but the
heart of the harm involved is something other than obstruction-usually
simple fraud. Rather than forcing prosecutors to proceed on a fraud theory
to prosecute this clearly wrongful activity, however, judges have acceded to
prosecutors' reliance on inapposite statutes. In so doing, they have
responded to bad facts by making bad law, giving prosecutors a mens rea
instruction that can be used to prosecute the culpable and the not culpable.
For example, in United States v. Neiswender, shortly after the
beginning of the criminal trial of former Maryland Governor Marvin
Mandel, defendant Neiswender contacted Mandel's defense attorney and
v. Brenson, 104 F.3d 1267, 1277-78 (1 1th Cir. 1997); Joseph V. DeMarco, Note, A Funny
Thing Happened on the Way to the Courthouse: Mens Rea, Document Destruction, and the
Federal Obstruction of Justice Statute, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 570, 576-84 (1992). But see
United States v. Rasheed, 663 F.2d 843, 852 (9th Cir. 1981) ("We hold that the word
'corruptly' as used in the statute means that the act must be done with the purpose of
obstructing justice.").
186 See, e.g., Herbert Wechsler, Codification of Criminal Law in the United States: The
Model Penal Code, 68 COLUM. L. REv. 1425, 1439 (1968).
187 DeMarco, supra note 185, at 589.
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told the attorney that he had a contact with a corrupt juror and could
"guarantee" an acquittal of Mandel if "proper financial arrangements were
made."' 88 Defense counsel promptly informed the court and prosecutor but
no corrupt juror was ever identified. Neiswender, indicted for obstruction
under § 1503, argued that his primary intent was to defraud, not to obstruct.
He contended that his actual motivation "was directly at odds with any
design to obstruct justice since a guilty verdict would have revealed
Neiswender's fraud. It was in his best interests for [Mandel's defense
counsel to continue] to press hard in his efforts to obtain an acquittal."''
89
The Fourth Circuit, however, upheld the conviction, ruling that "a
defendant who intentionally undertakes an act or attempts to effectuate an
arrangement, the reasonably foreseeable consequence of which is to
obstruct justice, violates § 1503 even if his hope is that the judicial
machinery will not be seriously impaired." 190 The court reasoned that had
Neiswender convinced defense counsel that Neiswender had a juror under
his control and induced defense counsel to participate in the scheme, the
natural consequence would have been to reduce defense counsel's efforts in
defending his client. 91 Presumably most people would agree that this
conduct is harmful-particularly the disturbing number of Neiswender-type
cases that involve fraud by attorneys on criminal defendants involving false
offers by counsel to pay off criminal justice officials to secure favorable
treatment for the defendants.1 92 But they are not first and foremost the type
of purposeful obstructive activity that is supposed to be pursued under §
1503. To allow the government to salvage these cases against (I concede)
people who are committing a crime (just not obstruction) by watering down
the "specific intent" instruction, courts are inviting overbroad and
irresponsible applications of the statute.
To return to our attempt to sketch out the elements of a prosecution
under § 1503's omnibus clause, we have one more ill-defined element to
discuss. The Supreme Court, in United States v. Aguilar, added another
element to the crime of obstruction under § 1503's omnibus provision,
thereby further muddying already murky waters: (7) The government must
prove that there was a "nexus" between the wrongful conduct and the due
188 590 F.2d 1269, 1270 (4th Cir. 1979).
189 Id. at 1273.
190 Id. at 1274.
191 Id. at 1272.
192 See, e.g., United States v. Machi, 811 F.2d 991 (7th Cir. 1987); United States v.
Silverman, 745 F.2d 1386 (11 th Cir. 1984); United States v. Buffalano, 727 F.2d 50 (2d Cir.
1984).
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administration ofjustice.193 In Aguilar, a judge was convicted under § 1503
for lying to two FBI agents who interviewed him in connection with a grand
jury investigation concerning alleged wrongdoing in the conduct of the
judge's office.' 94  The Supreme Court reversed Aguilar's conviction,
holding that the government had failed to demonstrate a sufficient "nexus"
between the judge's lies and the conduct of judicial proceedings (here, the
grand jury).1 95
The Aguilar Court was apparently concerned that the government's
theory would convert every lie to an investigator into obstruction, when §
1503 was intended to be reserved for obstruction of pending judicial
proceedings. Thus, the Court emphasized, "[t]he action taken by the
accused must be with an intent to influence judicial or grand jury
proceedings; it is not enough that there be an intent to influence some
ancillary proceeding, such as an investigation independent of the court's or
grand jury's authority."' 9 6  The Aguilar Court then imposed on the
Government the requirement that it prove a "nexus"-that is, the
defendant's "act must have a relationship in time, causation or logic with
the judicial proceedings. . . . In other words, the endeavor must have the
'natural and probable effect' of interfering with the due administration of
justice., 197
Does this "nexus" requirement sound familiar? It should. As Justice
Scalia pointed out in his Aguilar dissent, this is the precise language
previously employed in the lower courts to reduce the government's mens
rea burden from a specific intent to obstruct to an intentional act taken with
negligent disregard for its affect on the due administration of justice. 198
Justice Scalia argued in Aguilar that the Court's "nexus" element-which
requires that the defendant's activity have the "natural and probable effect"
of interfering with the due administration of justice-is correctly viewed as
a means of proving intent, not an independent evidentiary requirement as
the majority apparently held. 199 Should lower courts rethink their "specific
intent to obstruct" instructions? Where does the "nexus" requirement fit
into the statutory scheme? The Aguilar Court provided no answers, or at
least no answers that it has consistently applied.
19' 515 U.S. 593, 599 (1995).
194 Id. at 596-97.
'9' Id. at 606.
196 Id. at 599.
197 Id.
'9' Id. at 612 n.2.
199 Id. at 611-12.
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The Aguilar Court seemed to derive the "nexus" requirement from
lower court opinions that were themselves all over the lot with respect to
where that requirement fit in the statutory scheme.200 Those decisions cited
with approval by the Aguilar Court in support of the "nexus" requirement
treated it as modifying the "due administration of justice" element.2 01
Justice Scalia's opinion is correct in noting, however, that the "natural and
probable effect" language that the majority adopted for its "nexus"
requirement was and is often used not as an independent showing necessary
to prove the impairment of the "due administration of justice," but rather as
a means of lightening the government's burden of showing an intent to
obstruct.202 The Aguilar majority certainly implied in its response to Justice
Scalia's dissent its belief that the specific intent to obstruct may be present
even where the requisite "nexus" is absent, thus evidencing its belief that
the two proof requirements are separate. °3 All this would argue, then, that
the Court was tucking this new "nexus" requirement into the "due
administration of justice" element. Instead of endorsing a negligence mens
rea, the "nexus" element was intended to serve as a sort of objective
causation requirement or perhaps as a way of requiring some showing of
materiality (an element not yet read into the statute). If this is a new
element, it would mean that almost ha/f the elements of a prosecution under
§ 1503's omnibus clause are judge-made.
This reading of the Aguilar "nexus" requirement as an additional
element unique to § 1503's omnibus clause prosecutions was borne out by
post-Aguilar court of appeals decisions holding that prosecutors proceeding
under § 1512 did not need to satisfy the Aguilar "nexus" requirement to
200 See, e.g., United States v. Thomas, 916 F.2d 647, 651 n.5 (11 th Cir. 1990) (explaining
that various panels of the Eleventh Circuit have grafted the "nexus" requirement onto
different elements of§ 1503).
201 See United States v. Wood, 6 F.3d 692, 695-96 (10th Cir. 1993); United States v.
Thomas, 916 F.2d 647, 651 (1 1th Cir. 1990); United States v. Walasek, 527 F.2d 676, 679 &
n.12 (3d Cir. 1975).
202 See United States v. Brenson, 104 F.3d 1267, 1277-78 (11 th Cir. 1997).
203 See 515 U.S. at 602. The majority argued that an act done with a specific intent to
obstruct could still not be actionable if it would not have the natural and probable effect of
obstructing justice:
Justice Scalia ... apparently believes that any act, done with the intent to "obstruct ... the due
administration of justice," is sufficient to impose criminal liability. Under the dissent's theory, a
man could be found guilty under § 1503 if he knew of a pending investigation and lied to his
wife about his whereabouts at the time of the crime, thinking that an FBI agent might decide to
interview her and that she might in turn be influenced in her statement to the agent by her
husband's false account of his whereabouts. The intent to obstruct justice is indeed present, but
the man's culpability is a good deal less clear from the statute than we usually require in order to
impose criminal liability [because no nexus has been shown].
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prevail. 20 4 Given that § 1512 does not mandate that a defendant know of a
pending proceeding, and indeed does not require that a pending proceeding
even exist, it was difficult to see how a "nexus" requirement would work in
the § 1512 context. Yet, in the subsequent case of Arthur Andersen, LLP v.
United States, the Supreme Court required proof of a "nexus" in a case
prosecuted under § 1512(b), which has no "due administration of justice"
element.20 5 In Andersen, the Court's discussion-although far from clear
on this point-strongly implies that the "nexus" requirement is inherent in
any attempt to show a "knowingly corrupt" intent to obstruct justice.206
Does it matter what element the "nexus" requirement modifies? Of
course. First, in terms of notice of that which is proscribed, the "nexus"
requirement is not visible in the text of the statute. It would be helpful to
know which element it was read into so that one can forecast whether it
should also be read it into other obstruction statutes that require proof the
same element (e.g., "corrupt" motive or "due administration of justice").
Certainly, this mess is a drag on the fair and efficient administration of
justice. For example, following Aguilar and Andersen, prosecutors will be
scratching their heads about what proof will be required of them. Courts
will be trying to determine how to charge juries on the elements of the
offense. Assumedly, all parties in the system will be trying to figure out
how a "nexus" requirement works in the context of a statute that does not
require knowledge of the pendency of an official proceeding. It is almost
204 See, e.g., United States v. Gabriel, 125 F.3d 89 (2d Cir. 1997); United States v. Veal,
153 F.3d 1233, 1250-51 (1 lth Cir. 1998).
205 125 S. Ct. 2129 (2005).
206 The Andersen Court explained,
The instructions ... were infirm [because] ... [tihey led the jury to believe that it did not have to
find any nexus between the "persua[sion]" to destroy documents and any particular proceeding.
In resisting any type of nexus element, the Government relies heavily on § 1512(e)(1), which
states that an official proceeding "need not be pending or about to be instituted at the time of the
offense." It is, however, one thing to say that a proceeding "need not be pending or about to be
instituted at the time of the offense," and quite another to say a proceeding need not even be
foreseen. A "knowingly ... corrup[t] persaude[r]" cannot be someone who persuades others to
shred documents under a document retention policy when he does not have in contemplation any
particular official proceeding in which those documents might be material.
We faced a similar situation in Aguilar. Respondent Aguilar lied to a Federal Bureau of
Investigation agent in the course of an investigation and was convicted of "'corruptly
endeavor[ing] to influence, obstruct, and impede [a] ... grand jury investigation' under § 1503.
All the Government had shown was that Aguilar had uttered false statements to an investigating
agent "who might or might not testify before a grand jury." We held that § 1503 required
something more-specifically, a "nexus" between the obstructive act and the proceeding. "[I]f
the defendant lacks knowledge that his actions are likely to affect the judicial proceeding," we
explained, "he lacks the requisite intent to obstruct."
Id. at 2136-37.
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inevitable that the lower courts will disagree on the meaning of these
elements, thus ensuring that a defendant who might be acquitted in one
Circuit will be found guilty in another.
In short, absent guidance from Congress or the Supreme Court,
prosecutors, defense counsel, judges, and juries will waste valuable time
and resources trying to figure out what basic notions of justice require to be
crystal clear: the elements of § 1503 and other obstruction statutes. And
defendants may well be subjected to the agony of criminal investigation,
indictment, trial, conviction-and even spend some time in jail-before
being told that (sorry!) the theory of prosecution was mistaken after all.
The saddest part of this story is that § 1503 is only one example of the
disarray that exists in the definition of statutory elements.
2. Section 1512(b) and the Andersen Verdict
A very abbreviated synopsis of the facts of the Andersen case ought to
be sufficient to set the stage for the legal questions we wish to explore.
Andersen was indicted under § 1512(b)(2) for "knowingly ...corruptly"
persuading another person "with intent to . . . cause" that person to
"withhold" documents from, or "alter" documents for use in, an "official
proceeding.,20 7  The government alleged that Andersen violated this
provision by virtue of the fact that Andersen personnel assigned to the
Enron audit team engaged in "a wholesale destruction of documents,"
shredding and deleting Enron-related work papers over a two-week period
in Andersen's Houston, Portland, Chicago and London offices.20 8 The
district court charged the jury, in part, as follows:
(T]o determine whether Andersen corruptly persuaded "another person," an employee
or partner of Andersen is considered "another person." To "persuade" is to engage in
any non-coercive attempt to induce another person to engage in certain conduct. The
word "corruptly" means having an improper purpose. An improper purpose, for this
case, is an intent to subvert, undermine, or impede the fact-finding ability of an
official proceeding. In order to establish this corrupt persuasion element, the
government must prove that the agent of Andersen who engaged in the persuasion, not
the other person persuaded, possessed the improper purpose. The improper purpose
need not be the sole motivation for the defendant's conduct so long as the defendant
acted, at least in part, with that improper purpose.
Thus, if you find beyond a reasonable doubt that an agent, such as a partner, of
Andersen acting within the scope of his or her employment, induced or attempted to
induce another employee or partner of the firm or some other person to withhold,
207 18 U.S.C. § 1512 (2000).
208 See Indictment 9-12, United States v. Arthur Andersen, LLP, Cr. No. H-02-121,
(S.D. Tex. Mar. 14, 2002), as reprinted in O'SULLIVAN, supra note 11, at 442-45.
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alter, destroy, mutilate, or conceal an object, and that the agent did so with the intent,
at least in part, to subvert, undermine, or impede the fact-finding ability of an official
proceeding, then you may find that Andersen committed [an element of the charged
offense.] 209
What is extraordinary about the case is the apparent fact that, although
the jury convicted Andersen, it did not do so on the theory advanced in the
indictment-that is, the Andersen partners' wholesale destruction of Enron-
related audit documents over a two-week period in a variety of Andersen
offices.
Rather, the jury identified the "corrupt persuader" on its special verdict
form as an in-house lawyer for Andersen, Nancy Temple, who was not
involved in the extensive destruction of documents that was the focus of the
indictment. Six of the jurors subsequently explained in post-trial interviews
that the jury convicted Andersen based on one email Temple sent to David
Duncan, Andersen's partner in charge of the Enron account, in which she
advised him to make two alterations in a draft memo he was preparing for
the Andersen files. 2'0 Further background may assist in understanding the
jury's theory.
On October 16, 2001, Enron issued a press release announcing a $618
million net loss for the third quarter of 2001 and announced to analysts that
it would reduce shareholder equity by approximately $1.2 billion. As a
result of these disclosures, the price of Enron's stock plummeted. The
Enron press release characterized certain charges against income for the
third quarter as "non-recurring." Duncan's October 15 draft memorandum
to the files regarding Enron's proposed press release documented that
Andersen had, a few days before the press release was issued, conveyed its
concern to Enron that the characterization of these charges as "non-
recurring" could be misunderstood by investors. It is important to note that
the draft did not anywhere indicate that Andersen had concluded that the
press release was, in fact, misleading. 211 Duncan circulated the draft memo
for comment. On October 16, Temple wrote back to Duncan, suggesting
that he delete reference to his consultation with her and the legal group and
explaining that the reference may constitute a waiver of the attorney-client
privilege and make Temple a witness. She also "suggested deleting some
209 Court's Instructions to the Jury, Arthur Andersen, LLP, Cr. No. H-02-121, as
reprinted in O'SULLIVAN, supra note 11, at 447.
210 Indictment 5-6, Arthur Andersen, LLP, Cr. No. H-02-121, as reprinted in
O'SULLIVAN, supra note 11, at 443.
21) Government Exhibit No. 1018B, Arthur Andersen, LLP, Cr. No. H-02-121, as
reprinted in O'SULLIVAN, supra note 11, at 465.
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language that might suggest we have concluded the release is
misleading.
' 212
Judging from the way in which the indictment was drafted, this
evidence was not submitted to the jury to prove that Temple was the
"corrupt persuader." Although the indictment referred to Andersen's
documentation of its problem with the October 16 earnings release, it did so
under the heading "anticipation of litigation."213 Evidently, this evidence
was introduced in an effort to demonstrate that the Andersen could foresee
the initiation of an "official proceeding" against it.
We shall perhaps never know why the jury rejected the obstruction
theory traced in the indictment. It is reasonably clear from the post-trial
interviews, however, that the jury concluded that Temple's email "corruptly
persuaded" Duncan to "alter" a document-that is his draft memo-by
accepting her two suggested revisions, and that they acted "with intent to
impair" the draft memo's "integrity or availability for use in an official
proceeding." The defense's post-verdict motion took emphatic issue with
the jury's apparent conclusion that Temple persuaded Duncan to "alter" the
memo within the meaning of the statute, arguing that changing a hard-copy
original document by (for example) whiting out a date and inserting a false
date would be an "alteration" but "suggesting edits to a draft memorandum
explicitly circulated for that purpose-an action that will lead to creation of a
new draft"-plainly does not. l4 The defense argued, in vain, that
if collaboration on the redraft of a document may so easily be deemed a crime,
virtually every law firm in the United States engages in criminal conduct every day,
every suggested rephrasing of a memo to the file (or of an FBI form 302 [interview
memorandum]) relating to a matter that might give rise to litigation could be said to
undermine the factfinding function of an official proceeding. That cannot be what
Congress had in mind when enacting Section 1512(b).
2 15
The government defended its verdict in terms that seemed to
contemplate that a lawyer may not-without fear of criminal liability-give
her client advice on word choice used in a draft document to the files where
that word choice is designed to protect the client in any future litigation that
might eventuate.21 6 The defense's motion was ultimately denied based on
212 Id, as reprinted in O'SULLIVAN, supra note 11, at 463.
213 Indictment, supra note 210, § I1, Cr. No. H-02-121, as reprinted in O'SULLIVAN,
supra note 11, at 443.
214 Andersen's Motion for Judgment of Acquittal or a New Trial, Arthur Andersen, LLP,
Cr. No. H-02-121, as reprinted in O'SULLIVAN, supra note 11, at 453.
215 Id.
216 Government's Memorandum of Law in Oppostion to Andersen's Motion for a
Judgment of Acquittal or a New Trial, Arthur Andersen, LLP, Cr. No. H-02-121, as
reprinted in O'SULLIVAN, supra note 11, at 456.
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Federal Rule of Evidence 606(b), which, the District Court held, prohibited
inquiry into the validity of the verdict because insufficient evidence was
provided "of extraneous influence or the type of extraordinary prejudice
that would allow the Court to open to scrutiny the deliberation process. 217
Eventually, as will be discussed below, the Supreme Court reversed
Andersen's conviction because of error in the jury instructions and did not
pass on the validity of the jury's apparent basis for conviction.
C. THE STATUTORY ELEMENT(S) MOST CRITICAL IN TESTING
CRIMINAL CULPABILITY-THE MENS REA ELEMENT(S)-ARE
UNDEFINED, APPLIED IN AN INTERNALLY INCONSISTENT
MANNER, AND POTENTIALLY SANCTION THOSE WHO HAVE
PERFORMED NO GUILTY ACT AND/OR HAVE NO CONSCIOUSNESS
OF WRONGDOING
Reference to the many faces of the word "corruptly" should serve to
illustrate the general deficiencies of the code in relation to clear and
uniform definitions of applicable mens rea elements. "Corrupt" intent is
central to three important obstruction statutes-§ 1503's omnibus
provision, § 1505, and § 1512(b)'s prohibition on "knowingly... corrupt[]"
persuasion to obstruct. As is demonstrated in subsection a, below, contrary
to the usual rules applied in criminal law, judges have held that an
"improper" motive is all that may separate legal-even laudable-behavior
from conduct that will earn the actor jail time under § 1503. And, as is
demonstrated in subsections a and b, below, although one would think that
a "corrupt" intent is a "corrupt" intent, that is not the case; courts have read
the word to have different meanings even within the Chapter devoted to the
single subject-matter of obstruction. What all of the definitions have in
common is their utter lack of meaningful direction; each invites judges and
juries to apply their own views of what constitutes an "evil" or "improper"
motive to the case at bar. Sometimes, as occurred in the Poindexter case
decided under § 1505, that discretion is abused either out of error or for
political purposes.
Finally, the lack of a clear, consistent definition of the applicable mens
rea under § 1512 permitted prosecutors to secure a conviction of Andersen
under jury instructions that invited the jury to convict without any proof of
consciousness of wrongdoing. In essence, prosecutors used their discretion
to try and thus destroy a company on a legal theory that, everyone learned,
was not a crime only on ultimate appeal.
217 Order, Arthur Andersen, LLP, Cr. No. H-02-121, as reprinted in O'SULLIVAN, supra
note 11, at 461.
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1. "Corruptly" Under 18 U.S.C. § 1503
The "corrupt" mens rea required under § 1503 and other obstruction
statutes is nothing more than proof of an "evil" or "improper" motive and
thus is a throw-back that requires policing. As noted above, ancient notions
of mens rea turned on "evil" motives; the modern conception, however, is
that "motives" as elements should be abandoned in favor of proof of
specific states of mind-such as "knowledge" or "purpose., 218 As Jerome
Hall put it in 1960, "hardly any part of penal law is more definitely settled
than that motive is irrelevant" to criminal liability. 21 9  Scholars recently
have taken aim at Hall's statement and the tradition it reflects, both as a
descriptive and as a normative matter. 22  And certainly the scholars are
correct that Hall's much-quoted statement is overinclusive. Thus, motive
has long been relevant as evidence to prove matters such as intent, has
traditionally been part of prosecutors' charging choices, and often has often
been used in judges' sentencing determinations. Legislators have recently
resurrected "motive" crimes as well, making motive an element of an
offense in, for example, hate crimes statutes.
Still, there remains a universal consensus that while "motive" may
sometimes excuse or justify conduct that is otherwise criminal, or it may
make more blameworthy that which is already criminally culpable behavior,
it may not make a crime of an innocent act. "As a general rule, no act
otherwise lawful becomes criminal because done with a bad motive ....
218 See Martin R. Gardner, The Mens Rea Enigma: Observations on the Role of Motive in
the Criminal Law Past and Present, 1993 UTAH L. REv. 635, 640.
The first and historically original concept [of mens rea] embodied an explicitly normative
requirement that the offender not only intentionally commit a criminal act, but also do so out of
evil motivation. The second and currently more predominant tradition adopts an essentially
nonnormative approach that finds sufficient ground for liability in the presence of particular
states of mind without evaluating or even appealing to the motives underlying the offender's
actions.
Id.
219 JEROME HALL, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAW 88 (2d ed. 1960); see also
ALAN W. NORRIE, CRIME, REASON, AND HISTORY: A CRITICAL INTRODUCTION TO CRIMINAL
LAW 37 (1993) ("It is as firmly established in legal doctrine as any rule could be that motive
is irrelevant to responsibility."); Douglas N. Husak, Motive and Criminal Liability, 8 CRIM.
JUST. ETHICS 3, 3 (1989) ("This thesis is endorsed, sometimes with minor qualifications, by
almost all leading criminal theorists.").
220 Compare, e.g., Husak, supra note 219, passim, and Jeffrie G. Murphy, Bias Crimes:
What do Haters Deserve?, 11 CRIM. JUST. ETHICS 20 (1992), with Gardner, supra note 218,
passim, and Whitley R. P. Kaufman, Motive, Intention, and Morality in the Criminal Law,
28 CRIM. JUST. REv. 317 (2003).
221 Walter Harrison Hitchler, Motive as an Essential Element of Crime, 35 DICK. L. REV.
105, 109 (1931).
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A "bad" act must attend a corrupt motive for a variety of good reasons.
"One basic premise of Anglo-American criminal law is that no crime can be
committed by bad thoughts alone" and that basic premise applies in the
obstruction context just as elsewhere. 2  First Amendment concerns play a
part, as does the difficulty of "proving" thoughts unmoored from action and
distinguishing "a fixed intent from mere daydream and fantasy. 223
Professor LaFave emphasizes "the notion that the criminal law should not
be so broadly defined to reach those who entertain criminal schemes but
never let their thoughts govern their conduct. 224
In the context of statutes that do not require proof of a specific type of
obviously criminal "act" (such as killing, raping, or the like), this
prohibition has another rationale. "[I]n morality there is by no means
agreement on just what sort of good motives justify what sort of
wrongdoing" and what sort of "improper" motives might render an innocent
act criminal.225 While we trust our elected representatives to consider,
outside of specific cases, whether particular motives should be a crime,
modem legislatures have generally done so with reasonable specificity.
That is, we know what types of motives are "improper"-such as harming
another because of their race, sex, or ethnicity. When confronted with the
question of what constitutes a "corrupt" motive in the obstruction context,
however, juries and judges are given no such guidance. And where all that
stands between an otherwise legal act and incarceration is a "corrupt"
motive, this lack of guidance constitutes an invitation to arbitrary, uneven,
and potentially very unjust results depending on the "ethical"
predispositions of the persons called upon to decide a given case. This is
especially true when what is at issue is defense counsel's actions in
defending his client. Many jurors will not understand, or if they do,
sympathize with, the defense imperative of zealous advocacy even for a
guilty-as-sin client.
All this renders judicial interpretations and applications of the
"corrupt" motive requirement in § 1503 confounding. Judges regularly
hold that a "corrupt" motive for purposes of § 1503 can make innocent
conduct criminally culpable. As the Seventh Circuit explained in United
States v. Cueto,
222 WAYNE R. LAFAvE, CRIMINAL LAW 303 (4th ed. 2003).
223 Id. at 304.
224 id.
225 Kaufman, supra note 220, at 334 (arguing that the orthodox doctrine regarding the
general irrelevance of motive to criminal liability "is a quite sensible way to pursue goals of
preserving social order, providing clear definitions of criminality, yet allowing prosecutorial
or judicial discretion [in sentencing] to prevent serious injustices").
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"[c]orrect application of Section 1503 ...requires, in a very real sense, that the
factfinder discem-by direct evidence or from inference-the motive which led any
individual to perform particular actions .... 'Intent may make any otherwise innocent
act criminal, if it is a step in the plot."' Therefore, it is not the means employed by the
defendant that are specifically prohibited by the statute; instead, it is the defendant's
corrupt endeavor which motivated the action. Otherwise lawful conduct, even acts
undertaken by an attorney in the course of representing a client, can transgress §
1503 if employed with the corrupt intent to accomplish that which the statute
forbids.22
6
In Cueto, the Seventh Circuit affirmed the conviction of an attorney
under § 1503 for his corrupt attempts to influence the due administration of
justice through, inter alia, filing otherwise unexceptional appellate briefs
and a petition for certiorari with the Supreme Court on behalf of a client.
2 27
It was, in short, Cueto's corrupt motive-which the Seventh Circuit
identified as Cueto's intent to protect his own financial interest in his
client's illegal gambling operations-that converted legitimate advocacy on
behalf of his client into criminal conduct. To demonstrate just how far this
reasoning goes, courts have held that if a lawyer advises a client to assert a
valid privilege-say, his or her right against self-incrimination-that lawyer
may be convicted of obstruction where a jury concludes that his motive was
"corrupt. 1228
226 United States v. Cueto, 151 F.3d 620, 631 (7th Cir. 1998) (citations omitted)
(emphasis added).
227 See id. at 628-29.
228 See United States v. Cintolo, 818 F.2d 980, 992 (1st Cir. 1987) ("[M]eans, though
lawful in themselves, can cross the line of illegality if (i) employed with a corrupt motive,
(ii) to hinder the due administration of justice, so long as (iii) the means have the capacity to
obstruct."); United States v. Cioffi, 493 F.2d 1111, 1119 (2d Cir. 1974); cf United States v.
Farrell, 126 F.3d 484 (3d Cir. 1997) (under § 1512, no). There are two provisions-§§
1512(e) (which, prior to 2002, was numbered § 1512(d)) and 1515(c)-which are intended
to safeguard lawyers from prosecution for allegedly "obstructive" activities related to
legitimate advocacy. The first, § 1512(e) provides an affirmative defense as to which the
defendant has the burden of proof by a preponderance of the evidence. Section 1512(e)
provides that a person may lawfully engage in the prohibited means of influencing testimony
or withholding documents if his conduct "consisted solely of lawful conduct and ... the
defendant's sole intention was to encourage, induce, or cause the other person to testify
truthfully." Second, § 1515(c) was added to the statutory scheme in 1986. It provides: "This
chapter does not prohibit or punish the providing of lawful, bona fide, legal representation
services in connection with or anticipation of an official proceeding." 18 U.S.C. § 1515(c)
(2000). Note that the "chapter" referred to includes §§ 1503, 1505, 1510, 1512, 1519, and
1520.
The reason neither of these sections would seem to save someone like Amil Cueto,
however, is that they do not actually add anything to the statutory scheme. If a "corrupt"
motive makes otherwise legitimate lawyering unlawful, then the provisions giving safe
harbor to "lawful" advocacy activities by definition do not apply. That, at least, is the way
that the government has read them. See Government's Memorandum of Law in Opposition
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Courts do not explain why it is appropriate to read this statute to
violate a foundational rule of criminal law. Nothing on the face of the
statute would seem to require a reading that allows a "corrupt" motive to
render otherwise innocent conduct-like filing legal papers or advising
one's client to claim his constitutional rights-criminal. It may be that
judges have relied upon their moral intuitions rather than their criminal-law
learning. In moral theory,
although a good motive does not excuse a bad intention, a bad ulterior motive does
render an otherwise good action impermissible. In contrast, the orthodox legal
doctrine holds that motives in general are irrelevant, be they good or bad. (Thus an
executioner does not do wrong in executing a man for motives of personal
vengeance). 2
29
While judges' judgments may be correct as a matter of moral theory, it
is not their role to embody that morality in law; that job is emphatically the
province of the legislature.
At the very least, given the centrality of the term "corrupt" in
separating entirely legal activity from activity that will be subject to
criminal sanction, one would think that courts would by now have arrived at
a particular and uniform definition of that critical word. Not so: judging by
the case law, "corruptly" is word of many meanings.230 Justice Scalia
approved one definition in his dissent in Aguilar: "An act is done corruptly
if it's done voluntarily and intentionally to bring about either an unlawful
result or a lawful result by some unlawful method, with a hope or
expectation of either financial gain or other benefit to oneself or a benefit of
another person. ' ,231 This definition's emphasis on financial gain or other
benefit makes it more apposite to public corruption cases than to many
obstruction cases. Subsequently, the Supreme Court noted in Andersen that
the Fifth Circuit Pattern Jury Instructions define "corruptly" for purposes of
§ 1503 as "knowingly and dishonestly, with the specific intent to subvert or
undermine the integrity" of a proceeding. ' 232 In Andersen, the Supreme
Court also (for purposes of determining what "knowingly . . . corruptly"
meant in § 1512) noted that the dictionary defines "corrupt" and "corruptly"
to Andersen's Motion for a Judgment of Acquittal or a New Trial, supra note 216, as
reprinted in O'SULLIVAN, supra note 11, at 459-60.
229 See, e.g., Kaufman, supra note 220, at 334.
230 See, e.g., Eric J. Tamashasky, The Lewis Carroll Offense: The Ever-Changing
Meaning of "Corruptly" Within the Federal Criminal Law, 31 J. LEGtS. 129 (2004); Daniel
A. Shtob, Note, Corruption of a Term: The Problematic Nature of 18 U.S.C. § 1512(c), the
New Federal Obstruction of Justice Provision, 57 VAND. L. REV. 1429 (2004).
231 United States v. Aguilar, 515 U.S. 593, 616-17 (1995) (citation omitted).
232 Anderson v. United States, 125 S. Ct. 2129, 2136 (2005).
2006]
JULIE R. 0 'SULLIVAN
as normally associated with "wrongful, immoral, depraved, or evil. '2 33
Probably the most common way of expressing the meaning of "corruptly"
under § 1503 is acting with "an improper motive. 234  Other popular
formulations are (the circular) acting with a "corrupt motive, ''235 or (the
vague) with an "evil or wicked purpose. 2 36 Glanville Williams said it best:
"[a] layman might find it painfully ridiculous that, after a thousand years of
legal development, lawyers should still be arguing about the expressions
used to denote the basic ideas of our legal system.,
237
How can it be that Congress has invited judges and juries to delve into
the defendant's psychology to determine his motive and to apply their own
notions of what is "evil" or "improper" to judge his actions? How can it be
that judges have decided that an "evil" or "improper" motive can convert an
otherwise blameless act into something that warrants jail time? How can it
be that courts are unable to arrive at a uniform and reasonably specific
meaning for the word "corruptly" in § 1503 given that this one word
separates entirely legal conduct from conduct that could send one away for
ten years? And why is this a ten-year count, anyway? The same offense
was punishable by a maximum of three months in 1892238 and five years in
2005-is this incarceration inflation based on any rational judgment? My
belief is that there are no satisfactory answers to these questions, and that
the American public deserves better.
2. "Corruptly" Under 18 U.S.C. § 1505
While § 1503 applies to obstruction in the context of pending judicial
proceedings, § 1505239 is addressed to obstruction of administrative agency
proceedings and congressional inquiries; otherwise, these two statutes are
very similar in terms of structure and elements. The requisites for a
conviction under § 1505 are that the defendant, (1) knowing that there is a
proceeding pending before a department or agency of the United States or
an inquiry or investigation being had before either House, any committee of
either House, or a joint committee of the Congress; (2) corruptly; (3)
233 Id.
234 See O'SULLIVAN, supra note 11, at 407.
235 id.
236 See United States v. Haas, 583 F.2d 216, 220 (5th Cir. 1978); DeMarco, supra note
185, at 579 n.58.
237 GLANVILLE L. WILLIAMS, THE MENTAL ELEMENT IN CRIME 9 (1965); see also
Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 252 (1952) (Jackson, J.) (bemoaning the "variety,
disparity and confusion" of "definitions of the requisite but elusive mental element").
238 See Pettibone v. United States, 148 U.S. 197, 197 (1892).
239 For the full text of 18 U.S.C. § 1505, see supra note 166.
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endeavors; (4) to influence, obstruct, or impede the "due and proper
administration of the law" under which the pending agency proceeding is
being had, or "the due and proper exercise of the power" of the
congressional inquiry.24° We do not yet know whether the government
must demonstrate a specific intent to obstruct and an Aguilar "nexus" in a §
1505 case. Given the close correspondence between § 1503 and § 1505,
however, the government would be well advised to plead and prove these
judge-made elements.
Whatever "corruptly" means for purposes of § 1503, one would think
that the same meaning would control in § 1505 but this assumption would
be wrong, at least until Congress intervened. In 1990, a jury convicted
Admiral John Poindexter, President Reagan's National Security Advisor,
of, inter alia, two counts of obstruction of justice in violation of § 1505 for
making false or misleading statements to congressional committees,
participating in the preparation of a false chronology, deleting information
from his computer, and arranging a meeting with members of Congress at
which Oliver North gave false statements.24' In United States v.
Poindexter, the D.C. Circuit reversed Poindexter's § 1505 convictions,
ruling that § 1505 was unconstitutionally vague as applied to the false and
misleading statements to Congress. The court found that the word
"corruptly," in § 1505 but not § 1503, did not meet due process standards
for two reasons.
242
First, the D.C. Circuit concluded that to apply § 1505 to Poindexter's
false and misleading statements would require an "intransitive" reading of
the word "corruptly" (i.e., the defendant corrupts or the defendant becomes
corrupt) rather than a "transitive" meaning (i.e., the defendant corrupts
another by causing the other person to act corruptly), and on its face, the
statute favored a transitive reading.243 The court favored a transitive
reading of the statute in part because
[t]he other terms in the disjunctive series in which it appears are "by threats," "[by]
force," and "by any threatening letter or communication," all of which are transitive-
indeed all of which take as their object a natural person. In addition, to read
"corruptly" in an intransitive sense as "wickedly" or "immorally" would appear to
render the other methods of violating the statute superfluous: surely the use of force to
influence a congressional inquiry would always be "wicked" or at least "immoral. '
244
240 See O'SULLIVAN, supra note 11, at 409.
241 United States v. Poindexter, 951 F.2d 369, 377 (D.C. Cir. 1991).
242 Id. at 379.
243 Id. at 377-86.
244 Id. at 379.
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Thus, the court "found that the defendant could not constitutionally be
convicted under § 1505 for his own independent lies. . . . [T]he term
'corruptly' . . . commands a 'transitive' interpretation (A corrupts B), in
contrast with an "intransitive" interpretation (A is or becomes corrupt)
[required by the Poindexter indictment]. ' 45
Second, the D.C. Circuit, after examining various definitions of the
term "corruptly," found that term was too vague to provide sufficient notice
that it forbade lying to Congress.246 The court indicated that "corruptly"
might not be deemed unconstitutionally vague if applied transitively to
reach the "core behavior" at which the statute was addressed, i.e., a case in
which the defendant, "for the purpose of influencing an inquiry, influences
another person (through bribery or otherwise) to violate a legal duty., 24 7 It
concluded, however, that "[e]ven if that statute may constitutionally be
applied to all attempts to influence or to obstruct a congressional inquiry by
influencing another to violate his legal duty, it would still not cover the
conduct at issue on this appeal-making false and misleading statements
[directly] to Congress., 248 Although the word "corrupt," defined as acting
with an "improper motive," certainly is vague, it is hard to credit the D.C.
Circuit's conclusion that the word was unconstitutionally vague in
Poindexter's case. Thus, we will not dwell on the court's outlandish
suggestion that a senior Executive Branch official could not constitutionally
be charged with knowing that he is acting with an "improper" motive when
he intentionally lies to Congress about important matters of U.S. policy.
The D.C. Circuit's first ground for decision is facially more plausible,
but upon closer examination makes no sense given the statutory scheme as
a whole and its holdings under § 1512 and § 1503. As noted above, in 1982
Congress created § 1512, which was specifically aimed at witness
tampering-that is, transitive activity whereby a defendant acts upon
another person. When it created § 1512, Congress shifted "many activities
that were formerly prohibited by §§ 1503 and 1505" to § 1512.249 The Act
"deleted the word 'witness' from § 1503 and deleted the first clause
(prohibiting corruptly etc. influencing etc. a witness) from § 1505.,,25o It
left the omnibus provision of § 1505 untouched. In view of this
congressional activity, which preceded the Poindexter case, it makes little
245 United States v. Kelley, 36 F.3d 1118, 1127 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
246 Poindexter, 951 F.2d at 378.
247 Id at 385 (emphasis added).
248 Id. at 386.
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sense to hold that § 1505 was specifically and solely concerned with
witness tampering of the sort § 1512 was designed to address, while lying
to Congress was not covered by either § 1505 or § 1512.
Further, the Poindexter court's statutory analysis would counsel that §
1503 also apply only transitively-apparently excluding persons such as
perjurers, document destroyers, and other "intransitive" offenders
heretofore regularly sanctioned under that statute. And, one would assume,
the word "corruptly" in this statute is just as vague as the word "corruptly"
in its cousin, § 1505. The D.C. Circuit, however, has rejected a vagueness
challenge to § 1503's use of the term "corruptly" in a case in which the
defendant was convicted under that statute for lying before a grand jury.252
In United States v. Russo, the court did not discuss Poindexter's statutory
construction argument, or rehearse the Poindexter court's problems with the
inherent vagueness of the word "corruptly." 253  Rather, the Russo court
explained that
[w]hile the portion of § 1503 at issue here, and the portion of § 1505 at issue in
Poindexter, are very nearly identical, the settings in which the provisions apply are
vastly different. One can imagine any number of non-corrupt ways in which an
individual can intend to impede the work of an agency or congressional committee.
[One example is] an executive branch official calling the chairman of a congressional
committee and stating, "We both know this investigation is really designed to
embarrass the President (or a Senator), not to investigate wrongdoing. Why don't you
call it off?" The problem for the Poindexter court, then, was to discern some special
meaning in the word "corruptly," some meaning "sufficiently definite, as applied to
the conduct at issue on this appeal, viz. lying to Congress, to be the basis of a criminal
conviction." Otherwise, "the statute would criminalize all attempts to 'influence'
congressional inquiries-an absurd result that the Congress could not have intended in
enacting the statute." We have no such problem in this case.
Anyone who intentionally lies to a grand jury is on notice that he may be corruptly
obstructing the grand jury's investigation. Whatever the outer limits of "corruptly" in
§ 1503, Russo's acts of perjury were near its center .... [As we have said in other
contexts,] "very few non-corrupt ways to or reasons for intentionally obstructing a
judicial proceeding leap to mind." This is why... "the Poindexter court [] drew a
sharp distinction between § 1505 and § 1503, and repeatedly warned that the
provisions were too 'materially different' for the construction of one to guide the
other.
2 5 4
The D.C. Circuit's acceptance of an as-applied vagueness challenge in
Poindexter was, to put it charitably, extremely questionable, resting as it did
on the apparent premise that a senior Executive Branch official who (inter
252 United States v. Russo, 104 F.3d 431 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
253 Id. at 437.
254 Id. at 436 (second alteration in original); see also United States v. Brenson, 104 F.3d
1267, 1280 (11 th Cir. 1997) (rejecting similar attempt to apply Poindexter to § 1503).
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alia) knowingly lied to or misled Congress could not have had notice that
his conduct was "corrupt." One could justifiably ask whether a great many
"non-corrupt ways to or reasons for" impeding a congressional
investigation by intentionally lying to Congress "leap to mind." This author
cannot think of any.
The point, however, is that this construction was open to the court by
virtue of the vagueness and lack of definition inherent in the statute and the
statutory scheme generally. In this one instance, Congress responded to the
decision by adding § 1515(b) to the code in an effort to overrule
Poindexter.5  Section 1515(b) states that "[a]s used in Section 1505, the
term 'corruptly' means acting with an improper purpose, personally or by
influencing another, including making a false or misleading statement, or
withholding, concealing, altering, or destroying a document or other
information., 256 Thus, § 1515(b) puts persons chargeable under § 1505 on
notice "that Congress intended the word 'corruptly' . . . to be used in both
the transitive and intransitive sense, that is, both a defendant who corrupts
herself and a defendant who corrupts another can be prosecuted under
Section 1505. "257 It also, by specifying certain types of activity that are
deemed "corrupt," gives defendants like Poindexter notice that lying to or
misleading Congress is proscribed in § 1505. This correction, by its terms,
applies only to § 1505 and does little to clarify the meaning of the word
"corruptly" for purposes of § 1503 and § 1512. This kind of correction-as
limited as it was-is all too rare, and it is perhaps no accident that it came
after a politically charged (and, some would argue, a politically motivated)
decision.
3. "Corruptly" Under 18 US.C. § 1512(b) & (c)
The Supreme Court's decision in Andersen is laudable in one respect:
it insisted that there be consciousness of wrongdoing before a defendant can
be convicted for "corruptly" obstructing justice under one portion of §
1512(b). That this should even have been an issue, let alone one that had to
be litigated all the way to the Supreme Court, speaks volumes about the
deficiencies of the federal "code."
The Andersen Court spent very little time on the facts, but its
discussion indicates that it assumed that the jury decided the case based on
the Andersen partners' wholesale document destruction, as charged in the
indictment, rather than on Nancy Temple's email, which many jurors
255 See 142 CONG. REC. §§ 11605-02, 11607-608 (1996).
256 18 U.S.C. § 1515(b) (2000) (emphasis added).
257 United States v. Kanchanalak, 37 F. Supp. 2d 1, 4 (D.D.C. 1999).
[Vol. 96
OBSTRUCTION STATUTES AS CASE STUDY
indicated was the true basis for the conviction. In any case, the Court was
principally called upon to decide whether the district court's jury
instructions, reproduced in Part II(l)(b) above, were correct. It determined
that the jury instructions were incorrect in three respects.
First, the Court emphasized that its traditional restraint in assessing the
reach of federal criminal statutes was particularly appropriate where, as in
Andersen, "the act underlying the conviction-'persua[sion]'-is by itself
innocuous.,258 The Court argued that "'persuad[ing]' a person 'with intent
to .. . cause' that person to 'withhold' testimony or documents from a
Government proceeding or Government official is not inherently malign"
259
and emphasized that "[t]he [jury] instructions ...diluted the meaning of
'corruptly' so that it covered innocent conduct., 260 Accordingly, the Court
held that "[o]nly persons conscious of their wrongdoing can be said to
'knowingly . .. corruptly persuad[e].' 261 While this decision might be
thought groundbreaking in that it finally clears up the meaning of the word
"corruptly" for obstruction purposes, that is not the case. The opinion
emphasizes that the Court is interpreting the term "knowingly .
corruptly," which is only used in the particular code section at issue in
Andersen: § 1512(b)(2).
The Court's second and third holdings are related and somewhat
puzzling. Congress specifically provided in § 1515(e)(1) that an official
proceeding "need not be pending or about to be instituted at the time" of the
offense for prosecution under § 1512. Yet the Court ruled that an official
proceeding must be "foreseeable" and that the government must prove an
Aguilar "nexus" between the knowingly corrupt persuasion and the
foreseeable official proceeding.262 In so doing, the Court relied on Aguilar,
with no explanation, or seeming recognition, of the significant differences
between § 1503 and § 1512.
One can surmise that the Court was worried about the potential
application of § 1512, as read by the prosecutors and the district court, to
document retention (i.e., destruction) policies and other non-culpable
instances of legitimate document purges performed in the normal course of
business. The Court specifically noted that "[i]t is, of course, not wrongful
for a manager to instruct his employees to comply with a valid document
retention policy under ordinary circumstances., 263 The Andersen Court's
258 Anderson v. United States, 125. S. Ct. 2129, 2134 (2005).
259 Id.
260 Id. at 2136.
261 Id
262 Id. at 2136-37.
263 Id at 2135.
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requirement of consciousness of wrongdoing, a foreseeable official
proceeding, and proof of a nexus between the act of destruction and the
official proceeding were apparently designed to protect such managers and
other "innocents."
I have no disagreement with what the Court was trying to achieve.
What I find troubling is, first, that a company could be indicted and
convicted-thus destroying the company and the livelihoods of thousands
of people--on the mistaken assumption of the prosecutor, jury, and trial
judge that a "corrupt" intent did not require proof of any consciousness of
wrongdoing. Second, the decision may have-too tardily, to be sure--done
justice in the case of Andersen, but it is an extremely narrow mens rea
decision. This piecemeal fix to one specific subsection is unlikely to affect
the ingrained mistakes courts have made in applying the "corrupt" intent
requirement in other statutory sections. Finally, the Court attempted to
"correct" a potential injustice under the statute in a way that shows a
disregard for the importance of statutes-that is, their particular language,
history, and context. While I may agree with the policy result, the casual
nature with which the Court decided to require a "foreseeable" official
proceeding and to engraft its § 1503 "nexus" requirement onto § 1512
demonstrates that courts have become so accustomed to lawmaking that
they no longer even feel the need to do so in a rigorous and careful way.
These requirements, while they may "solve" problems the Court had with
the Andersen case, may well cause unanticipated problems in future cases.
The Andersen decision, then, serves as a worthy introduction to our
discussion of the problems inherent in case-by-case judicial "fixes."
D. CASE-BY-CASE JUDICIAL "FIXES" (AKA LAW-MAKING) RESULTS IN
MORE CONFUSION AND (SOMETIMES) LESS JUSTICE
Judges cannot seem to resist the urge to "rationalize" the code where
they can. Rather than striking a statute as vague or overboard, judges will
try to "fix" the statute by adding elements, reading existing elements
narrowly, or otherwise tinkering with it. The obstruction area provides
some good examples of the problems that this case-specific fixing creates.
In particular, it illustrates that statute-specific fixes often cause irrational
results when they run into judge-made fixes added to other statutory
provisions.
As examples, I will reference two cases that involve the interaction
between § 1503 and the false statements statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1001. At the
time of the decisions we will be discussing, § 1001 made it a felony
"knowingly and willfully" to make "any false, fictitious or fraudulent
statements or representations" in "any matter within the jurisdiction of any
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department or agency of the United States." Section 1001 is designed to
deal, inter alia, with lies made to investigating officers. Judges concerned
about the breadth of this statute in certain situations created limitations on
its application not found in the language of the statute.
First, judges created what was known as the "exculpatory 'no'
exception to the § 1001 prohibition.264  This doctrine, in simple terms,
provided that a suspect's simple denial of guilt did not constitute a false
statement within the meaning of the statute. There were a number of
concerns underlying this "exception," one of which was that, absent such an
exception, government agents could essentially manufacture crimes.
Since agents may often expect a suspect to respond falsely to their questions, the
statute is a powerful instrument with which to trap a potential defendant.
Investigators need only informally approach the suspect and elicit a false reply and
they are assured of a conviction with a harsh penalty even if they are unable to prove
the underlying substantive crime.265
It was not until 1998 that the Supreme Court definitively rejected this
"exculpatory 'no"' exception in Brogan v. United States.266
Judges created the "judicial function" exception to § 1001 in response
to a different perceived problem. Section 1001 convictions can be secured
either by proof of an affirmative false statement or by proof of the
defendant's concealment of material information by trick, scheme or
device. Judges became concerned about the potential application of § 1001
to acts of alleged "concealment" in the course of judicial proceedings. The
D.C. Circuit asked in Morgan v. United States whether the statute might be
interpreted to criminalize conduct that falls well within the bounds of
responsible advocacy: "Does a defendant 'cover up . . . a material fact'
when he pleads not guilty? Does an attorney 'cover up' when he moves to
exclude hearsay testimony he knows to be true, or when he makes a
summation on behalf of a client he knows to be guilty? '267 In response to
these concerns, the "judicial function" exception was born. This judicially-
crafted exception provided that if a false statement or concealment
concerned a court's "judicial function" it was not actionable under § 1001;
if, however, the conduct was addressed only to the administrative functions
of the court, it was actionable. The Supreme Court was silent for thirty-two
years after Morgan-until 1995 when, in Hubbard v. United States, the
264 See, e.g., Hubbard v. United States, 514 U.S. 695, 698-99 (1995).
265 William J. Schwartz, Note, Fairness in Criminal Investigations Under the Federal
False Statement Statute, 77 COLUM. L. REv. 316, 325-26 (1977) (footnotes omitted).
266 522 U.S. 398, 408 (1998).
267 309 F.2d 234, 237 (D.C. Cir. 1962).
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Court held that § 1001 did not, in fact, even apply to the judicial branch.268
A year later, Congress responded to Hubbard by amending the statute to
explicitly include false statements made in matters over which the judicial
branch has jurisdiction and by crafting its own limited exception for certain
communications made by parties or their counsel to judges.269
Having sketched out these judicially-created exceptions to § 1001, we
can examine now their interaction with judicial interpretations of the
obstruction statutes. First, one might ask why in the world prosecutors
faced with lies to FBI agents did not simply charge Judge Aguilar with a
false statement under 18 U.S.C. § 1001. The problem with proceeding
under § 1001 was the "exculpatory 'no"' exception. The Ninth Circuit
below in Aguilar recognized that the conduct alleged in Aguilar's case "is
governed not by section 1503 but by 18 U.S.C. § 1001," but acknowledged
that in the Ninth Circuit Aguilar's prosecution under § 1001 would have
been barred by the "exculpatory 'no"' doctrine. 27°  Brogan v. United
States, in which the Supreme Court rejected the "exculpatory 'no"'
exception, was not decided until four years after the Ninth Circuit's
decision in Aguilar and obviously not soon enough to provide prosecutors
with the appropriate tool to address Aguilar's lies.27'
Accordingly, the prosecutors stretched to bring an obstruction case.
The Supreme Court, apparently disturbed by the possibility that all lies to
investigators might be brought as obstruction cases, responded by doing a
little "fixing" of its own: that is, engrafting a new element, the "nexus"
requirement, onto § 1503 which would apply in all cases-whether they
involved lies to investigators or not. So Judge Aguilar's conduct-although
it clearly ought to have been subject to criminal sanction (at least in the
view of this author)-was not covered by either § 1001 or § 1503 due to
judicial "fixing."
Another example of the problems that arise from case-by-case "fixes"
is the case of United States v. Wood.272 In Wood, a defendant allegedly
made false statements to FBI agents who were "acting under the authority
26' 514 U.S. 695, 715 (1995).
269 See 18 U.S.C. § 1001(b) (2000) ("Subsection (a) does not apply to a party to ajudicial
proceeding, or that party's counsel, for statement, representations, writings or documents
submitted by such party or counsel to a judge or magistrate in that proceeding.") This
revision obviously does not accept the line between "judicial" functions and "administrative"
functions drawn by the courts; rather, it seems to give a free pass to parties and their counsel
for any communication while providing no haven for non-party communications regardless
of the context.
270 United States v. Aguilar, 21 F.3d 1475, 1483 (9th Cir. 1994).
271 522 U.S. 398 (1998).
272 958 F.2d 963 (10th Cir. 1992).
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of the Phoenix grand jury." The court of appeals affirmed the dismissal of a
§ 1001 count brought against the defendant because his statements were
made in the course of a judicial proceeding and thus were exempt from
prosecution under the judge-made "judicial function" exception. At the
same time, however, the court affirmed dismissal of the § 1503 count
because the defendant's statement failed the Aguilar nexus standard-that
is, it would not have the natural and probable effect of impeding the
pending grand jury investigation.
E. THE OVERLAPS IN, AND IRRATIONAL GRADING OF, OBSTRUCTION
OFFENSES OVER-EMPOWERS PROSECUTORS
To illustrate the power that prosecutors derive from the vagueness,
redundancy, and over breadth of the obstruction statutes, let us take a
couple of representative fact situations and assess the extent to which the
obstruction statutes offer prosecutors charging choices. Readers will recall
that such choices mean that prosecutors' leverage over defendants is
augmented by their ability to choose offenses with greater or lesser
sentencing exposure or other consequences. The irrationalities in grading
reflected in random statutory maximums is particularly acute in the
obstruction area and gives prosecutors unwarranted power to force
dispositions. These characteristics also mean that prosecutors may be able
to bring cases under one statute, that, for evidentiary or other reasons,
would fail under a statutory provision intended to specifically address the
conduct at issue. Sometimes this may serve the interests of justice in
permitting punishment of an obviously culpable individual. In this context,
however, given the judicial constructions of the statutes discussed above, it
may well result in prosecutors being able to successfully convict persons
who should not be subjected to criminal sanction.
1. Assume that a Defendant Is Alleged To Have Intentionally Lied Under
Oath Before a Grand Jury or During a Congressional Investigation
In addition to whatever perjury counts could be brought under 18
U.S.C. §§ 1621 and 1623, the defendant may be prosecuted under either §
1503's omnibus clause or (assuming judges do not adopt a limiting
construction) § 1512(c)(2)'s new omnibus clause. Section 1512(c)(2)'s
omnibus clause was added to § 1512 in 2002, as a part of the flurry of
changes designed to respond to the Andersen case. Sections 1512(c)(1) and
(2) are intransitive provisions-that is, they apply to obstructive activity
performed directly by the defendant, rather than obstructive activity the
defendant persuades, threatens, or misleads others to do. This new section,
then, converts § 1512 from it original function-a pure witness tampering
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statute-into an amalgam that apparently substantially overlaps with other
code sections. I say "apparently" because courts may try to find limiting
constructions for § 1512(c)(2) so as to avoid the most egregious overlap in
coverage-an overlap that would probably eliminate use of § 1503 in favor
of § 1505(c)(2) in cases to which both apply.273
The overlap between the two sections is pronounced: both cover cases
in which the defendant acted "corruptly" to "influence," "obstruct," or
"impede." Section 1503 requires that the object of this activity must be the
"due administration of justice" in a pending judicial proceeding, and the
Supreme Court has added the requirements that the government prove a
specific intent to obstruct and an Aguilar "nexus" to secure a § 1503
conviction. Section 1512(c)(2) applies more broadly. The object of the
obstructive activity may be an "official proceeding," which is defined to
include not only judicial proceedings, but also proceedings before Congress
274
or federal agencies. While the Supreme Court has mandated that, under §
1503, the defendant must know of the pending judicial proceeding,
Congress dictated that the "official proceeding" need not be pending for
purposes of § 1512 prosecutions.275 (The Andersen Court did indicate,
however, that the official proceeding must at least be foreseeable for
purposes of § 1512(b)).276 We simply do not know whether the Supreme
273 One could rely, for example, on the interpretive canon of ejusdem generis, which
"limits general terms which follow specific ones to matters similar to those specified."
Section 1512(c)(2)'s new, very general, omnibus provision follows immediately after §
1512(c)(1), which focuses only on defendant's intransitive efforts to destroy documents.
Because of this Congressional choice, counsel may attempt to craft a theory that limits the
omnibus clause to similar activities. Whether such an effort would fly, however, is hard to
forecast. See, e.g., United States v. Aguilar, 515 U.S. 593, 614-15 (1995) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) (rejecting argument that ejusdem generis required § 1503's omnibus clause to be
read narrowly).
274 Sections 1512(b)(1), (b)(2)(A)-(D), and (c)(1)-(2) all require that the proscribed
conduct occur in the context of an "official proceeding." Section 1515(a) defines "official
proceeding" as a proceeding in any federal court (including those conducted before
bankruptcy judges) and before a federal grand jury, "a proceeding before the Congress," "a
proceeding before a Federal Government agency which is authorized by law," or a
proceeding involving (interstate) insurance businesses. Thus, § 1512 is much more broadly
applicable than § 1503, which may be invoked only when the due administration of justice in
judicial proceedings (such as grand jury or court proceedings) is threatened.
275 "In contrast to section 1503, 'an official proceeding need not be pending or about to
be instituted at the time of the offense' for a defendant to be convicted under § 1512(b).
United States v. Frankhauser, 80 F.3d 641, 651 (1st Cir. 1996) (quoting 18 U.S.C. §
1512(f)(1) (2000), which at the time was numbered § 1512(e)(1)). "Because an official
proceeding need not be pending or about to be instituted at the time of the [allegedly
obstructive conduct], the statute obviously cannot require actual knowledge of the
proceeding." Id; see also United States v. Kelley, 36 F.3d 1118, 1128 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
276 Arthur Andersen LLP v. United States, 125 S. Ct. 2129, 2136-37 (2005).
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Court will add to § 1512(c)(2) a specific intent to obstruct element. The
Andersen Court did add to § 1512(b)'s elements the "nexus" requirement,
but it is unclear whether that ruling also applies to § 1512(c). Only in one
respect is § 1503 more attractive: it outlaws "endeavors," while § 1512
covers only "attempts," a marginally more demanding standard.
So what if prosecutors enjoy a choice of charges? What difference
does it make? In terms of bargaining power, a lot. Under § 1503, the
maximum penalty is ten years if no killing or other special circumstances
are involved. Under § 1512(c), however, the maximum penalty is twenty
years for, in many cases, the same conduct. Note that § 1512(c)(2)'s new
omnibus provision also substantially overlaps with § 1505's prohibition on
obstruction in the context of congressional and agency investigations. Here
the disparities in statutory maximums is even more pronounced: under §
1505, in the absence of proof that the offense involves terrorism, the
statutory maximum penalty is five years' imprisonment. It may be worth
asking at this point whether obstruction in the context of agency or
congressional proceedings is less dangerous or blameworthy than
obstruction in other contexts (e.g., judicial proceedings under § 1503)?
What rationale could be advanced for a fifteen-year difference in the
defendant's potential sentencing exposure for obstructive conduct in the
agency or congressional context dependent only on whether a prosecutor
chooses to proceed under § 1505 or § 1512(c)(2)?
These overlaps obviously give prosecutors a huge club with which to
induce pleas or cooperation. While the use of such "clubs" is not
constitutionally troubling,277 one has to ask whether prosecutors should be
required to bargain based on the strength of their cases, not the vagaries the
code hands them. More troubling is the possibility that, faced with the
difference between a possible penalties of five years and twenty years,
defendants may, even in truly contestable or borderline cases, choose to
plead rather than seek a resolution before a jury.
2. Assume that a Defendant Is Alleged To Have Lied To-That Is, Tried To
Mislead-A Witness Called Before a Grand Jury or Congressional
Committee
Defendants indicted under § 1503 for witness tampering that could be
prosecuted under § 1512 often make the argument that Congress's creation
of § 1512 repealed by implication the application of § 1503's "omnibus"
provision to witness tampering. The Second Circuit stands alone in
accepting this argument, holding that prosecutors must pursue witness
277 See Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357 (1978).
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278tampering under § 1512, not § 1503's "omnibus" provision. All other
circuits to consider the issue have held to the contrary. 279 The statutes
available to prosecute this type of witness tampering, then, will depend on
whether the defendant acted within or without the Second Circuit.
In most federal circuits, one could proceed under either § 1503 or §
1512 in the case posited. Under § 1503, the government would have to
show that the defendant, knowing that a judicial proceeding was pending,
corruptly endeavored to influence, obstruct or impede the due
administration of justice, with a specific intent to obstruct, and in
circumstances where it was foreseeable that the defendant's lies would have
the natural and probable effect of impeding justice. Under § 1505, of
course, many of the same elements would be required in the context of
congressional or agency investigations, although we do not yet know
whether § 1505 requires the government to prove a specific intent to
obstruct or an Aguilar "nexus." Finally, again depending on how courts
read § 1512(c)(2), it may be that this new omnibus provision would apply
as well.
All of these statutes require proof of at least "corrupt" intent. By
contrast, under § 1512(b), the government need only prove that the
defendant knowingly engaged in misleading conduct toward another person
with intent to influence, delay or prevent the testimony of any person in an
official proceeding. I will assume that Andersen's additional requirements
that a "nexus" be proven and that the official proceeding be foreseeable
would apply. The Andersen Court's requirement that the defendant be
conscious of his wrongdoing-which the Court read into the "knowingly..
• corruptly" persuasion element of § 1512(b)-certainly does not apply
here, however, where the charge is that the defendant "knowingly" misled
another witness. Absent further judicial "fixing," the only mens rea
requirements are that the defendant knew he was engaged in misleading
conduct and intended to influence that person's testimony.
What does this overlap mean? When it has a choice, the government
would rationally choose § 1512(b) because of its more forgiving mens rea
standard, the fact that an official proceeding need only be foreseeable, and
its perfectly ample ten-year maximum. Prosecutors may not always be able
to sufficiently master the welter of obstruction statutes to choose wisely,
however. For example, at the time Aguilar was charged, the "misleading"
conduct portion of § 1512 was available to the government. Yet, in
Aguilar, the government lost under the Supreme Court's reading of § 1503
278 See United States v. Masterpol, 940 F.2d 760 (2d Cir. 1991).
279 See, e.g., United States v. Ladum, 141 F.3d 1328 (9th Cir. 1998); United States v.
Mullins, 22 F.3d 1365, 1369 (6th Cir. 1994).
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when it almost certainly could have secured a conviction under § 1512(b)
for Aguilar's attempt to "mislead" the agents where an official proceeding
was foreseeable. This is another cost of an incoherent code: the amount of
time and training (and resources spent litigating these issues) that must be
devoted in order to give prosecutors, defense lawyers and courts a chance of
dealing intelligently with these statutes.
For the defendant, a critical affect of this overlap lies in the power it
gives prosecutors to manipulate the potential sentencing consequences of its
charge. Again, a defendant may be sentenced (outside the Second Circuit)
for: up to five years under § 1505 for misleading witnesses during a
pending congressional investigation; up to ten years under § 1503 for
misleading a witness in the context of a pending judicial proceeding; up to
ten years under § 1512(b); and up to twenty years under the newly minted §
1512(c)(2) omnibus provision. And again, one has to ask what penal
purpose is serving by permitting identical conduct to be prosecuted under a
number of statutes specific to the subject-matter when the grading of these
offenses is so disparate?
3. Assume that the Defendant Destroyed or Concealed Documents that He
Knew Would Shortly Be Subpoenaed by a Grand Jury or by a
Congressional Committee
Sections 1503 (or 1505) and 1512(c)(1) substantially overlap in this
context, yet a defendant might get a sentence of: up to five years under §
1505 for destroying materials needed for a pending congressional
investigation (after Congress revised the statute to respond to the
unfortunate Poindexter decision); up to ten years under § 1503 for
document destruction in the context of a pending judicial proceeding; and
up to twenty years under the newly added § 1512(c)(1) for corruptly
altering, destroying, mutilating, or concealing a document or other object
with the intent to impair the object's integrity or availability for use in
judicial proceedings, congressional investigations, or other pending or
foreseeable "official proceedings."
Not content with providing prosecutors with this array of choices,
Congress also responded to the Andersen case by enacting 18 U.S.C. §§
1519 and 1520.280 Although § 1519281 is hardly a model of clarity, it
280 See, e.g., Dana E. Hill, Note, Anticipatory Obstruction of Justice: Pre-emptive
Document Destruction Under the Sarbanes-Oxley Anti-Shredding Statute, 18 U.S. C. § 1519,
89 CORNELL L. REv. 1519 (2004).
281 18 U.S.C. § 1519 (2000) (Destruction, alteration, or falsification of records in Federal
investigations and bankruptcy) provides,
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appears to apply in the context of executive branch or agency investigations
(overlapping with § 1505) and bankruptcy proceedings (thus overlapping to
that extent with § 1503).282 Section 1519 is clearly intransitive and thus
should be measured against the intransitive provisions of § 1512(c). 283
Whoever knowingly alters, destroys, mutilates, conceals, covers up, falsifies, or makes a false
entry in any record, document, or tangible object with the intent to impede, obstruct, or influence
the investigation or proper administration of any matter within the jurisdiction of any department
or agency of the United States or any case filed under title 11, or in relation to or contemplation
of any such matter or case, shall be fined under this title, imprisoned not more than 20 years, or
both.
282 Section 1519 is restricted to circumstances in which the destruction or alteration of
physical evidence takes place in connection with "any matter within the jurisdiction of any
department or agency of the United States" or a bankruptcy case under title 11 (as opposed
to § 1503, which requires knowledge of a pending judicial proceeding, or § 1512(c), which
applies to obstructive activity pertinent to an "official proceeding"). What does this
jurisdiction provision mean? The definitions of § 1515(a) do not apply; by that subsection's
terms, it is confined to sections 1512 and 1513. The reference to "any department or agency
of the United States" may be drawn from the portion of § 1505 proscribing obstruction in
connection with federal agency proceedings. That portion of § 1505 has been confined in
application to proceedings before executive branch departments (e.g., Department of Justice,
IRS, Customs Service) or federal agencies (e.g., SEC). See also 18 U.S.C. § 6 (2000).
It also may be notable that the language here echoes the language of 18 U.S.C. § 1001
(2000) before that statute was amended in 1996. Prior to 1996, § 1001 outlawed false
statements "within the jurisdiction of any department or agency of the United States." The
Supreme Court, in Hubbard v. United States, 514 U.S. 695 (1995), read the words "any
department or agency of the United States" to exclude the judicial branch. The Hubbard
Court's reasoning also indicated that the Court would read the language to exclude false
statements made to the legislative branch. See, e.g., United States v. Oakar, 111 F.3d 146,
153 (D.C. Cir. 1997). Congress overruled the Hubbard decision by amending § 1001 to
include false statements made "in any matter within the jurisdiction of the executive,
legislative, or judicial branch of the Government of the United States." 18 U.S.C. § 1001
(2000). Given this recent judicial and legislative interchange, one must presume that
Congress intentionally chose language that would be read to preclude application of § 1519
to the judicial or legislative branches. It appears, then, that this statute is aimed at
obstructive activity that affects the investigation, or proper administration, of any matter
within the jurisdiction of the executive branch or the independent agencies. This limitation
is consistent with the context in which the statute was enacted: Congress was, at least in
part, concerned with the obstructive activity of Andersen that was said to impede the
investigation of Enron's financials by the SEC. Also, given the similarity in language, it
seems likely that courts will turn to the Supreme Court's broad interpretation of the term
"jurisdiction" under § 1001 and hold that that term includes "all matters confided to the
authority of an agency or department." United States v. Rodgers, 466 U.S. 475, 479 (1984).
283 The Department of Justice's explanation of this provision states that "[t]his section
explicitly reaches activities by an individual 'in relation to or contemplation of any matters.
No corrupt persuasion is required. New section 1519 should be read in conjunction with the
amendment to 18 U.S.C. 1512 added by Section 1102 of this Act,... which similarly bars
corrupt acts to destroy, alter, mutilate or conceal evidence, in contemplation of an 'official
proceeding."' Attorney General's Field Guidance on 2002 Sarbanes-Oxley Act, at § 802.
Senate Judiciary Committee Chairman Patrick Leahy wrote a letter to Attorney General John
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Section 1519, unlike § 1512(c), does not require proof of a "corrupt" intent.
It punishes any "knowing" impairment of a physical object with the "intent"
to impede, obstruct, or influence the investigation or proper administration
of matter or case, or "in relation to or contemplation" of any such matter or
case. Obviously, a proceeding need not be pending and, given the mens rea
stated in the statute, it is unlikely that courts will require proof that the
defendant acted with a specific intent or a consciousness of wrongdoing.
Yet § 1519, like § 1512(c), carries a penalty of up to twenty years'
imprisonment. Note that, in contrast, a conviction for other types of non-
coercive witness tampering under § 1512(b) results in exposure of up to ten
years' imprisonment. Is the knowing (but not necessarily corrupt)
destruction, alteration, or concealment of physical evidence in
contemplation of some investigation twice as culpable or dangerous as
bribing witnesses to lie under oath?
Finally, if accountants' audit papers concerning a regulated corporate
issuer of securities are involved, newly-enacted § 1520 may apply.284
Ashcroft objecting to some of the positions taken in the Justice Department's Field Guidance
Memorandum. See White Collar Crime: Leahy Faults Ashcroft Guidance On
Implementation of Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 71 CRIM. L. REP. (BNA) 583 (2002). In particular,
he disagreed with the Department's assertion that §§ 1512 and 1519 should be read "in
conjunction with" each other. Senator Leahy claimed that § 1519 "is plainly written to be a
new, stand alone felony" that "is in no way linked" to the amendment to § 1512. Id.
Although Senator Leahy argued that reading § 1519 in this manner "risks a significant
narrowing" of the new offense, he provided no specifics to support this judgment. Id.
284 Section 1520 (Destruction of corporate audit records) provides:
(a)(1) Any accountant who conducts an audit of an issuer of securities to which section 10A(a) of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. 78j-l(a)) applies, shall maintain all audit or
review workpapers for a period of 5 years from the end of the fiscal period in which the audit or
review was concluded.
(2) The Securities and Exchange Commission shall promulgate, within 180 days, after adequate
notice and an opportunity for comment, such rules and regulations, as are reasonably necessary,
relating to the retention of relevant records such as workpapers, documents that form the basis of
an audit or review, memoranda, correspondence, communications, other documents, and records
(including electronic records) which are created, sent, or received in connection with an audit or
review and contain conclusions, opinions, analyses, or financial data relating to such an audit or
review, which is conducted by any accountant who conducts an audit of an issuer of securities to
which section IOA(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. 78j-I(a)) applies. The
Commission may, from time to time, amend or supplement the rules and regulations that it is
required to promulgate under this section, after adequate notice and an opportunity for comment,
in order to ensure that such rules and regulations adequately comport with the purposes of this
section.
(b) Whoever knowingly and willfully violates subsection (a)(1), or any rule or regulation
promulgated by the Securities and Exchange Commission under subsection (a)(2), shall be fined
under this title, imprisoned not more than 10 years, or both.
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Section 1520 is notably different from § 1512(c) and § 1519 in that it does
not penalize the obstructive act of compromising or destroying physical
evidence in certain contexts. Instead, it establishes a positive duty to retain
specified records and then penalizes the "knowing and willful" failure to
meet that duty with a sentence of up to ten years' imprisonment. Note that
this provision does not require a corrupt intent for criminal liability to
attach, nor does it require that proceedings be pending or even
contemplated.
4. Assume that a Defendant Persuaded Another To Destroy Documents
Subpoenaed by a Grand Jury or a Congressional Committee
We know, after Andersen, that § 1512(b)(2) may apply in these
circumstances. Alternatively, the government could pursue the defendant
under § 1503 if the conduct involves pending judicial proceeding, or § 1505
if it involves a pending congressional or agency investigation. Once again,
reference to congressional grading choices illustrates the irrationalities of
this portion of the code. First, § 1503 and § 1505 can apply either where
the defendant is the primary actor or (outside the Second Circuit) where the
defendant acts on another to induce the other to destroy documents and the
like. However, the statutory maximums for each of these statutes do not
differ depending on the context. So, for example, a defendant charged
under § 1503 could be sentenced to up to ten years' imprisonment for either
transitive or intransitive document destruction, but he can also, at the
prosecutor's election (assuming either section could be charged on the
facts) be potentially subject to twenty years' imprisonment for intransitive
document destruction under § 1512(c)(1). If all this occurs within the
context of an agency or congressional investigation, these irrationalities are
compounded. A defendant charged under § 1505 could "only" be sentenced
to up to five years' imprisonment for either transitive or intransitive
document destruction, but he can also, at the prosecutor's election
(assuming either section could be charged on the facts) be potentially
subject to ten years' imprisonment under § 1512(b) if he persuades another
to do his dirty work but up to twenty years' imprisonment if he does his
own document destruction under § 1512(c)(1).
(c) Nothing in this section shall be deemed to diminish or relieve any person of any other duty
or obligation imposed by Federal or State law or regulation to maintain, or refrain from
destroying, any document.
18 U.S.C. § 1520 (2000).
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III. THE U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES, BOOKER, AND THE RENEWED
PROSPECTS FOR CODE REFORM
The state of the federal criminal code threatens the viability of the
entire penal enterprise-that is, the law's capacity to command the respect
of those who must abide by it and punish, consistent with the purposes
identified by Congress and constitutional due process and equal protection
norms, those who do not. What accounts for the fact that the federal
criminal code is universally reviled but nothing has been done about it?
Historically, 285 and lately, 286 politics has not been kind to code reform
projects. "Reform of the federal criminal law is a project of awesome scope
and complexity entailing not merely legal considerations but also sensitivity
to history, politics, social psychology, penology and the religious, ethnic
and economic tensions within this nation. 2 87  On the federal level, a
number of forces are working against reform at any given time. Vested
interests are a huge factor. Prosecutors, judges, and defense counsel are
busy people with little time to focus on the larger project of rationalization.
Further, they are generally disinclined to push for a new code when they
have invested so much time and effort in making sense of the current code
and cannot forecast whose ox will be gored by reform.288 What "reform" is
made often comes piecemeal, with amendments driven by special-interest
group lobbying or the latest headline; such amendments simply further
degrade the criminal code.289
A strange combination of forces, however, suggests that code reform
now may be possible. As reference to the affiliations of the individuals and
sources I have cited above may suggest, the consensus regarding the sorry
state of the federal criminal code is just as strong as it was decades ago and
that consensus is increasingly shared across the political spectrum. In short,
that the criminal code is a disgrace is not an issue about which reasonable
minds differ (although they may accord different priorities to its overhaul).
What may translate widely-held disgust with the state of the federal
criminal "code" into active efforts to achieve code reform is the Supreme
285 Gail M. Beckman, Three Penal Codes Compared, 10 AM. J. LEGAL HISTORY 149
(1966); Maxwell Bloomfield, William Sampson and the Codifiers: The Roots of American
Legal Reform, 1820-1830, 11 AM. J. LEGAL HISTORY 234 (1967); Sanford H. Kadish,
Codifiers of the Criminal Law: Wechsler's Predecessors, 78 COLUM. L. REV. 1098 (1978).
286 For insights into the politics surrounding recent code reform efforts, see Gainer,
Federal Criminal Code Reform, supra note 3, passim; Joost, supra note 1, passim; Lynch,
Revising the Model Penal Code, supra note 20, at 225; Schwartz, supra note 8, passim.
287 Schwartz, supra note 8, at 4.
288 See, e.g., Paul H. Robinson & Michael T. Cahill, Can a Model Penal Code Second
Save the States from Themselves?, 1 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 169, 173-75 (2003).
289 Id. at 170 (making the case for comprehensive, rather than piecemeal, reform).
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Court's recent landmark decision in Booker v. United States, holding that
the Sentencing Guidelines cannot be applied in a mandatory fashion.290
While much of the ensuring commentary has been consumed with
discussion of sentencing policy, commentators are increasingly coming to
the conclusion that code reform must be part of any response to the
upheaval in the federal criminal system occasioned by Booker.
This thesis requires some explanation regarding the relationship
between code reform and the Sentencing Guidelines. During the 1960's
and 1970's, federal code reform was a hot issue, pushed by Democratic and
Republican administrations alike.291  Despite massive efforts by many
parties, including many members of Congress, code reform efforts
languished and then died the 1980's. The only part of that effort to come to
fruition was the attempted rationalization of sentencing through delegation
of sentencing policy to the newly-created U.S. Sentencing Commission.292
In essence, the politics and circumstances in the early 1980's meant that,
although Congress did not have the political will to reform the criminal
code at the front end-by sorting out crimes and statutory maximums-it
decided to let an expert, specialized agency attempt to rationalize it through
the back door-by attempting to make sentencing more uniform and
proportional.293  Since that time, the overwhelming majority of energy-
scholarly and congressional-formerly absorbed by substantive code
reform has been absorbed by debates about sentencing policy.
In the pre-Guidelines federal sentencing system (as today) prosecutors
exercised broad discretion in choosing the applicable charge. Once a
conviction was obtained, sentencing judges had the discretion to choose a
sentence anywhere within the usually generous penalty range set by statute
(e.g., 0-10 years).294 Judges were permitted, and indeed encouraged, to
consider all manner of "real" information regarding the offender and the
offense, including proof of other criminal conduct for which the defendant
had not been convicted.295 The judge's discretion was circumscribed only
by the minimum or maximum punishments prescribed in the statute(s) for
whose violation the defendant was convicted; these congressionally-set
290 543 U.S. 220, 226-27 (2005).
291 See NAT'L COMM'N ON REFORM OF FED. CRIMINAL LAWS, FINAL REPORT: A PROPOSED
NEW FEDERAL CRIMINAL CODE (1971); Gainer, Federal Criminal Code Reform, supra note
3, at 92-135; Joost, supra note 1, passim.
292 See, e.g., Joost, supra note 1, at 210-212.
293 See id. at 210-12.
294 See, e.g., Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 363-64 (1989).
295 See, e.g., Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 247 (1949) ("Highly relevant ... to
[the judge's] selection of an appropriate sentence is the possession of the fullest information
possible concerning the defendant's life and characteristics.").
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statutory minimums and maximums provided a floor or ceiling for the
judge's sentence. This statutory constraint did not in practice significantly
limit judges' sentencing discretion, however, in that the statutory ranges
generally were sufficiently broad to permit different sanctions to be
imposed upon different defendants for the same statutory offense based
upon disparities in the "real" characteristics of the offenses and the
offenders.2 96 "So long as the judge kept within the statutory range, there
were virtually no rules about how he or she made the choice of sentence,
and the sentence was effectively unreviewable by a court of appeals.,
2 97
The impetus behind the Sentencing Guidelines was evidence that
showed that the unconstrained discretion exercised by judges resulted in
disparate sentencing treatment of similarly situated defendants.298 In the
Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, Congress delegated to the U.S. Sentencing
Commission the task of making more uniform, proportional, and rational
federal sentencing through promulgation of mandatory guidelines that
directly constrained the sentencing discretion of judges.299 The mandatory
Sentencing Guidelines provided sentencing formulas to be applied to the
facts of offenders' cases and required judges to sentence offenders within
the relatively narrow sentencing range (e.g., 15-2 months) dictated by the
formulas absent extraordinary circumstances. The thought was that, by
constraining the sentencing discretion of judges, uniform and proportionate
sentencing could be achieved.
A major difficulty the Sentencing Commission faced in undertaking
this mission was the chaotic nature of the criminal code and the reality that
prosecutorial charging decisions based on that code could reintroduce
disparities among similarly situated defendants. The Commission did not
(and, given its mandate, could not) seek directly to regulate prosecutorial
charging choices. It chose, however, to attempt to blunt the extent to which
those choices could re-introduce sentencing disparities by creating a largely
"real offense" sentencing system. This modified "real" offense sentencing
system meant that the sentence to be imposed would be more a function of
what the defendant "really" did than the charge the prosecutor chose to levy
against him.30
0
296 See, e.g., Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 364.
297 Frank 0. Bowman, III, Departing Is Such Sweet Sorrow: A Year of Judicial Revolt on
"Substantial Assistance" Departures Follows a Decade of Prosecutorial Indiscipline, 29
STETsON L. REv. 7, 9 (1999) (footnotes omitted).
298 See, e.g., Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000) (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
299 See O'SULLIVAN, supra note 11, at 122-23 (citing sources).
300 See id. at 122-36.
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Three aspects of this modified "real" offense sentencing system are
worthy of discussion for present purposes. First, the Sentencing
Commission created its own classification scheme, meaning that it
attempted to have the same sentencing calculations apply to related
categories of offenses grouped largely by type of harm. For example, the
Commission determined that the sentencing calculus to be applied to a
defendant charged with some type of obstruction offense would (for the
most part) be the same-regardless of which of a number of related
obstruction provisions (18 U.S.C. § 1503, 1505-13, 1516, or 1510)
prosecutors elected to charge.3°'
Second, the Guidelines required judges, in many cases, to consider
related but uncharged conduct that the Guidelines deemed relevant to an
assessment of offender culpability even though the conduct was never tried
to a jury and the defendant was not convicted for that conduct. For
example, assume prosecutors charged the defendant with one fraud count
alleging that he bilked one victim out of $1000. The sentencing judge,
301 See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2J1.2 (2005). Under § 2J1.2 (and
assuming that none of the cross-references apply), defendants convicted under the above
code sections started with an offense level of 14 (which, assuming no criminal history,
worked out to a sentencing range of 18-24 months). Enhancements were then added for the
particular circumstances of the case. If the offense involved causing or threatening to cause
physical injury to a person, or property damage, in order to obstruct the administration of
justice, 8 levels was added (an offense level of 22, assuming no criminal history, yields a
sentencing range of 41-51 months). If the offense resulted in a "substantial interference with
the administration of justice," 3 levels were added (an offense level of 17, assuming no
criminal history, yields a sentencing range of 24-30 months). Finally, if the offense (A)
involved the destruction, alteration, or fabrication of a substantial number of records,
documents, or tangible objects; (B) involved the selection of any essential or especially
probative record, document or tangible object, to destroy or alter; or (C) was otherwise
"extensive in scope, planning, or preparation," 2 levels was added (an offense level of 16,
assuming no criminal history, yields a sentencing range of 21-27 months). Assuming all
three of these enhancement were appropriately assessed in a case, a defendant would max
out at offense level 27 which, assuming no criminal history and no other adjustments were
applicable (e.g., for aggravated role, vulnerable victim or the like), meant a sentencing range
of 70-87 months (approximately 6-7 years).
Another important part of the guidelines is a provision that mandates that judges assess
a 3 point adjustment of a defendant's offense level if he obstructed justice during the
investigation, prosecution, or sentencing of the principal offense of conviction, or recklessly
endangered others in fleeing from law enforcement. See id. §§ 3C1.1 (Obstructing or
Impeding the Administration of Justice), 3C1.2 (Reckless Endangerment During Flight).
This means that where a defendant is not convicted of an obstruction related offense, he can
be penalized for obstructive conduct that accompanies his primary crime. If the defendant is
convicted of obstruction offenses and his guidelines are determined under the general
provision applicable to those offenses (§ 2J1.2), discussed above, this obstruction
enhancement of 3 points is not applicable because the conduct has already been considered
in applying that guideline. See id., Application Note 2.
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upon finding by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant's
scheme was actually part of a larger scheme that netted him an additional
(but uncharged) $100,000, would be required to compute the defendant's
sentence based on the total $101,000 loss figure.
30 2
Finally, in many cases, the Guidelines dictate that multiple counts
relating to the same harm be aggregated, thus blunting prosecutors' ability
to multiply a defendant's sentencing by bringing multiple charges. Thus,
for example, the defendant posited above would receive the same sentence
whether the prosecutors chose to charge him with one count specifying a
loss of $1,000, or a series of counts related to the full $101,000. In sum, the
Guidelines did not directly regulate prosecutorial discretion in charging, but
in a variety of ways they sought to ameliorate the effect of prosecutorial
charging choices on the ultimate sentences that defendants received.
To be sure, the sentencing range that the Guidelines yield was (and is)
always constrained by the statutory maximum set by Congress; in this, then,
the charge chosen by prosecutors would have some sway. So, for example,
if a prosecutor chose a charge that carried a five-year maximum but the
Guidelines range was six to seven years, the judge could not impose a
sentence of over five years. But the applicable statutory maximums were
generally sufficiently generous to accommodate the Guidelines range.
Thus, in most cases, it was the Guidelines range that applied at sentencing,
effectively eliminating many of the grading irrationalities and neutralizing
the effect of many of the redundancies in the code. If a prosecutor chose to
charge a five-year count (§ 1505), a ten-year count (§§ 1503, 1512), or a
twenty-year count (§§ 1512(c)), the same calculus applied and the choice
would often carry no sentencing consequences, at least where the
sentencing range yielded by the Guidelines was below the applicable
303
statutory maximum.
One could argue that the combination of prosecutorial discretion in
charging, judicial acquiescence to such prosecutorial charging choices, and
the mandatory Sentencing Guidelines basically rendered criminal statutes
302 See O'SULLIVAN, supra note 11, at 122-36.
303 It should be noted that these provisions were not always effective in constraining
prosecutors' power over sentencing; indeed, many commentators believe that the Guidelines
actually enhanced prosecutorial powers in this respect. Prosecutors sometimes could
continue to manipulate the Sentencing Guidelines calculus by their choice of charge,
especially in cases where the statutory maximum was low or where Congress provided for
statutory minimum sentences or mandatory statutory sentencing add-ons. More importantly,
prosecutors had a virtual monopoly over the information that would be used under the
mandatory sentencing guidelines to arrive at a sentencing range. So, for example, in the
above-posited case, the judge would only find out about the additional loss of $100,000 if
the prosecutor chose to share this information.
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"irrelevant." 30 4 Federal prosecutors could choose from a variety of vague,
overbroad, and redundant statutory provisions in bringing cases; the
condition of the code made it possible to shop for a code section that
maximized the chance of conviction. Where prosecutors had to stretch the
code to fit the case, they could be fairly confident that aggressive theories of
prosecution under such statutes which resulted in a conviction-after a trial
or through guilty plea-would not be challenged by the judiciary. Finally,
at least in cases not involving mandatory maximums, minimums, or add-
ons, the Sentencing Guidelines range, and not in most cases the statute of
conviction, determined the sentence. Only in exceptional cases would the
applicable statutory maximum be relevant to "cap" that sentence; in most
cases it operated only to aggravate the defendant's sentencing exposure,
through mandatory minimums and the like, and thus give prosecutors
additional powers to force pleas. As Professor Standen has argued, in such
an environment, "[s]tatutory definitions of many crimes, including the most
popular ones, do not matter because they seldom provide significant
limitations on charging decisions; instead they appear to serve merely as
vehicles for prosecutors to label conduct and, under the [mandatory]




All this changed with the Supreme Court's 2005 landmark decision in
Booker v. United States.30 6 In Booker, the Supreme Court held that the
Sixth Amendment jury trial right is violated where, under a mandatory
guidelines system, a sentence is increased because of facts found by the
judge that were neither admitted by the defendant nor found by the jury in
arriving at a judgment of conviction.30 7 Thus, for example, it is a violation
of the defendant's jury trial right to have a system that required the judge to
enhance a sentence based on his finding of a $101,000 loss figure when a
jury had only passed on the count charging a loss of $1,000. The Booker
Court noted, however, that where the guidelines are not mandatory, that is,
"when a trial judge exercises his discretion to select a specific sentence
within a defined range, the defendant has no right to a jury determination of
the facts that the judge deems relevant., 30 8 Accordingly, the remedy the
Supreme Court chose was to strike those portions of two statutes that make
the Sentencing Guidelines binding on sentencing judges. After Booker,
courts are required by 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) to "consider" the applicable
Sentencing Guidelines range in sentencing federal defendants, but are
304 See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
305 Id.
306 543 U.S. 220 (2005).
307 Id. at 226-27.
308 Id. at 233.
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permitted to "tailor" the sentence in light of other statutory considerations
embodied in § 3553(a). The Guidelines, then, continue to be relevant but
they are now advisory only.
What does this mean for code reform? First and foremost, it means
that the statutory maximums set by Congress-in all their irrationality and
incoherence-now (again) set the true range for judicial sentencing
discretion. And when statutory maximums create the range for sentencing
purposes, and prosecutors choose the statutory maximums in charging a
given offense, prosecutorial power over defendants' sentencing exposure is
obvious. So, for example, let us assume that prosecutors can choose
between two otherwise equally applicable statutory sections applicable to
obstruction of justice, 18 U.S.C. § 1505, which carries a statutory maximum
of five years, and 18 U.S.C. § 1512(c), which carries a statutory maximum
of twenty years' imprisonment. The Sentencing Guidelines mandate that
these two sections are subject to the same sentencing calculus and the
guidelines range under that calculus very rarely would exceed five years in
cases of non-coercive obstruction. Before Booker, then, prosecutors' choice
of charge would be largely meaningless as far as the sentencing calculus
was concerned and judges' sentencing discretion would also be strictly
limited. After Booker, prosecutors' power to choose between these two
charges has real punch. Prosecutors can threaten a defendant with a twenty-
year count if he does not plead to the five-year count. That threat will have
real force because, although the Sentencing Guidelines are still relevant,
judges now have the discretion to disregard the advisory guidelines range
and sentence up to the full statutory maximum.
By reinvesting prosecutors and judges with the discretion to
significantly affect sentencing results, the potential for differential treatment
of similarly situated defendants increases exponentially. This post-Booker
scheme almost inevitably will reintroduce the unjust sentencing disparities
that plagued pre-Guidelines sentencing. For present purposes, however, the
most important effect of Booker will be to restore the substantive criminal
code to its former importance. The choice of charge will, once again, be
critical to assessments of culpability in the form of sentencing
consequences. Although many commentators criticized the results yielded
by the Sentencing Guidelines, I would assume that all of them would have
to concede that the Guidelines were a vastly more rational scheme than the
existing criminal "code."
Because the irrationalities of the substantive criminal code will once
more be revealed in highly-visible sentencing outcomes, it seems likely that
the code will again receive the type of scrutiny it did prior to the Guidelines
revolution in the 1980's. All of those fine minds who have, for the past few
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decades, focused so productively on sentencing reform should begin to
recognize that, post-Booker, the best chance for just sentencing outcomes
rests on rationalizing the core of criminal justice: the substantive code. Will
this be enough to spur meaningful and comprehensive code reform? I hope
so. It is appropriate to end where I began-by echoing Herbert Wechsler:
I am the last person in the world to say [if the project of producing "a thoughtful
criminal code"] is really feasible.... I will say, without fear of contradiction, that if
any problems call for thinking through, they lie in this area. Penal law suffers from
the lack of that sustained and specialized attention that has nurtured the development
of private law and of those aspects of the public law that regulate the basic economic
interests. Important as it is that trover for a cow should lie as justice, grace and
wisdom indicate, it is the penal law that safeguards our deepest human interests at the
same time that it governs condemnation and disgrace and punishment, with all the
suffering that they entail and their irreparable scars. It is vital, I submit, that we
should bring to bear on the full body of the law of crime whatever knowledge,
statesmanship, morality and effort we are able to command.
30 9
309 Wechsler, A Thoughtful Code, supra note 8, at 525.
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